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Modality and Evidentiality in Political Discourse： 
A Cognitive-functional Account 
 









This thesis has three main objectives. The first is to propose a new theoretical 
framework for analyzing modality in political discourse from a cognitive-functional 
perspective. The second is to explore the types, forms, values and functions of 
modality in English political speeches both quantitatively and qualitatively. The third 
is to identify and demonstrate the categories and functions of evidentiality in political 
discourse, and to discuss its co-occurrence and interaction with modality in the 
persuasion process. 
 
Drawing on some relevant theories and concepts from Cognitive Linguistics, 
including Chilton’s model of discourse space, image schemas of space, Langacker’s 
epistemic model, as well as Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics, this thesis 
establishes an analytical framework for studying three types of modality (epistemic, 
  ii 
deontic and volitional modality) in political discourse from a cognitive-functional 
perspective. The framework illustrates the functions of modality in political discourse 
modelled in dimensions of Space, Time and Evidentiality, which interact through 
deontic distance / epistemic distance / volitional distance, value of modality and 
strength of evidence.  
 
The framework is applied in a discourse analysis of thirty English political speeches 
by three politicians: Tony Blair, Barack Obama, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Analysing 
the data both quantitatively and qualitatively demonstrates how different speakers 
express stance, reflect ideologies and (de)legitimise assertions or actions with 
different forms, values and types of modality in political discourse. In addition, on the 
basis of a new classification of evidentiality with regard to its source and mode of 
knowing, this thesis illustrates the functions of six types of evidentials in political 
discourse. It is suggested that the adoption of different sources of evidentials reveals 
the speakers’ corresponding commitments toward their stance and marks subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity of their stance. Some types of evidentiality reflect the speaker’s 
ideology as they encode presuppositions about authorities, facts or shared knowledge. 
It is also argued that there are five patterns in the co-occurrence of modality and 
evidentiality at the sentential level: Evidentials as SOURCE of Evidence for modal 
stance; epistemic modality as PART of evidentials; a concessive relation; a conditional 
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‘Modality’ is one of the ‘golden oldies’ among 
the basic notions in the semantic analysis of 
language.  
Jan Nuyts (2010:5) 
 
In the field of philosophy, the study of modality can be traced back to the times of 
Aristotle, whose focus was on ‘modal logic1’. Contemporary philosophers have also 
contributed a lot from the perspectives of meaning and value, focusing on topics such 
as ‘epistemic modality’ (e.g. Egan 2007; Willer 2013) and ‘theories of possible worlds’ 
(e.g. Divers 2002; Arregui 2005).  
 
Modality has also triggered the interest of linguists since the pioneering work of Von 
Wright (1951) in philosophy. As far as the field of linguistics is concerned, ‘modality’ 
has been addressed from various perspectives, covering Semantics (e.g. Ehrman 1966; 
Palmer 1979, 1986, 2001; Perkins 1983), Typology (e.g. Narrog 2005, 2012), 
Pragmatics (e.g. Leech 1983; Papafragou 1998, 2000), Systemic Functional 
Linguistics (SFL) (e.g. Halliday 1985; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004), Cognitive 
Linguistics (e.g. Sweetser 1990; Langacker 1991; Talmy 2000a; Chilton 2004; 
Dancygier and Sweetser 1996, 2005) and Corpus Linguistics (e.g. Stubbs 1996; Baker 
2006). However, there is not much work about modality in the field of discourse 
analysis, particularly in Political Discourse Analysis (PDA).  
 
It is widely accepted in the literature that ‘modal items in natural language are 
context-dependent expressions’ (Papafragou 2002:185) and their meanings often arise 
                                                        
1 ‘Modal logic is the area of logic which specifically focuses on reasoning involving the concepts of necessity and 
possibility’ (Portner 2009:10). 
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‘through interpretation in a context of utterance’ (Klinge and Hoeg Muller 2010:1). 
Therefore, there is no point of studying the meaning or function of modality isolated 
from the context of discourse. Besides the function of expressing stance, modality also 
largely contributes to the establishment of speaker’s commitment and authority (Kress 
and Hodge 1979; Fairclough 1995a, 2001), reflects the speaker’s ideology and 
legitimises propositions (cf. Hart 2011; Marín-Arrese 2011a, 2011b) in political 
discourse, however this is not explicit in previous studies and has not been examined 
properly. This is also the main reason why I intend to explore modality in the context 
of political discourse.  
 
Although modality has been approached widely from various perspectives in 
discourse studies, previous studies of modality in political discourse often focus on 
epistemic modality (e.g. Simon-Vandenbergen 1997; Hart 2010; van Dijk 2011) and 
modal verbs (e.g. Chilton 2004; McKenna and Waddell 2007; Wang 2010). As a result, 
other modal types (e.g. deontic modality or volitional modality) and forms (e.g. 
semi-modals or modal adjectives) have been relatively neglected in this area.  
 
Purpose in political discourse is closely related to persuasion (Fotheringham 1966: xi; 
Adrian 2000:35), and other strategic functions such as coercion, resistance, opposition, 
protest, dissimulation, legitimisation and delegitimisation (see Chilton and Schäffner 
1997).  
 
However, there is little work involving modality and evidentiality in studying political 
speeches from the perspective of persuasion, which will be explored in this study. The 
functions of evidentiality and its relationship with modality have also largely been 
ignored in political discourse studies (but see Mushin 2001; Hart 2010, 2011; 







Against this background, this thesis will answer the following research questions, 
aiming to analyse modality and evidentiality in political discourse from the 
perspective of functions with a new systemic analytical framework:  
(1) How can modality be approached from a cognitive-functional perspective? 
(2) What functions does modality perform in political discourse? 
(3) How do different speakers use modality in political discourse? 
(4) How does evidentiality function in political discourse and how does it relate 
to modality? 
 
Research scope  
In this section, I will explain the position I take in this thesis so as to delimit the 
research scope and context.     
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) often involve a multiperspectival and 
transdisciplinary approach to text analysis by combining linguistic analysis and social 
or political themes (Wodak and Meyer 2009; Hart and Cap 2014). The most prevailing 
themes in PDA are ‘Stance’, ‘Ideology’, and ‘Legitimisation’, and the functions of 
modality in political discourse are closely related to these themes. However, the 
boundary among these three terms is not impermeable. As a matter of fact, they are 
not distinct, but rather interrelated with each other. First of all, modality is 
traditionally treated as one way of expressing stance in discourse (e.g. Biber and 
Finegan 1989). The stance taken by speakers reflects their wider worldviews 
(ideologies) consciously or unconsciously. They also form part of legitimations – 
attempts on the part of the speaker to convince the audience of something. Therefore, 
the relation would be that ideology and legitimisation are realised through stance in 
discourse, including modal stance. More precisely, the function of modality in terms 
of expressing stance is explicit, while the functions of modality in terms of presenting 
ideology and legitimising propositions are more or less implicit, and can only be 
inferred from one’s stance in discourse. However, the role of evidentiality relating to 
Introduction 
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these themes has largely been ignored in previous studies, and therefore deserves 
attention in this thesis.    
 
On the one hand, I will engage in a detailed analysis of modal and evidential meanings 
from a linguistic perspective; on the other hand, I will also explore the modal and 
evidential functions from a political perspective, involving ideology, stance, and 
legitimisation.  
 
Therefore, this study will address political discourse from both perspectives: the 
linguistic perspective and the political (social) perspective, thereby avoiding the 
problems of discussing social (political) issues without linguistic evidence or studying 
linguistic meanings without relating to social context (van Dijk 2001:363). 
                                                  
Traditionally, political discourse analysis and other types of discourse analysis adopt 
qualitative research rather than quantitative research. There are several merits of 
qualitative research in discourse analysis. First, there are fewer restrictions for the 
forms or amount of data in terms of qualitative research. Second, qualitative research 
enables us to study the context of the data, which is essential for discourse analysis. 
Third, qualitative research allows us to study a great variety of data in terms of 
disparities.  
 
However, qualitative research necessarily deals with a smaller amount of data 
compared with quantitative research, thus facing the problem of generalizing the 
findings (Brannen 1992). Similarly, quantitative research also has its advantages and 
disadvantages. It can surely benefit a lot from its larger amount of data, which allows 
us to generalize our findings more convincingly (Hammersley 1992). Besides, it is 
possible for us to deal with the data efficiently and systematically in quantitative 
research. Nevertheless, it also has its own weaknesses, such as the neglect of context 




In order to combine the strengths of each approach, I shall adopt a mixed approach to 
conduct my research, with quantitative research facilitating qualitative research (see 
e.g. Bryman 1988, 2004; Brannen 1992, 2005; Koller and Mautner 2004; Hardman 
2008). Here quantitative research refers to the corpus linguistic approach I adopt in 
this study. A corpus linguistic approach will serve as a useful tool to analyze and 
compare the choices of modality and evidentiality among three politicians, which can 
provide empirical evidence for this study (see Section 2.4.1 for details).  
 
Above, I explained the specific perspectives I take to set the stage for this thesis. On 
the one hand, I will study modality in political discourse both from a linguistic 
perspective and a political perspective. On the other hand, this study will adopt a 
research approach combining qualitative research and quantitative research.  
 
Thesis structure 
The thesis is organized into seven chapters, excluding the introduction and concluding 
remarks. Chapter One presents a literature review on modality and evidentiality in 
PDA. The chapter starts with a general introduction to two concepts (modality and 
evidentiality), highlighting semantic (typological) versus more pragmatic perspectives. 
It also discusses the relation between modality and evidentiality. It then defines 
political discourse before discussing political speeches as a genre with reference to its 
purpose and main features. After that, it reviews the literature on modality and 
evidentiality in political discourse by focusing on their relations with stance, ideology, 
and legitimisation. It then introduces the frameworks for studying modality and 
evidentiality in political discourse, including Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) & 
Appraisal Theory, and Cognitive Linguistics. Finally, it critiques previous studies and 
proposes the way forward for the study of modality in this thesis, laying a solid 
foundation for the thesis.  
 
Chapter Two answers the first research question: how modality can be approached 
from a cognitive-functional perspective. First of all, drawing on theories or concepts 
Introduction 
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from Cognitive Linguistics and SFL, I propose a cognitive-functional framework for 
studying the functions of three modal types in political discourse from the dimensions 
of space, time and evidentiality. I also elaborate the key concepts in the framework, 
such as epistemic / deontic / volitional distance, value of modality and strength of 
evidence. In particular, I discuss the functions of modality in political discourse with 
regards to stance-taking, ideology, and legitimisation. Second, I introduce the research 
data for this thesis concerning the criteria of collecting data and their backgrounds. 
Lastly, I illustrate the method of data analysis for this thesis from both quantitative 
and qualitative perspectives. From the perspective of quantitative analysis, I 
demonstrate how to identify, annotate and analyze modality and evidentiality by 
adopting a corpus linguistic approach. In particular, this part defines and classifies 
modality and evidentiality by taking a data-driven approach. Modality is classified 
into four main categories: Epistemic Modality, Deontic Modality, Volitional Modality 
and Dynamic Modality. Evidentiality is classified into six categories based on source 
of information and mode of knowing. From the perspective of qualitative analysis, I 
explain the procedures of exploring the functions of modality and evidentiality within 
the research framework.  
 
Chapters Three to Five are the answers to the second and third research questions: 
what functions modality performs in political discourse and how different speakers 
use modality in political discourse. Each chapter focuses on one type of modality 
respectively, namely epistemic modality, deontic modality and volitional modality. All 
three chapters take both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. The quantitative 
sections deal with the comparison of three political speakers in the use of different 
modal markers from the perspectives of forms, values and top-ten modal markers, 
followed by discussions and implications of the results. On the other hand, the 
qualitative sections involve the functions of specific type of modality in terms of 
stance, ideology and (de)legitimisation by applying the research framework proposed 
in Chapter Two, illustrated by a number of annotated examples from the three cases in 




Although these three chapters share similar structures and approaches, their results are 
distinctive from various perspectives. First, with regard to quantitative analysis, three 
political speakers present quite different patterns in adopting different types of 
modality in terms of forms, values and modal markers. Second, three types of 
modality express three different kinds of stance, including knowledge-based stance,   
value-based stance, and emotion-based stance. Last but not least, the modal markers in 
terms of three different values (distance) are certainly of different forms and functions 
in the context. Despite the differences mentioned above, these three chapters also 
demonstrate some common features for three types of modality both quantitatively 
and qualitatively.  
 
Chapters Six and Seven are the answers to the last research question: how 
evidentiality functions in political discourse and how it relates to modality. Chapter 
Six starts with the quantitative analysis of evidentiality with regards to its forms, types 
and top-ten markers among the three cases, followed by discussions and implications 
of its results. After that, it discusses the functions of evidentiality in political discourse 
with regard to making commitments, marking (inter)subjectivity and encoding 
ideology. Lastly, I demonstrate the functions of six types of evidential markers in the 
context of political discourse. Chapter Seven discusses the co-occurrence of modality 
and evidentiality in political discourse quantitatively and qualitatively, focusing on 
their relations during the process of persuasion. The chapter first investigates the 
distributions and comparisons of the co-occurrence of different types of modals and 
evidentials among the three cases. It then examines the examples of the co-occurrence 
between modality and evidentiality in the context from various perspectives and 
discusses their interaction patterns at both sentential and discourse levels.  
 
In short, this thesis proposes a cognitive-functional analytical framework for exploring 
the functions of modality and evidentiality in English political discourse, from both 
quantitative and qualitative perspectives.  
  









In this chapter, I will review the literature on modality and evidentiality in PDA. I will 
first review previous studies about modality and evidentiality in terms of definition, 
typology, and perspectives in both semantics and pragmatics. Then I will discuss the 
relationship between modality and evidentiality in previous literature. After that, I will 
review the literature about modality and evidentiality in political discourse by 
discussing the definition of political discourse, political speeches as a genre, as well as 
the role of modality and evidentiality in political discourse. In particular, I will discuss 
some important frameworks for studying modality and evidentiality in political 
discourse from the perspectives of SFL & Appraisal Theory and Cognitive Linguistics. 
Finally, I will critique the issues concerning modality in previous studies and propose 
possible solutions to them.  
 
1.2 What are Modality and Evidentiality? 
Modality and evidentiality are two interrelated concepts which have attracted much 
attention in previous linguistic studies, particularly for the relations between them. In 
what follows, I will first provide an overview of these two concepts, followed by a 




The notion of modality in semantics is not as easily defined as tense or aspect (Bybee 
et.al. 1994:176), but has been given many diverging definitions. It can be defined in 
different ways either in a narrow sense or in a broad sense. According to Narrog, there 
are three main different ways of defining modality in linguistic studies (for details, see 
Narrog 2005): 
(1) modality as the expression of the attitude of the speaker, or the expression of 
subjectivity and the speaker’s opinions and emotions (e.g. Lyons 1968, 1977; 
Palmer 1986; Bybee et al. 1994; Nitta 1989, 2000 for Japanese), (2) modality as 
something including all linguistic expression outside the proposition (e.g. Fillmore 
1968; Gerstenkorn 1976), and (3) modality as the expression of realis vs. irrealis or 
factuality distinctions (e.g. Givón 1995; Palmer 1998, 2001; Dietrich 1992 for 
German; Narrog 2002; Nomura 2003 for Japanese).      (Narrog 2005:168) 
                                                 
The first way of defining modality is the most popular and practical one for its 
briefness, though modality has more functions than expressing one’s attitude or 
emotions, especially in political discourse. The second one is too broad to be useful in 
practice, for one can hardly draw a line between modality and proposition. I agree 
with the opinion that the third one seems more plausible in demarcating the category 
of modality (Narrog 2005:182), but it is rather narrow in its meaning for two reasons. 
On the one hand, this approach excludes the role of the speaker in choosing the 
expressions of modality. For example, Halliday observes that modality often involves 
the speaker’s evaluation of the probabilities or the obligations of his proposition 
(1985:75). On the other hand, modality is not only about factuality and non-factuality, 
but it is also concerned with the concepts of ‘probability, necessity, possibility and the 
related notions of permission, obligation and volition’ (see Hoye 1997:149-150; 
Barbiers 2002:1).  
 
Political discourse analysts often associate modality with power, authority, attitude 
and commitment, thereby defining modality differently from those in semantic studies. 
Fairclough, for example, holds the view that modality expresses the degree of 
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commitment or obligation of the speaker / the writer (1995a:162). Kress and Hodge 
(1979:122), on the other hand, argue that modality often reflects the level of authority 
with regard to an utterance. Similar to Kress and Hodge’s opinion, Fairclough 
(2001:105) also associates modality with speaker or writer authority, which encodes 
‘relational and expressive values in grammar’. These definitions of modality in PDA 
focus on its pragmatic functions rather than its semantic meaning, when in fact the 
two complement each other. It would therefore be better if we can take both semantic 
meanings and pragmatic functions into consideration when defining modality.   
 
The typology of modality has also been the subject of diverse investigations in 
semantic studies (see e.g. von Wright 1951; Palmer 1979, 1986, 2001; Perkins 1983;  
Halliday 1994, 2004; Portner 2009; Nuyts 2010; Narrog 2012). There is a variety of 
approaches concerning the classification of modality. An important traditional way of 
classifying varieties of modality is into the categories of epistemic and deontic (cf. 
Portner 2009:2). Epistemic modality is concerned with knowledge, while deontic 
modality involves moral evaluations concerning right and wrong based on certain 
rules (Portner 2009:2). For example, ‘must’ is epistemic in the example “Tom must be 
in his office”, while it is deontic in the example “Tom must pay his bills”. However, 
this classification excludes some modal meanings, such as volitions, intentions and 
capabilities. 
 
Another traditional version is that modality comprises three basic semantic 
dimensions: dynamic, deontic and epistemic (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 52; Nuyts 
2005:2). Dynamic modality, sometimes also called facultative modality or inherent 
modality, is traditionally featured as ‘an ascription of a capacity to the 
subject-participant of the clause’ (Nuyts 2005:7), such as ‘can’ in “The boy can swim 
like a fish.” or ‘be able to’ in “She is able to speak four languages”. Deontic modality 
is traditionally defined with the concepts of permission and obligation (see Palmer 
1986: 96-7), such as ‘should’ in “We should exercise more in order to keep fit”, or 
‘may’ in “You may leave now”. Epistemic modality typically expresses ‘the degree of 
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probability of the state of affairs’ (Nuyts 2005:10), as indicated by ‘will’ in “Someone 
is knocking at the door. That will be John.” or the modal adverb ‘maybe’ in “This 
manuscript is damned hard to read. Maybe some more light can help.”  
 
However, the modal meanings such as intention and willingness (alternatively often 
referred to as dynamic modality) (cf. Papafragou 2002:186), are actually not 
compatible with the category of dynamic modality, because they often express the 
emotions (such as intentions or determination) of the subjects rather than their 
capabilities or abilities.   
 
The third prevailing version is the distinction between root and epistemic modality 
(Papafragou 2002). Root modality is often treated as a cover term for deontic and 
dynamic modality (see Hofmann 1976; Coates 1983; Papafragou 2002).  
 
Indeed, there are several other prevailing classifications of modality in the field of 
semantics (e.g. Palmer 2001; Halliday 1985, 2004; Portner 2009; Nuyts 2010; Narrog 
2012), as shown in Table 1.1.  















Table 1.1 Classifications of modality in the field of semantics 
 
      Classification of 
modality 
References 
     
 Categories & Sub-categories of modality  
1. von Wright’s mode 
(1951:1-2) 
alethic epistemic deontic existential 
2. Traditional mode (cf. 
Papafragou 2002:186) 
epistemic root 
3. Traditional mode (cf. 
Nuyts 2005:2) 
epistemic deontic dynamic 
4. Traditional mode (cf. 
Portner 2009:2) 
epistemic deontic 
5. Palmer’s mode 
(2001:24, 70) 
Propositional Modality Event Modality 
epistemic evidential deontic dynamic 
6. Halliday’s mode 
(2004:147) 
Modalization Modulation 
probability usuality obligation inclination 
7. Portner’s mode 
(2009:2-3) 




epistemic priority dynamic 





9. Narrog’s mode (2012) Volitional Non-volitional 
Speech act- oriented Event- oriented 
 
For example, von Wright, a pioneer in his work on modal logic (1951:1-2), proposes 
four modes of modality: the alethic modes or modes of truth; the epistemic modes or 
modes of knowing; the deontic modes or modes of obligation; the existential modes or 
modes of existence. According to von Wright, ‘the study of modality is relevant to the 
study of logical proof and hence also to the foundations of mathematics’ (1951:7). In 
Chapter One 
 13 
his mind, these modes of modalities are all related to truth-concepts. 
 
Although von Wright’s (1951) approach of modality is more suitable for philosophers 
and logicians, the terms he proposed such as ‘epistemic’ and ‘deontic’ are widely used 
by linguists (Palmer 2001:8). Following von Wright, previous studies in linguistics 
often take one of the three traditional modes of classifying modality for practical 
purposes, as shown in Table 1.1 (No.2-4). However, these three classifications are 
unfortunate because they either group totally different modal meanings in the same 
category such as ‘root’ or ‘dynamic’ modality, or miss some essential meanings such 
as in the classification of ‘epistemic’ and ‘deontic’ modality (cf. Papafragou 2002:186; 
Nuyts 2005:2; Portner 2009:2).  
 
Palmer proposes to ‘take into account both form and meaning’ in dealing with 
modality, as he realizes the value of both ‘semantic basis’ to modality and its ‘formal 
features’ in his later work (Palmer 1979:2). However, in his early works, his main 
emphasis was ‘on the detailed and systematic subdivisions of modal auxiliary verbs 
based on formal criteria’ (Badran 2002:81).  
 
In his latest account of modality (Palmer 2001), however, Palmer adopts semantic 
criteria in classifying modality into ‘propositional modality’ and ‘event modality’. 
According to this classification (shown in Table 1.1), epistemic modality and 
evidential modality are two main types of propositional modality, which both are 
concerned with ‘the speaker’s attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the 
proposition’ (Palmer 2001:24). Palmer claims that epistemic modality and evidential 
modality are different in the way they influence ‘the factual status of the proposition’: 
the former makes judgments about it, whereas the latter provides the evidence for it 
(2001:24). Deontic modality and dynamic modality are the two main types of ‘event 
modality’, which both refer to ‘events that are not actualized, events that have not 
taken place but are merely potential’ (Palmer 2001:70). According to Palmer, the basic 
distinction between deontic modality and dynamic modality is ‘the status of the 
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conditioning factors’ to the person indicated as the subject. In terms of deontic 
modality, they are external when the person is permitted, ordered, etc., to act, while 
with dynamic modality, they are internal when the person is able, willing, etc., to act 
(2001:70). 
 
Compared with his former approaches (Palmer 1979, 1986), this classification of 
modality (Palmer 2001) is more inclusive and useful in practice. His discussion of the 
interactions between modality and mood, tense, negation shows useful insights for the 
study of modality. However, epistemic modality, a sub-category of propositional 
modality in Palmer’s classification, can also refer to events that are not actualized or 
potential (the same as event modality proposed by Palmer). Furthermore, Palmer 
treats evidentials as evidential modality under the category of propositional modality, 
which is quite controversial in this field (see the discussion of the relations of 
modality and evidentiality in this section).  
 
Halliday (1994) classifies modality into two main categories: modalization in 
propositions (including probability and usuality) and modulation in proposals 
(including obligation and inclination), as shown in Table 1.1. As his theory of 
modality will be part of my research framework, I will deal with it in great detail in 
section 1.4.1.  
 
Portner (2009:1) classifies modality into three types in a broad sense: sentential 
modality, sub-sentential modality and discourse modality, as shown in Tables 1.1 and 
1.2. For Portner (2009:2-3), sentential modality is ‘the expression of modal meaning 
at the level of the whole sentence’, and sub-sentential modality is any modal 
expressions within constituents smaller than a full clause, for example within the 
predicate (e.g., by verbs) or modifying a noun phrase (e.g., by adjectives), while 





Table 1.2 Portner’s categories of modality 
 
Main Categories of Modality                   Sub-categories of modality  
        
Sentential Modality 
Modal auxiliaries; Modal verbs; Modal adverbs; Generics, 
Habituals, and Individual-level predicates; Tense and aspect; 
Conditionals; Covert modality 
     
   Sub-sentential Modality 
Modal adjectives and nouns; Propositional attitude verbs and 
adjectives; Verbal mood, in particular the indicative and 
subjunctive; Inﬁnitives; Dependent modals; Negative polarity 
items 
    Discourse Modality Evidentiality; Clause types; Performativity of sentential modals; 
Modality in discourse semantics 
  
Although Portner proposes a super-category of modality, illustrated in Table 1.2, he 
only discusses the three primary semantic categories of sentential modality: epistemic, 
priority
2
 (include the deontic, bouletic, and teleological modals), and dynamic 
(include volitional and quantiﬁcational modals), which he refers to as ‘theories of 
sentential modality’ (for details, see Portner 2009). 
 
Portner’s approach to modality is rather inclusive and it provides some useful 
implications for the classification of modality in this research, especially the concept 
of volitional modality. However, his theories of sentential modality are still not clear 
as to the relations between different modal expressions in sentential modality and their 
semantic meanings. He seems to be more interested in explaining his semantic 
theories of modality from the perspective of modal logic than from a common 
linguistic perspective (see Portner 2009). 
 
Gabrielatos (2010) classifies modality into three categories: (1) Likelihood (What I 
                                                        
2 For Portner, the idea behind the term ‘priority’ is that ‘such things as rules, desires, and goals all serve to identify 
some possibility as better than, or as having higher priority than, others. Priority modals have a circumstantial 
modal base and fairly easy-to-perceive ordering sources which provide the priority ranking’ (2009:135). 
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think the state of affairs is/was/will be); (2) Desirability (What I want the state of 
affairs to be/have been); (3) Propensity (What inherent properties I see in 
entities/situations). The category of Likelihood is similar to epistemic modality, which 
includes the modal meanings such as actuality, factuality, truth, knowledge, belief, 
possibility and probability. The category of Desirability subsumes directed modal 
meanings (obligation, permission, promise) and non-directed modal meanings 
(volition, intention, willingness, desire, need, hope, wish). The category of Propensity 
includes the modal meanings such as ability, capability, potentiality, aptitude, and 
feasibility. Overall Gabrielatos’ classification would be appropriate if it did not put 
deontic modal meanings (obligation, permission) under the category of Desirability. 
That is because deontic modality often indicates the modal judgements based on 
external values such as obligations or responsibilities, which is totally different from 
Desirability (often related to the speaker’s / the subject’s emotions).     
 
Taking a cross-linguistic perspective, Narrog (2012) proposes a two-dimensional 
classification: (1) Volitive Modality and Non-volitive Modality; (2) Speech act- 
oriented Modality and Event- oriented Modality. He also classifies modality into nine 
categories: Epistemic Modality; Deontic Modality; Teleological Modality; Preferential 
Modality; Boulomaic Modality; Participant-internal Modality; Circumstantial 
Modality; Existential Modality; Evidential Modality (Narrog 2012:8). Narrog’s 
classification provides much evidence for this research, particularly for the concepts 
of volitive modality and speech act-oriented modality. However, the criteria of his 
classification of nine categories of modality are a mixture, integrating semantic 
categories (such as epistemic modality and deontic modality) with functional 
categories (such as Teleological Modality and Circumstantial Modality, Evidential 
Modality). When examining the examples of these categories, one will find some 
overlapping meanings among them. For instance, the modal ‘can’ in the example ‘If 
you take the short cut through the valley, you can be there at least ten minutes earlier.’ 
for ‘Teleological Modality’ is similar to ‘Epistemic Modality’ and the example for 
‘Preferential Modality’ as in ‘(In order to stay in shape) You should exercise at least 
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20 minutes a day.’ can also be interpreted as ‘Deontic Modality’ (see Narrog 
2012:8-10). 
 
In sum, there has been no consensus as to the classification of modality in semantic 
studies. However, previous studies show that the categories like epistemic modality 
and deontic modality are non-controversial, while the notions such as root modality, 
dynamic modality, and evidential modality are still under debate.  
 
In terms of typology, most researchers in PDA often adopt the traditional modes, as 
shown in Table 1.1. For example, one of the traditional modes - there are two main 
aspects of modality: ‘one is to do with truth’ (viz. epistemic modality) ‘the other with 
obligation’ (viz. deontic modality) (Portner 2009:2) is very popular in political 
discourse (e.g. Fairclough 1995a, 2003; Chilton 2004). However, this classification 
neglects many modal meanings other than ‘truth’ and ‘obligation’, such as 
‘willingness’ or ‘capability’, which also play important roles in political discourse in 
terms of persuasion.  
 
Fairclough (2001), however, also classifies modality into relational modality and 
expressive modality, depending on ‘what direction authority is oriented in’. Relational 
modality here refers to the authority of one participant in relation to others, and 
expressive modality refers to the speaker or writer’s authority with respect to the truth 
or probability of a representation of reality (Fairclough 2001:105). Fairclough’s 
classification of modality would be more reasonable if modality were only related to 
authority in political discourse. But he is right in this view that modality is not 
restricted to its interpersonal meaning but is also concerned with the representation of 
reality.   
 
Fowler (1991), on the other hand, distinguishes four types of modality from the 
perspective of making comments, which are to do with (a) truth, (b) obligation, (c) 
permission, and (d) desirability. Though Fowler’s classification is more inclusive and 
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useful in discourse analysis, it also neglects some modal meanings such as capability 
and intentionality.   
 
Aiming to group the similar modal meanings into proper categories in political 
discourse and investigate their functions more thoroughly, modality in this study is 
classified into four types: Deontic Modality, Epistemic modality, Dynamic Modality 
and Volitional Modality. The redefining and reclassifying of modality will be 
discussed in detail in Section 2.4.1. 
 
Like Modality, evidentiality has also been studied widely both in semantics (e.g.De 
Haan 1999; Palmer 2001; DeLancey 2001; Aikhenvald 2004; Boye & Harder 2009) 
and discourse studies (e.g. Mushin 2001, 2013; Bednarek 2006a; Hart 2010, 2011; 
Marín-Arrese 2006, 2011a, 2011b) since Boas (1938) first introduces this term to 
linguistics. It is usually defined in terms of ‘sources of information’ (e.g. Jakobson 
1957; Chafe 1986; Willett 1988; Nuyts 2010). It can also be defined as a 
functional-conceptual domain indicating the author’s cognitive and/or communicative 
justification for a judgement (Boye and Harder 2009). Based on corpus analysis, 
Stubbs claims that evidentiality reflects the way how the speakers encode evidence for 
justifying a factual claim (1996:200). Portner notes that evidentiality involves ‘the 
speaker’s assessment’ of the evidence which supports her assertion (2009:263). Hart 
suggests that ‘[E]videntiality marks the basis of the speaker’s knowledge concerning 
the state of affairs reported in the assertion’ and ‘evidentials indicate how the speaker 
has come to know what they are claiming’ (2011:758). In this sense, evidentiality can 
be a useful tool for the investigation of speaker’s cognitive/conceptualization process 
of communication, such as persuasion or manipulation (Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 
2014).  
 
All the above definitions define evidentiality in terms of its sources or functions. It is, 
however, also necessary to consider evidentiality under the lens of quality or validity, 
which is more important in political discourse studies. I will therefore redefine 
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evidentiality in the next chapter (see Section 2.4.1 in Chapter Two), taking both 
source and quality (strength) of evidence into account.  
 
Evidentiality has also been the subject of typological research (Hart 2011:758), which 
has been conducted comprehensively and diversely both in semantics and discourse 
studies. 
 
Traditionally, evidentiality is differentiated between ‘direct evidence’ and ‘indirect 
evidence’ (Willett 1988:57; also see Palmer 2001:56). Based on Willett’s proposal, 
Hart makes some adaption to it, as shown in Figure 1.1 (reproduced from Figure 2 in 
Hart 2011:758).  
 
Figure 1.1 The semantic domain of evidentiality 
 
Similarly, Whitt holds the view that perception is the most direct evidence since it can 
be attested from the speaker’s first-hand experience (2010:8). Visual and auditory 
perceptions are often regarded as the most salient direct evidence, while other 
perceptions such as touch, taste, and smell are used much less as evidence (Palmer 
2001:43). Hearsay, on the other hand, can be seen as the most typical form of indirect 
evidence (Whitt 2010:9).  
 
Types of  
Evidence 
 
















Base on the distinction of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ evidence, Plungian (2001:352) makes 
a distinction between direct evidence, reflected evidence and mediated evidence 
according to the parameter ‘forms of access to the information’.  
 
Chafe (1986:263), who takes a broader view of evidentiality, categories evidentiality 
in English conversation and academic writing from three aspects: source of 
knowledge; mode of knowing; knowledge matched against verbal resources or 
expectations. Although Chafe’s work gives us many inspirations due to its 
inclusiveness (includes a great variety of evidential markers), its classification of 
English evidentiality is not satisfactory for several reasons. The major problem is the 
confusion of its subcategories. In particular, the categories of ‘source of knowledge’ 
and ‘mode of knowing’ are overlapping in this framework. For example, both ‘belief’ 
and ‘hearsay’ (in the category of mode of knowing in Chafe’s work) also indicate the 
evidence coming from indirect sources, as shown in Figure 1.1. On the other hand, the 
expressions in the category of ‘knowledge matched against verbal resources or 
expectations’ can also be treated as indirect sources of knowledge as it often indicates 
the evidence inferred from unspecific sources (e.g. ‘in fact’ implies that there is 
evidence from common knowledge to support the following information as a fact.). 
Another main problem is that Chafe’s model of evidentiality is ‘purely knowledge 
based and does not take into account the multitude of rhetorical reasons people have 
for making use of this semantic area’ (Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007:28).  
 
Grammatical evidentiality and lexical evidentiality have also been distinguished and 
discussed in previous studies (see Lazard 2001; Aikhenvald 2003; Squartini 2008). 
For example, some languages have a system of grammatical evidentiality to mark the 
information source such as Tariana, an Arawak language spoken in the multilingual 
area of the Vaupés in northwest Amazonia (Aikhenvald 2004:1). Aikhenvald 
(2007:211) summarises the recurrent terms of semantic parameters employed in the 
languages with grammatical evidentiality: 
I. VISUAL covers evidence acquired through seeing. 
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II. SENSORY covers evidence through hearing, and is typically extended to smell 
and taste, and sometimes also touch. 
III. INFERENCE based on visible or tangible evidence or result. 
IV. ASSUMPTION based on evidence other than visible results: this may include 
logical reasoning, assumption or simply general knowledge. 
VI. REPORTED, for reported information with no reference to who it was 
reported by. 
VII. QUOTATIVE, for reported information with an overt reference to the quoted 
source. 
 
Aikhenvald (2003: 2, 18–20) also proposes the term ‘evidentiality strategies’ to cover 
‘a range of meanings characteristic of reported and non-firsthand evidentials: they 
combine reference to inference and to verbal report’ (Aikhenvald 2007: 213). The 
term of ‘evidentiality strategies’ is useful in describing those extended evidential 
meanings which are outside the traditional domain of evidentials (Squartini 2008: 
917), even though Aikhenvald uses it to refer to extended grammatical evidentiality 
such as perfects, resultatives, passives, nominalizations and reported speech (ibid.).  
 
In discourse studies, evidentiality is often categorised by its functions or reliability. 
For example, from the perspective of epistemological positioning, Bednarek (2006a) 
identifies four specified bases of knowledge used as evidence in British newspaper 
reportage: PERCEPTION, PROOF, OBVIOUSNESS and PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. 
However, ‘there is clear semantic overlap between the categories ‘perception’, ‘proof’ 
and ‘obviousness’, which all invoke forms of experiential access to the evidence’ 
(Marín-Arrese 2011b:792) .  
  
Marín-Arrese (2011b) classifies evidentials into personal evidentiality and mediated 
evidentiality, evaluating their validity or reliability in terms of epistemic stance. 
Within the domain of personal evidentiality, Marín-Arrese (2011b:792) helds that 
validity involves a set of variables:  
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i) whether the form of access to the information is portrayed as direct (I saw P) or 
indirect (It seems P);  
ii) whether the mode of access to the evidence invokes experiential (I saw P), 
cognitive (I know P) or communicative events (I say to you P); to this must be 
added the gradability value of the expression within each mode of access 
(Clearly > Apparently) (Know > Believe), (Categorically state > Would 
suggest); 
iii) whether the evidential expression indexes subjective (I think P) or 
intersubjective (We all know P) positioning, and the extent to which the 
conceptualizer is explicitly invoked (I assume P, We infer P) or implicitly 
evoked (may P, It seems P, obviously P). 
 
Her distinction of personal evidentiality and mediated evidentiality as well as the 
variables of assigning validity are quite convincing, though she treats evidentiality as 
part of epistemic stance which is different from my point of view in this thesis.  
 
Drawing on Chafe’s work (1986), Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza (2014:392) adapt the 
categories of English evidentiality and study their pragmatic functions in political 
debates during US campaigns, as illustrated in Table 1.3 (reproduced from Table 2 in 
Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014:392). Their work is inspiring for this study due to the 
fact that they treat evidentials as a tool of manipulation in political discourse. 
However, their framework of English evidentiality is not consistent and systematic 










Table 1.3 Lexical indices of evidential markers in English  
 
 
The most insightful example is from Hart’s work (2011), who classifies evidentiality 
in terms of reliability and the degree of subjectivity, as shown in Figure 1.2 (cited 
from Hart 2011:760). However, he treats epistemic modals as part of evidentiality, 
which is different from the position I take in this thesis.  
     
Figure 1.2 The reliability of evidence and degree of subjectivity  
 
In sum, the classification of evidentiality in the previous studies often involves source 
of evidence (knowledge) (e.g. Frawley 1992: 413), or mode of knowing (e.g. Willett 
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1988), or its validity (e.g. Marín-Arrese 2011b), but their interplay has been relatively 
neglected in most classifications (Botne 1997: 523-524; also see Squartini 2008: 918). 
It is therefore necessary to make a distinction between the source of evidence and the 
mode of knowing so as to account for the system of lexical evidentiality (Squartini 
2008: 917). It would contribute to a better understanding of the domain if we integrate 
both the source of evidence and mode of knowing as well as the validity of knowledge 
into the classification of evidentiality.  
 
This study will take a relative broad view of evidentiality, which is not only concerned 
with ‘evidence for making factual claims’ (Anderson 1986:273), but also involves 
truth, certainty, doubt, reliability, authority, confidence, personal experience, validity, 
inference, reporting factual and imaginative stance, confirmation, surprise, and 
expectedness (Bednarek 2006a:637; also see Chafe and Nichols1986; Stubbs 1996; 
Mushin 2001). Based on important previous studies (Chafe 1986; Willett 1988; 
Plungian 2001; Bednarek 2006a; Hart 2011; Marín-Arrese 2011b, 2013), I will 
reclassify evidentiality according to its source and modes of knowing in Chapter Two 
(see Section 2.4.1 in Chapter Two). 
 
One of the various issues remaining unresolved about modality is its relationship to 
evidentiality, particularly for the criteria of distinguishing modal and evidential 
meanings (Marín-Arrese 2011b:790).  
 
There are mainly four different views towards this relationship. One view is that 
evidentiality is a sub-category of modality or epistemic modality. For example, Palmer 
places evidential modality and epistemic modality under propositional modality 
(2001:8). McCready and Ogata, also, argues that evidentials are best analysed as ‘a 
special kind of epistemic modal’ by showing ‘some expressions indicating source of 
evidence are part of propositional content’ (2007:147).  
 
By contrast, Chafe (1986:264-6) includes words that indicate the ‘degree of liability’ 
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of a proposition in his discussion of evidentiality in English academic discourse.  
 
However, some researchers also note the meanings in modality and evidentiality are 
often overlapping as they are inherently connected (Whitt 2010; also see Anderson 
1986). This is especially the case regarding inferentials (Whitt 2010:13). Anderson 
(1986: 308-11), for another example, shows that these two domains ‘are connected in 
the mental domain’, and often share ‘common historical sources’.  
 
While the more widespread view is that evidentiality is distinct from epistemic 
modality and ought to be considered a (grammatical) category in its own right, and not 
a mere subcategory of some type of modality (Aikhenvald 2004:7-8). The point of 
evidentiality, Aikhenvald claims, is not to indicate some sort of ‘morality’ (deontic 
modality) or ‘truth’ (epistemic modality), but rather ‘accuracy’, i.e. to indicate the 
source of information one has for asserting a proposition (2004:344). Similarly, De 
Haan argues that epistemic modality evaluates the speaker’s confidence on the 
evidence which is in support of his utterance (1999:85).  
 
Nuyts holds a similar view, i.e. evidential expressions and modal expressions are 
basically independent from each other when involved in the same constructions and in 
most cases modality is expressed ‘without indication of evidentiality’ (1992:83-4). 
Nuyts also argues that evidentiality is at a higher level than modality (1992:91). In 
line with this position, Hart (2010:172) points out: 
the distinction between them can be captured where epistemic modality expresses 
an evaluation pertaining to the truth or probability of a proposition and 
evidentiality concerns the basis upon which that evaluation is made.  
 
I agree with the last point of view that modality and evidentiality differ in essence, 
because the former is concerned with the speaker’s/writer’s evaluation towards a 
proposition, while the latter emphasizes the source and quality of the evidence. 
However, they share the common ground that both of them deal with attitudinal 
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evidence, contributing to truth conditions. They are like two sides of the same coin as 
they are distinct yet closely interrelated in semantic meanings and pragmatic functions. 
In this research, evidentiality is treated as a distinct notion, but it works together with 
modality, serving as an indispensable part in (de)legitimizing political actions or 
proposals.  
 
Besides, the interaction between evidentiality and modality has also been discussed a 
lot from the perspective of subjectivity, intersubjectivity or objectivity. In this study, 
drawing on previous studies (e.g. Nuyts 1992, 2001b; Marín-Arrese 2011a; Hart 2011), 
the source and strength of evidentiality will serve as important criteria in evaluating 
the subjectivity, inter-subjectivity and objectivity of modality (See Section 6.3.1.2 for 
details). 
 
In sum, there are still several unsolved issues in the field of modality and evidentiality. 
Firstly, the previous classifications for modality and evidentiality are not satisfactory 
enough so as to be accepted unanimously. Secondly, the relations between modality 
and evidentiality still remain unclear, especially when it comes to their co-occurrences 
or interactions in the context. Thirdly, the criteria for differentiating the subjectivity, 
intersubjectivity or objectivity of modality are still under debate. To figure out these 
problems becomes one of the main tasks of this thesis.  
     
1.3 Modality and Evidentiality in Political Discourse 
 
1.3.1 What is Political Discourse? 
Aristotle’s (1991) famous definition - ‘Man is by nature a political animal’ provides 
evidence that the study of politics has a long tradition. But since then, the question of 
“what is political language (discourse)?” has remained a problem.  
 
There are mainly three different views towards this issue. The first and most common 
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view is that political discourse is discourse produced by politicians (van Dijk 
1997a:12). For example, Wilson (1990), who takes a linguistic pragmatics view, 
claims that the terms ‘political discourse’ or ‘political language’ should be narrowed 
down to (what politicians actually say). He also criticizes Geis (1987) for studying 
political journalism only, because ‘what politicians say and what journalists say they 
say is not the same thing’ (Wilson 1990:16). This is true because political journalism 
is more or less embedded in the stance of journalists, since they look at the same 
political event or politician from diverse perspectives. It is therefore seen as 
commentary and secondary.  
 
Political discourse can also be defined as ‘purposeful communication about politics’ 
(Gee 1999:27). Like Graber (1981) and McNair (1995), Gee argues that political 
discourse should not be restricted to ‘verbal or written statements’ (ibid.). From his 
point of view, all the elements in political communication may involve the 
construction of ‘a political image or identity’ (ibid.).  
 
Another crucial view is that what counts as political discourse is mainly decided by its 
political contexts and purposes. Chilton and Schäffner (2002:4), for example, believe 
that ‘politics varies according to one’s situation and purposes – a political answer in 
itself.’ Similarly, van Dijk (1997a:12) proposes that the definition of political 
discourse is actually decided by context.  
 
From the above debates, we can see that the definition of political discourse is quite 
controversial and it is hard to reach a consensus. However, when taking political 
participants, context, and purpose into account, we find that speeches of politicians are 
clear examples of political discourse, which is the main reason why I choose this 
genre as my research data in this thesis.  
 
After delimiting the scope of political discourse for this research, I will move on to 




In a discourse activity, the notion of genre often involves its social purpose and 
context (Eggins and Martin 1997:236; Marín-Arrese 2011a:198). For example, 
according to Martin and Rose (2003:7), genre refers to ‘different types of texts that 
enact various types of social contexts’, making it ‘a staged, goal-oriented social 
process’. From a functional linguistic perspective, Martin and Rose (2008) argue that 
genre is realized by configurations of register, which is realized by configurations of 
meaning in language. According to Martin and Rose, register refers to the context of 
situation of a text, which consists of the tenor, field and mode of a situation (2008:11).  
 
Similarly, Biber and Conrad (2009:253) claim that ‘studying registers and genres’ is 
an attempt to ‘explain the patterns of linguistic variation’ from the perspective of ‘the 
situational context and communicative purpose’. In this sense, when treated as a genre, 
political speeches have their unique political purposes and patterns of linguistic 
variation in political contexts.  
 
Indeed, as discussed in the chapter of Introduction, the main purpose of political 
speeches is persuasion (Chilton and Schäffner 1997). For example, drawing on Swales’ 
(1990) genre theory, Liu (2012) analyses the genre of the American Presidential 
Inaugural Speech. She identifies three main purposes for political speaking: ‘to 
convince people to take action as the speaker expects, to change radically their 
attitudes or beliefs or to weaken their current attitudes or beliefs’ (Liu 2012:2408). 
Therefore, the main characteristics of the genre of political speeches can be dealt with 
from these three respects.  
 
In this vein, reasoning is one of the main genre features of political speeches. It is 
often realized in the process of argumentation as argumentation is the way to use 
language ‘to justify or refute a standpoint, with the aim of securing agreement in 
views’ (van Eemeren et al. 1997:208). For example, Fairclough and Fairclough 
(2012:17) propose that political discourse can be featured as ‘practical argumentation’. 
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However, van Dijk is more inclined to equate argumentation with manipulation rather 
than persuasion (2006). He adopts argumentation as one of the strategies of critical 
epistemic analysis, which is concerned with modality and evidentiality (van Dijk 
2011). From van Dijk’s studies, we can get the hint that it is also possible to 
investigate how politicians manipulate their audience through their specific choices of 
modals and evidentials in political discourse (Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014; also 
see Oswald 2011).  
 
The second main genre feature of political speeches is expressing stance, which is 
employed to persuade the audience through the speaker’s stance involving expertise, 
knowledge, command and authority (Reyes 2014:543). This is therefore concerned 
with the study of linguistic patterns of variation in stance-taking in political speeches 
including modality. It is generally accepted that epistemic modality expresses 
epistemic stance based on the speaker’s expertise or knowledge (Dunmire 2005; van 
Dijk 2011, 2014), and deontic modality encodes stance involving the speaker’s moral 
values and authority (Chilton 2004). For example, following the five categories of 
modality (including validity, predictability, desirability, obligation, and permission) 
proposed by Fowler (1985), Lillian (2008) studies how modality can be applied as a 
tool of persuasion or manipulation in Canadian Conservative Discourse.     
 
Another main genre feature of political speeches is expressing emotions, which is 
employed to ‘display emotional ties and build rapport with the audience’ (Reyes 
2014:543). This is also connected with modality as volitional modality often expresses 
the speaker’s emotions such as intentions, determination and willingness.  
   
In sum, political speeches are treated as a representative genre of political discourse in 
this study, with its communicative purpose as persuasion or manipulation and its main 
genre characteristics as reasoning, expressing stance and expressing emotions. In this 
sense, studying modality and evidentiality in political speeches is an attempt to 
investigate how the political speakers persuade or manipulate their audiences through 
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different choices (patterns) of modal and evidential variations in political contexts.  
 
1.3.2 Modality and Evidentiality in Political Discourse Analysis 
 
As discussed previously, though typological studies of modality are useful, one still 
needs to consider the functions of modality in specific contexts. It is generally 
accepted that the role of modality in political discourse is related to social-cognitive 
themes such as stance, ideology, and legitimisation. However, evidentiality has been 
largely neglected in this field with only a few exceptions (e.g. Hart 2010, 2011; 
Marín-Arrese 2011a; van Dijk 2011; Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014). In what 
follows, I will review the previous literature about modality and evidentiality on 
stance, ideology, and legitimisation in (political) discourse studies respectively, and 
then discuss how they can be related to this thesis.  
 
Stance  
Stance can be defined as ‘all speakers and writers taking up some position in relation 
to the propositions they make’, either ‘explicit (also known as overt) or hidden 
(covert), and either conscious (also known as inscribed) or unconscious’ (Bloor & 
Bloor 2007:33).  
 
Previous studies show that modality is an important way of expressing stance in 
discourse studies (e.g. Bednarek 2006a, 2006b; Marín-Arrese 2011a). For example, 
Bednarek (2006b) proposes a new framework of evaluation in media discourse to 
analyse the phenomenon of speaker opinion, also known as evaluation, appraisal and 
stance. Modality is concerned with ‘evaluative parameters’ in her study, adopted to 
evaluate aspects of world as ‘(not) possible or (not) necessary’ and ‘reliable’ (2006b:1). 
According to Bednarek (2006b:50), ‘the parameter of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY 
deals with what has traditionally been described as deontic or dynamic modality, i.e. 
with the writer’s evaluation of what is (not) necessary or (not) possible’. 
‘[E]valuations of RELIABILITY are connected to what is generally described as 
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epistemic modality, i.e. to matters of reliability, certainty, confidence and likelihood’ 
(2006b:52).  
 
Bednarek’s parameters are somewhat confusing when it comes to the distinctions 
between POSSIBILITY and RELIABILITY. There are two reasons for this confusion. 
On the one hand, the parameter of POSSIBILITY traditionally relates to epistemic 
modality rather than deontic modality. On the other hand, these two parameters are 
closely related in semantic meaning since events that are more possible to be realized 
tend to be more reliable as well. However, Bednarek’s study also gives us the 
important hint that modality is an essential linguistic device in coding the speaker’s 
stance.  
 
Drawing on Langacker’s cognitive linguistic account of evaluation (2007, 2009), 
Marín-Arrese (2011a) distinguishes between effective versus affective stance-taking 
acts. She places deontic modality under the categories of effective stance-markers, 
while treating epistemic modality and evidentiality as categories of epistemic 
stance-markers. She analyses expressions of each in the discourse of Blair, Obama and 
Aznar. She found that the use of both effective and affective stance-markers enables 
the political leaders to persuade their audience by ‘claiming true knowledge of the 
events and claiming to be morally right in the proposed realization of events’ 
(Marín-Arrese 2011a:220). She also claims that stance resources signify the speakers’ 
expression of subjectivity/intersubjectivity, through which the speakers manage their 
responsibility for their epistemic and deontic estimations (ibid.).  
 
Marín-Arrese’s study (2011a) is one of the main inspirations for this thesis. In 
particular, ‘the interaction of two parameters of subjectivity/ intersubjectivity’ lay a 
solid foundation for the study of evidentiality in this thesis: including degree of 
‘salience and explicitness of the role of the conceptualizer’, and ‘personal vs. shared 
responsibility’ (Marín-Arrese 2011a). Besides, the thesis will adopt her definition of 




Overall, this thesis will treat modality and evidentiality as stance-markers from 
different perspectives, as they function differently in stance-taking acts. This will be 
explored in detail in the following chapters.  
 
Ideology 
According to Widdowson, the main task of CDA is to ‘discover traces of ideological 
bias in texts’ (2007:71). Likewise, the motivation of Critical Linguistics is to explore 
‘ideology in language’ on the basis of linguistic analysis (Simpson 1993:5). For 
Critical Linguistics, ‘ideology’ can be defined as ‘a systematic body of ideas, 
organized from a particular point of view’, involving ‘a systematically organized 
presentation of reality’ (Kress and Hodge 1979:15). According to Simpson, however, 
an ideology ‘derives from the taken-for-granted assumptions, beliefs and 
value-systems which are shared collectively by social groups’ (1993:5).  
 
Ideologies are closely related to power and language (Fairclough 2003:2). In other 
words, linguistic analysis can be ‘a powerful tool for the study of ideological 
processes which mediate relationships of power and control’ (Fowler and Kress 
1979:186). 
 
From the perspective of Cognitive Linguistics, Koller defines ideology as ‘a 
(metaphorical) network of beliefs that gives rise to expectations, norms and values 
about events, ideas and people’ (2014:239). She also holds that the function of 
ideologies is to organize or maintain social relations and this can be realised through 
their epistemic, deontic and evaluative content (ibid.), that is by ‘social beliefs about 
what is the case, good or bad, right or wrong’ (van Dijk 1998:8). In this sense, 
modality also encodes ideology as it certainly involves epistemic and deontic 




According to Haynes (1989:119), ‘ideology is made possible by the choices a 
language allows for representing the same material situation in different ways’, which 
suggests that the different choices of modality should also represent the speaker/ 
writer’s ideology. For example, we often use deontic modality when we think it is 
moral or right to take certain actions, such as “We should pay taxes.” This example 
clearly illustrates the speaker’s belief (as part of his ideology) that ‘paying taxes is our 
duty’.  
 
However, there has been little work relating modality to ideology. For example, 
Fowler (1991) holds that all linguistic devices convey ideology and he also 
distinguishes four types of modality in terms of making comments, but he does not 
explicitly spell out how modality plays a role in encoding ideology. Similarly, 
Dunmire (2005) discusses rhetoric and ideology of the future in political discourse 
through comparative studies in modality, but fails to explain the relationship between 
modality and ideology. It is, therefore, possible and necessary to explore how different 
types of modality encode ideology in political discourse in this thesis. 
 
Evidentiality, on the other hand, has never been related to the study of ideology; 
though I will argue in this thesis that evidentiality also reflects the speaker’s ideology 
(See Section 6.3.1.3 in Chapter Six). This is because ideologies are often treated as 
‘forms of common sense’ (van Dijk 1998:106; Bax 2011:127), and evidentiality is 
closely related to the speaker’s concept of knowledge (including common knowledge) 
(van Dijk 2014).  
 
Legitimisation  
According to Reisigl and Wodak, ‘power is legitimised or de-legitimised in discourses’ 
(2009:89). One of the five types of discursive strategies in the Discourse-historical 
Approach is ‘argumentation’, with the devices of topoi (formal or more 
content-related) and fallacies, which serve as tools of legitimisation to justify and 
question the claims of truth and normative rightness (Reisigl and Wodak 2009:94). 
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According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), ‘legitimation provides the “explanations” 
and justifications of the salient elements of the institutional tradition’. They have even 
argued that, effectively, all of language is legitimisation (1966:112). In other words, 
the study of legitimisation is extremely important, particularly in revealing how power 
relations and domination are maintained through certain legitimising strategies.  
 
However, in previous studies, though legitimisation has been studied widely and from 
various angles, few studies addressed modality or evidentiality. That means these 
studies take a more social and political perspective rather than a linguistic perspective. 
Therefore it is necessary for us to explore this topic further in terms of linguistic 
analysis, including through modality and evidentiality. For example, from the 
perspective that ‘discourse is the recontextualization of social practice’ (van Leeuwen  
2008:3), van Leeuwen claims that ‘recontextualization involves not just the 
transformation of social practices into discourses about social practices, but also the 
addition of contextually specific legitimations of these social practices’ (2008:105). 
He also distinguishes four main strategies for legitimation (van Leeuwen 2008:105-6):  
(i)  Authorization: Legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, 
law and / or persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested.  
   (ii)  Moral Evaluation: Legitimation by reference to value systems.  
(iii) Rationalization: Legitimization by reference to the goals and uses of 
institutionalized social action, and to the knowledges that society has 
constructed to endow them with cognitive validity. 
(iv) Mythopoesis: legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes 
reward legitimate actions and punish nonlegitimate actions.   
                                            
In fact, van Leeuwen’s account of legitimation strategies mainly involves the different 
kinds of sources of evidence the speaker/writer provides to legitimise his/her 
propositions, all belonging to the domain of evidentiality. However, he fails to relate 




Rojo and van Dijk (1997) also explore ‘the discursive and political strategies of 
legitimation’, by positing ‘three levels of legitimation: (a) pragmatic: various 
strategies of the justification of controversial official actions; (b) semantic: the ways a 
discourse represents its partisan view of the events or properties of actors as ‘true’ or 
as the ‘facts’; and (c) socio-political: the way official discourse self-legitimates itself 
as authoritative and delegitimates alternative discourses’ (1997:523). Though Rojo 
and van Dijk deal with legitimisation strategies at three levels, their perspective is 
political rather than linguistic. Their study involves only a limited treatment of 
modality.  
 
Legitimisation in political discourse can be defined as ‘enactment of the political 
speaker’s right to be obeyed and the linguistic justification of actions following this 
obedience’ (Cap 2008: 32). For Cap, ‘proximization’3 is ‘one of the most effective 
strategies in accomplishing legitimisation effects in political (interventionist) 
discourse’ (Cap 2011:81). He (Cap 2006, 2008) also develops a tripartite model of 
‘proximization’: ‘spatial, temporal and axiological’, which illustrates ‘the different 
conceptual relations between the entities localized inside the deictic centre’ (cf. 
Chilton, 2004) of the stage (speaker, addressee, the so-called inside-the-deictic-centre 
entities) and the alien, outside-the-deictic-centre entities (Cap 2011:81). 
 
Chilton (2004) claims that epistemic and deontic are two basic types of legitimisation 
in political discourse. The former has to do with ‘the speaker’s claim to have better 
knowledge, recognition of the “real” facts’; the latter refers to ‘the speaker claims, 
explicitly or implicitly, to be not only “right” in a cognitive sense, but “right” in a 
moral sense’(Chilton 2004:114-117). Following Cap (2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, and 
2013) and Chilton (2004), Hart (2014) explores the cognitive dimensions of 
proximization in the context of two case studies from Tony Blair’s discourse. In 
particular, he proposes ‘epistemic proximization’ for the description of a conceptual 
                                                        
3 According to Cap, proximization is ‘a pragmatic-cognitive strategy whereby the speaker presents the events on 
the discourse stage as directly affecting the addressee, in negative and threatening ways’ (2011:81). 
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relation between temporal and epistemic distance (Hart 2014:179). Hart argues that 
‘epistemic proximization can be characterized as a conceptual shift along the 
epistemic axis so that a situation comes to form part of the conceptualizer’s epistemic 
ground’ (2014:179). To attain legitimacy and public support, political speakers 
therefore need to ‘establish a conceptualization in which their premises for action are 
treated as true’ (also see Chilton 2004) through the means of epistemic proximization. 
They can either presuppose ‘certain propositions as established fact’ or ‘ask the 
audience to place their trust in the speaker’s evaluation’ (Hart 2014:179).  
 
Cap, Chilton and Hart’s theories about legitimisation lay a solid foundation for this 
study because their research is not only closely related to modality but also based on 
political contexts from a cognitive linguistic perspective, particularly the concepts ‘the 
deictic centre’, ‘distance’ and ‘epistemic proximization’. However, their studies do not 
involve evidentiality (except for Hart 2014).  
 
Hart (2010, 2011) also proposes that evidentiality and epistemic modality can be used 
in political discourse to serve ‘two different legitimising strategies: “objectification” 
and “subjectification” respectively’, eliciting ‘an epistemic evaluation in the 
text-consumer’. In effect, objectification is concerned with the speaker legitimising a 
proposition by ‘standing back’ from the assertion and allowing the evidence to ‘speak 
for itself’. By contrast, subjectification involves the speaker legitimising a proposition 
‘relying on their own claim to authority and their own experience’ (Hart 2010:173). 
Similarly, Marín-Arrese (2011b) also discusses legitimisation strategies in terms of 
epistemic modality and evidentiality in political discourse from a cognitive point of 
view. She argues that by using epistemic positioning strategies the speaker/writer is 
able to influence the addressee’s ‘exercise of epistemic vigilance and accept the 
assertion as true’ (Marín-Arrese 2011b:791).  
 
Hart and Marín-Arrese’s studies of legitimisation strategies focus on the study of 
epistemic modality and evidentiality, which lay a solid foundation for this research. 
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However, it is still necessary to explore further how other modal types function in the 
process of legitimisation in political discourse, and interact with evidentiality.  
 
Reyes (2011b) proposes five legitimisation strategies for political speeches, including 
(1) emotions (particularly fear), (2) a hypothetical future, (3) rationality, (4) voices of 
expertise and (5) altruism (Reyes 2011b:781). Though Reyes’ research does not 
involve the study of modality and evidentiality, the data he uses is very relevant to this 
thesis (the speeches from George W. Bush and Barack Obama on the topic of ‘war on 
terror’). Besides, we can also relate his findings to this research. The first three 
strategies can be related to volitional modality (emotions
4
), epistemic modality 
(hypothetical future) and deontic modality (rationality) respectively, while the third 
and fourth also have strong connections with evidentiality. Epistemic modality can 
also express voices of expertise as it often involves the epistemic estimation towards 
the designated proposition based on the speaker’s expertise / knowledge.    
 
Another example is from van Dijk’s work in critical epistemic discourse analysis5. In 
his study (van Dijk 2011), he adopts strategies including ‘evidentiality’ and 
‘modalities’, because van Dijk claims ‘[D]iscourse is more credible when it is 
attributed to recognized experts. Hence, most forms of knowledge discourse will be 
replete with references and other linguistic ways of legitimating arguments through 
evidence provided by experts’ (van Dijk 2011:38). Besides, van Dijk claims that 
‘events and knowledge about such events may be presented as modalized in several 
ways, for instance as certain (necessary), probable or possible — depending again on 
the interests of the authors’ (ibid.). With these two notions (evidentiality and 
modalities), illustrated by the example of ‘Tony Blair on Iraq’, he is able to 
demonstrate how speakers use evidentials to show their own credibility or the 
legitimacy of their opinions, and how the speakers assert the strength of their beliefs 
                                                        
4 Although the emotions expressed by volitional modality are different from what Reyes proposed, they can also 
reflect the speaker’s ideology and contribute to the legitimisation process (See Chapter Five for details). 
5 ‘Epistemic discourse analysis is meant here as the (multidisciplinary) study of the way knowledge is expressed, 
implied, suppressed, distributed, etc. in text and talk, for instance in presuppositions, topic-comment and focus 
structures, levels and details of description, and so on’ (van Dijk 2011:35). 
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in various ways (van Dijk 2011). Van Dijk’s study suggests that evidentiality is 
indispensable in the study of modality, especially in terms of how political speakers 
legitimise their stance.  
 
Although the previous studies of legitimisation in political discourse serve as a solid 
foundation, there is little work involving both modality and evidentiality, which 
therefore needs to be explored further in this thesis.  
 
In sum, the previous studies show that it is possible to study modality and 
evidentiality in terms of stance, ideology and legitimisation in political discourse, and 
there are some missing parts which still need further study. On the one hand, although 
modality can certainly be treated as a stance-marker, it is not clear how stance-taking 
acts relate to their function of legitimisation. On the other hand, the functions of 
evidentiality have been largely neglected in political discourse, especially with respect 
to how it encodes the speaker’s ideology and its role in persuading / manipulating 
addressees.   
 
1.4 Frameworks for modality and evidentiality in Political Discourse 
Analysis 
 
As we can see from the previous section, studies of modality and evidentiality in 
political discourse have tended to adopt frameworks either based on systemic 
functional linguistics or cognitive linguistics. In this section, I therefore review how 
modality and evidentiality fit within the theoretical frameworks from both functional 
and cognitive linguistic perspectives.  
 
1.4.1 SFL and Appraisal Theory  
Halliday’s SFL plays an important role in the area of CDA (and PDA). For example, 
Fairclough (2003:5) affirms that SFL provides ‘a valuable resource for CDA, and 
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indeed major contributions to CDA have developed out of SFL’ (see, e.g., Fowler et al. 
1979; Hodge and Kress 1988, 1993; Kress 1985; Kress and van Leeuwen 2001; 
Lemke 1995; Thibault 1991; van Leeuwen 2005).  
 
Many discourse studies of modality adopt Halliday’s SFL (Halliday 1985, 1994; 
Halliday and Matthiessen 2004). For example, drawing on the system of transitivity
6
 
and modality in SFL, critical linguists have uncovered the ideology encoded in 
political discourse (e.g. Fowler 1991). For another example, Fowler et al. (1979:185) 
adopts the theory of interpersonal metafunction (or the grammar of modality in their 
terms) in studying modality. In addition, Kress and Hodge (1979:122-126) discuss the 
relationship between modality and power, taking Halliday (1970b) on modality as a 
major reference. 
 
It is therefore necessary to introduce the theory of modality in SFL, and explain how 
modality in this research fit within its framework.  
 
According to Halliday and Matthiessen (2004:116), modality involves ‘likely or 
unlikely (if a proposition), desirable or undesirable (if a proposal)’. It is known as ‘the 
intermediate degrees between the positive and negative poles’ and its work is ‘to 
construe the region of uncertainty that lies between “yes” and “no”’ (Halliday and 
Matthiessen 2004:147). Halliday then classifies modality into two main categories: 
modalization in propositions and modulation in proposals, as illustrated in Figure 1.3.  
                                                        
6
 Transitivity is a property of verbs that relates to whether a verb can take direct objects and how many such 
objects a verb can take. Here ‘transitivity’ refers to the grammar of transitivity proposed by Halliday (1985). 
Transitivity has been employed within the critical linguistic tradition to ‘uncover how certain meanings are 




Figure 1.3 Halliday’s classification of modality 
 
There are two kinds of intermediate possibilities between asserting and denying a 
proposition: (i) degrees of probability: ‘possibly/probably/certainly’; (ii) degrees of 
usuality: ‘sometimes/usually/always’. Likewise, there are also two kinds of 
intermediate possibility between prescribing and proscribing depending on the speech 
function in a proposal, whether command or offer: (i) In a command, the intermediate 
points represent degrees of obligation: ‘allowed to/supposed to/ required to’; (ii) in an 
offer, they present degrees of inclination: ‘willing to/ anxious to/ determined to’ 
(Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:147).  
 
Based on the above divisions, Halliday introduces two further variants to more 
detailed descriptions of modality, as shown in Figure 1.4 (adapted from Fig.4-25 in 
Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:150). The first is the value of modality, which can be 
identified as low, median and high. Since modality is an expression of indeterminacy 
for Halliday, he sets up a systemic paradigm to show a system of three values for 
modality, for example, ‘probability’ can be expressed as a low value ‘possible’, a 
median value ‘probable’ and a high value ‘certain’ (Halliday and Matthiessen 
2004:149). In this case, the three different degrees of ‘usuality’, ‘obligation’ and 
‘inclination’ (mentioned above) also correspond respectively to the low, median and 
high values. The second is what Halliday (1985:336) refers to as the different 










instance, ‘[T]hese can be either subjective-explicit (e.g. I think Mary knows) or 
subjective-implicit (e.g. Mary will know) on the one hand, or they could be either 
objective-explicit (e.g. It is likely that Mary knows) or objective-implicit (e.g. Mary 
probably knows) on the other’ (Badran 2002:133).  
 
 
Figure 1.4 Halliday’s system of value and orientation of modality 
 
Halliday’s theory of modality has many advantages so it has been prevailing among 
CDA (e.g. Hodge and Kress 1993; Kress and van Leeuwen 2001; van Leeuwen 2005). 
Firstly, different from Palmer’s approach (Palmer 1979, 2001), Halliday focuses on 
the use of language rather than its form. Therefore, it is more useful in discourse 
studies. Secondly, Halliday’s approach is more inclusive, thereby avoiding the trap of 
assigning one interpretation per modal as other ‘monosemantic approaches’7 (see e.g. 
Ehrman 1966；Perkins 1983) do. In addition, his proposal of orientation for modality, 
such as the value system, is useful in describing modality in detail, though different 
readers may interpret the same modal expression in different ways, as Badran points 
                                                        
7 Monosemantic approach to modality refers to the approach to ‘adopt a common core for the meaning of each 
modal, and to use it as a basis for deriving the vast range of possible interpretations which the modals may 














out (2002:134).  
 
However, despite of its merits, Halliday’s approach also has its shortcomings. On the 
one hand, he places modality under the category of the interpersonal metafunction. 
According to his theory of SFL, the ideational metafunction is content-oriented, the 
interpersonal metafunction is participants-oriented, and the textual metafunction is 
context-oriented. However, the expression of modality should not be restricted to the 
relations between the participants, for it is also inseparable from the content and 
context. Thus, the study of modality should not be restricted to interpersonal meaning, 
which is also a main standpoint of this research. On the other hand, Halliday includes 
some modal expressions such as modal adverbs, adjectives and nouns in his 
classification such as ‘possible, possibly, certain, certainly, willingness, and 
possibility’, but he mentions neither non-auxiliary verbal modals nor other modal 
markers. 
 
Another important framework (based on SFL) for studying modality is Martin and 
White’s Appraisal Theory (Martin and White 2005). Martin and White state that SFL 
is ‘a multi-perspectival model designed to interpret language in use’ and their theory 
developed from ‘the general framework’ of SFL by focusing on ‘the interpersonal 
metafunction’ (2005:7). For instance, drawing on the framework of Appraisal Theory 
(Martin 2000; Martin and White 2005; White 2003), Marín-Arrese (2006) elaborates 
the analysis of the categories of evaluation (emphasizing engagement, writer stance 
and inter/subjectivity) pertaining to modality in the context of journalistic discourse.  
 
Within the framework of Appraisal Theory, there are three interacting domains – 
‘attitude’ (including ‘affect’, ‘judgement’ and ‘appreciation’), ‘engagement’ and 
‘graduation’ (Martin and White 2005:35). Modality is concerned with ‘engagement’ in 
this theory, ‘entertain8’ in particular. According to Martin and White:  
                                                        
8
 Entertain: by explicitly presenting the proposition as grounded in its own contingent, individual subjectivity, 
the authorial voice represents the proposition as but one of a range of possible positions – it thereby entertains or 
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‘engagement’ counts for those linguistic resources whereby the authorial voice positions itself 
with respect to other textual voices and alternative positions at stake in a given communicative 
context.  (2005: 94) 
 
However, concerning the functions of modality, the categories of attitude and 
engagement are rather slippery and hard to delineate. I hold that both deontic modality 
and epistemic modality pertain to making judgements. The former can be adopted to 
make deontic judgements (viz. moral judgements), involving what someone should do 
or should not do. Similarly, the latter can be used to make epistemic judgements, 
involving what may or may not be. Therefore, Martin and White’s framework does not 
fit studying modality in expressing stance, though the idea of ‘engagement’ still makes 
sense from a functional point of view.  
 
In short, the theory of SFL is especially useful in the linguistic analysis of discourse 
and it is also useful for studying modality in political discourse, particularly the idea 
of ‘value of modality’ will be adopted as a main element of modality for this research. 
In spite of its merits, however, SFL also receives criticism for ‘its limited social theory 
and non-existent cognitive theory’, resulting in its vagueness and arbitrary explanation 
of detailed linguistic analysis (van Dijk 2008b: 30). Therefore, it is necessary for SFL 
to take in more cognitive theory, which can be a useful complement to its theoretical 
foundation as well as its analytical framework for discourse studies. 
 
1.4.2 Cognitive Linguistics  
From a cognitive linguistic perspective, modality is often addressed in terms of ‘force 
dynamics’ (Talmy 1985, 1988, 2000a; Sweetser 1982, 1984, 1990; Johnson 1987; 
Langacker 1990), ‘mental spaces’ (Fauconnier 1994; Sweetser 1996; Dancygier and 
Sweester 1996; Dancygier and Sweester 2005) ‘epistemic model’ (Langacker 1987, 
                                                                                                                                                               
invokes these dialogic alternatives such as ‘it seems, the evidence suggests, apparently, I hear, or perhaps, 
probably, maybe, it’s possible, in my view, I suspect that, I believe that, probably, it’s almost certain that …, 
may/will/must; some types of ‘rhetorical’ or ‘expository’ question’ (Martin and White 2005:98).  
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1991), ‘discourse space’ (Chilton 2004; 2014), ‘epistemic stance’ (Dancygier and 
Sweetser 2000; Evans and Green 2006), or epistemic proximization (Hart 2014).  
 
For example, Talmy (1985, 1988, 2000a) proposes a theory of force-dynamics and 
applies it to the use of modality. Force-dynamics refers to ‘how entities interact with 
respect to force’ and it counts for cause and effect relations in terms of pressure and 
motion (Talmy 2000:409). The relations included here are ‘the exertion of force, 
resistance to such a force, the overcoming of such a resistance, blockage of the 
expression of force, removal of such blockage, and the like’ (ibid.).  
 
According to Talmy, modals can be viewed as the semantic categories which encode 
the various ways ‘in which entities interact with respect to forces and barriers’ (ibid.). 
For example, ‘cannot’ indicates the subject (the Agonist) has a tendency toward the 
realization of the action, but some factor (force) opposes the tendency (Talmy 
2000a:441). ‘Must’, for another example, indicates the subject (the Agonist) is forced 
to stay in place by ‘an active social pressure’ (Talmy 1988: 79). ‘Will/ would not’, on 
the other hand, indicates the subject (the Agonist) refuses to perform the action 
imposed by external pressure (Talmy 2000a:441). Talmy also claims that the 
force-dynamic system can be applied to other modal forms besides traditional modal 
verbs, such as semi-modals (e.g. have to, be supposed to, be to, etc.) and some lexical 
verbs (e.g. let, make, have, etc.). In particular, he claims that force-dynamic structures 
are not restricted to physical forces, but also associated with psychosocial 
interpretations (ibid.; Chilton 2014:257).  
 
The theory of force-dynamics is applicable in explaining most modals, particularly for 
deontic modals, which often imply an internal or external force that urge the subject to 
take or give up the designated actions. However, some of the above descriptions about 
the forces of modals may be not appropriate in different contexts. For example, 
instead of indicating the subject (the Agonist) is forced to stay in place by ‘an active 
social pressure’, ‘must’ is often used to urge the subject to take actions, as illustrated 
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in the example ‘We must finish the work before the end of this month’. Also, ‘Will/ 
would not’ can also indicate the subject (the Agonist) refuse to take the action out of 
his/her own will or determination, as shown in the example ‘I will not let you down’. 
Furthermore, this theory is not fit for studying epistemic modals as they do not 
indicate any forms of inherent force. Overall, the concept is unable to delimit the 
domain of modality in a satisfying way (Nuyts 2001:26; Boye 2010:59), though it can 
still be useful in accounting for some deontic modals or volitional modals in this 
thesis.   
 
As the research framework of this study will draw on some theories from Cognitive 
Linguistics including Image Schemas of Space, Langacker’s Epistemic Model and 
Chilton’s theory of discourse space, I will now discuss them in detail.  
 
Image Schemas of Space  
 
According to Croft and Cruse (2004:44), an image schema is ‘a theoretical construct 
in cognitive linguistics which imposes a conceptualization of experience’, defined as 
‘schematic versions of images’- ‘representations of specific, embodied experiences’. 
Image schemas are ‘construals of experience’ (Croft and Cruse 2004:45), used to 
illustrate the typical mental representation patterns of our embodied experiences. In 
other words, image schemas are concepts derived from our embodied experience, 
being the foundations of our conceptual system.  
 
Lakoff proposes that ‘radial structure in categories’ can be represented ‘in terms of 
CENTRE-PERIPHERY schemas’ (1987: 283). He then argues that: 
Like other categories, a radial category is represented structurally as a container, 
and its subcategories are containers inside it. What distinguishes it is that it is 
structured by the CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema. One subcategory is the centre; 




Drawing on Lakoff’s proposal (1987), I will integrate two important image schemas 
of space (the CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema and the NEAR-FAR schema) to 
demonstrate the distance between the centre category and non-centre categories in 
terms of modality, which is divided into three categories: close, near, and distant, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.5. Thus, various forms of modality will be positioned in 
different categories according to their distance to the centre
9
 (See Section 2.2 of 
Chapter Two for details).  
 
 
Figure 1.5 The integration of CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema and NEAR-FAR 
schema 
 
Langacker’s Epistemic Model 
 
Langacker proposes an epistemic model (a kind of idealised cognitive model (ICM)) 
to elaborate the interaction between tense and modals, including a basic epistemic 
model and two elaborated epistemic models (Langacker 1991:242). The basic 
epistemic model is illustrated in Figure 1.6 (borrowed from Figure 18.1. Evans and 
Green 2006: 627). 
                                                        




Distant   




Figure 1.6 Langacker’s epistemic model 
 
The large circle in this model indicates ‘here and now’, viewed as immediate reality, 
representing the ground (including the speech event and the participants). The small 
shaded circle represents the conceptualizer (the speaker or the language user). The 
horizontal line running through the centre of the diagram represents TIME, which 
Langacker (1991: 242) describes as ‘the axis along which reality evolves’ (Evans and 
Green 2006: 627). 
 
Epistemic distance, then, is viewed as a type of variation along parameters of distance 
between reality and irreality based on ‘whether they are immediate (close) or 
non-immediate (distant) relative to the ground’ (Evans and Green 2006: 628).  
 
On the basis of the epistemic modal, Langacker observes that modals in their distal 
form often suggests ‘a greater epistemic distance’ than their zero form10; ‘might, for 
instance, suggests a more tenuous possibility than may’ (1991:246). On this account, it 
is possible for us to address modality in terms of epistemic distance, closely related to 
time and tense. Importantly, the notion of epistemic distance will be adopted in my 
framework of modality, which positions epistemic modals in different values 
according to their distance to the centre (now and certainty). 
                                                        
10 Here ‘zero form’ refers to the base form of modals (such as may and can), so as to distinguish from their past 




Chilton’s Model of Discourse Space  
Chilton (2004) proposes a model of three-dimensional ‘discourse space’ in Political 
Discourse Analysis: space, time and modality.  
 
In his model, Chilton claims that ‘these three dimensions are always “anchored” at the 
speaking self or in the mind of the speaking self’ (2014:12). In other words, during the 
discourse production process, people tend to position other entities in their discourse 
‘world’ relative to themselves along the three axes: space, time and modality (Chilton, 
2004:57). Hence, the deictic centre represents the speaking self (that is, I or we), 
which is the ‘origin’ of the three axes, as illustrated in Figure 1.7 (borrowed from 




Figure 1.7 Chilton’s dimensions of deixis 
 
In this modal, the s axis represents space, which locates entities encoding spatial 
deictic meanings according their geographical distance or metaphorical social distance 
(e.g. ‘near relations’, ‘close cooperation’, ‘remote connection’) (Chilton 2004:58). In 
this sense, the speaker represents the here & now and the entities ‘indexed by 
second-person and third-person pronouns are ‘situated’ along s, some nearer to, some 




The t axis represents time, with the origin as the time of speaking or ‘now’. Other 
entities indicating a time of happening can be located as ‘near’ or ‘distant’: ‘the 
revolution is getting closer’, ‘the time for an agreement has arrived’, ‘we are a long 
way from achieving our goals’ (Chilton 2004:58). That is because time can be 
conceptualized in relation to motion through space, relative distance to or from Self, 
and events (Langacker 1991).   
 
The m axis represents modality and its deictic centre represents ‘the origin of the 
epistemic true and the deontic right’ (Chilton 2004:59). It is widely accepted that 
epistemic and deontic modality can be viewed as scales (see e.g. Frawley 1992; Nutys 
2010), and ‘seems to be also conceptualised in terms of remoteness’ (Chilton 
2004:59).  
 
Chilton’s model of ‘discourse space’ emphasizes the significance of positioning 
various entities in the ‘discourse world’ in relation to the speakers themselves along 
three axes, space, time and modality. In this type of ‘discourse space’, the speaker 
himself represents the centre of ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘rightness’. That is to say, Chilton’s 
model of ‘discourse space’ is established from the perspective of the speaker. This is 
rather useful for the study of modality because modality is often treated as the position 
taken by the speaker.  
 
In effect, Chilton’s model will serve as the most important theoretical base of my 
research framework, though I adapt this model and apply it rather differently. In 
particular, his idea of the deictic centre being ‘not only here and now but also the 
origin of the epistemic true and the deontic right’ contributes a lot to my analytical 
model of modality in political discourse: the STE (Space, Time and Evidentiality) 
model, which I am going to elaborate in detail in the following chapter. However, 
modality is only one dimension in Chilton’s model and it is hard to evaluate how the 
speak positions entities in terms of modals. It is therefore necessary to take in ‘the 
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value of modality’ from SFL so as to examine the epistemic, deontic and volitional 
positioning in political discourse. 
 
Undoubtedly, Cognitive Linguistics has several merits in discourse analysis. Firstly, it 
allows us to analyse the discourse from a new perspective. Secondly, it is possible for 
us to reveal the potential processes of text production and interpretation when we 
adopt a cognitive linguistic approach in discourse analysis. That is because for 
Cognitive Linguistics, language is ‘a window to the mind’ (Fauconnier 1999:96). 
Thirdly, some theories from Cognitive Linguistics can be useful tools in analysing 
discourse, such as the concepts of discourse space, force-dynamics and image schema.  
 
However, though Cognitive Linguistics is distinct in many ways from generative 
linguistics, its research methods have typically relied on ‘introspection’ (Talmy 2006), 
as it derives ‘intuitively plausible hypotheses about conceptual structure from patterns 
in language and on the basis of native speaker knowledge’ (Hart 2010:24), and ‘there 
are very few published writings on the methods in Cognitive Linguistics’ (Gibbs 
2006:7), resulting in ‘a big problem of falsifying theories/ ideas from cognitive 
linguistics’ (Gibbs 2006:3). So despite the merits of Cognitive Linguistics, it is still 
necessary for us to adopt the theory concerning modality from SFL, especially in 
discourse studies. 
 
1.5 Critique and the Way Forward  
Overall, previous studies on modality are abundant and extensive, laying a solid 
foundation for this research. However, there remain some unsolved or controversial 
issues with respect to forms, meanings, functions and perspectives of modality. For 
example, many previous semantic studies (e.g. Narrog 2012) use invented examples 
isolated from actual contexts, which to a large extent undermines the reliability and 




More importantly, many studies deliberately ignore the significance of other modality 
markers other than modal auxiliaries, or focus on epistemic modality only in terms of 
modality meanings (types), or neglect other modality functions besides its 
interpersonal meaning (particularly in expressing stance) for their convenience, which 
makes it impossible to get the whole picture of modality.  
 
In this section, I will address some specific issues which are of particular interest to 
this study, and propose the way forward for this study of modality in political 
discourse.  
 
Forms, Meanings and Functions of Modality  
As mentioned above, this study explores the forms, meanings (types) and functions of 
modality in political discourse, particularly on how politicians persuade their 
addressees through different choices of modals. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the 
scope of this study in terms of forms, meanings and functions.   
 
Forms of modality here refer to the markers of modality, involving modal auxiliaries, 
modal adjectives, modal adverbs, modal nouns and semi-modals, etc. Traditionally, 
the semantic study of modality has been restricted to modal verbs (modal auxiliaries), 
but recently, more linguists hold the view that there are other ways of expressing 
modality besides modal verbs (see, e.g. Stubbs 1996; Barbiers 2002). Barbiers, for 
instance, claims that ‘[M]odal verbs are just one way to encode modality in natural 
language. Among the other means attested are modal particles and adverbs, 
imperatives and to infinitives’ (2002:14). Other modal expression types besides modal 
verbs, such as semi-modals (e.g., Krug 2000), modal adjectives (e.g., van Linden 2012) 
and modal adverbs (e.g., Nuyts 2001a, 2002), can also be found in semantic studies 
(also see Table 1.2), though they often lack a common core: ‘they are like scattered 
pieces of a highly complex puzzle’ (Mortelmans 2007:869). However, many discourse 
studies deliberately ignore the significance of other modality expressions other than 
modal verbs only for their convenience. In contrast to the previous discourse studies, 
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this thesis will also include other important modal forms besides modal verbs in a 
systemic analytical framework in order to avoid the neglect of other interesting modal 
meanings or functions in political discourse. In addition, modality is also interrelated 
with tense as modals in their past tense are often of lower value (lower certainty) than 
their bare forms (see Halliday 1994; Palmer 2001; Langacker 1991). So this thesis will 
also take tense into consideration within the framework.  
 
It is important to note that there is covert modality, which is either marked by 
infinitives (Bhatt 1999) or unmarked (cf. Barbiers 2002). However, different 
researchers may have different views towards this phenomenon. Covert Modality is 
‘modality which we interpret but which is not associated with any lexical item in the 
structure that we are interpreting’ (Bhatt 1999). According to Bhatt, sentences with 
infinitivals often involve covert modality (Bhatt 1999:2). For example, “Tim knows 
[how to solve the problem]” can be interpreted as “Tim knows how one/he 
could/should solve the problem” (Bhatt 1999:1). Kissine, on the other hand, proposes 
that ‘every asserted proposition which is not under the scope of an explicit modal may 
be considered as being under the scope of a covert epistemic necessity’ (2008:144). It 
is, therefore, rather controversial and difficult to identify their exact modal meanings. 
So this thesis is not going to deal with covert modality or zero-marked modality (or 
zero-marked evidentiality). Moreover, some modal markers can be modified with 
intensified or mitigated adverbs such as ‘nearly’, ‘almost’, ‘definitely’, ‘extremely’ 
and ‘absolutely’. These adverbs sometimes are treated as epistemic modals (see e.g. 
Biber and Finegan 1989) or ‘usuality in modalization’ (see Figure 1.3, Halliday 1994) 
in previous studies. This thesis will not treat these adverbs as modals.  
 
Based on the above discussions, this study will address four main categories of modal 
forms in the data, including modal verbs, semi-modals, modal adjectives, and modal 
adverbs.   
 
Meanings of modality refer to the semantic meanings/types of modal markers, which 
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traditionally can be classified into epistemic modality, deontic modality, and dynamic 
modality / root modality.  
 
Since von Wright (1951) first proposed his classification of modality, ‘epistemic 
modality’ and ‘deontic modality’ have always been the main categories of modality 
(see section 1.3.2) and major themes in the studies of modality. As a matter of fact, 
many political discourse studies of modality are rather restricted to epistemic modality 
or deontic modality in terms of modal meanings/types (e.g. Hart 2010; Fairclough 
1995a, 2003; Chilton 2004) .  
 
However, in addition to epistemic and deontic modality, it is also essential to explore 
other modal meanings in political discourse, such as volitional modality, which will be 
proposed in the new classification of modality (see Section 2.4.1 in Chapter Two for 
explanations) and will be examined in detail in Chapter Five.  
 
Functions of modality refer to the specific roles modality plays in political discourse, 
such as ‘expressing stance’. Modality has been studied widely in terms of stance from 
various perspectives, such as ‘point of view’ (e.g. Simpson 1993), ‘evaluation’ (e.g. 
Thompson and Hunston 2000; Bednarek 2006b), ‘appraisal’ (e.g. Martin and White 
2005), or ‘epistemic stance’ (e.g. Dancygier and Sweetser 2000; Evans and Green 
2006) in discourse analysis.  
 
However, in addition to its explicit function of expressing stance, modality has its 
special functions contributing to the establishment of ideology, and legitimation in 
political discourse, although they have not been explicitly addressed in previous 
studies (e.g. Kress and Hodge 1979; Fairclough 2000a, 2001, 2003; Hart 2010, 2011) 
(see section 1.3.2 for details).  
 
According to Hart (2010), a complete discourse analysis must necessarily address both 
the production and interpretation of text, which ‘entails a cognitive approach to 
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discourse, accounting for meaning construction at both ends of the discourse process’ 
(Hart 2010:23). This means the process of discourse analysis can be divided into three 
parts: Text Production; Text Itself; Text Interpretation. By analysing the forms of 
modality and the evidence given by the contexts in the text, we are able to identify the 
functions of modality which the speaker/writer would like to convey through different 
forms of modality during the text production stage, namely the intentions or purposes 
of the speaker/writer. There is no doubt that every speaker has specific purposes in 
making a speech, and the speaker tends to make assumptions (consciously or 
unconsciously) that the choices of modality he or she makes can best achieve his or 
her purposes, even if the result is unclear. As mentioned previously, the main purpose 
of political speeches is persuasion, which is why this thesis will focus on the role of 
modality (and evidentiality) in the process of persuasion.  
 
At the same time, it is also possible for the reader/hearer to infer the meanings of 
modality from its forms and evidence in given contexts at the stage of text 
interpretation. Though, as common readers/ hearers, we may not catch the full 
meanings of modality immediately. But based on our common knowledge, we can 
make inferences and make sense according to the forms and the evidence given in the 
context. The evidence mentioned here is often marked by evidentials. See Figure 1.8 
for the forms, meanings and functions of modality during the process of discourse 
analysis.  
 
Figure 1.8 The forms, meanings and functions of modality during the process of 
Text Production  
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Based on this, this thesis will explore the functions of modality (including expressing 
stance, legitimising propositions, and reflecting ideologies) in political discourse in 
terms of three semantic types/ meanings (including epistemic, deontic and volitional 
modality) in four forms (including modal verbs, semi-modals, modal adjectives, and 
modal adverbs).  
 
The Integration of Functional and Cognitive Linguistic Perspectives 
 
As discussed previously, this thesis will combine theories both from functional and 
cognitive linguistics. There are several reasons for the integration of these two 
perspectives in political discourse analysis. Firstly, it is common for PDA to adopt a 
variety of methods, which may differ methodologically but share a common 
conceptual framework and critical perspective (van Dijk 1997b:xi; 2001:353). Gee 
(2011:ix) also argues that ‘anyone engaged in their own discourse analysis must adapt 
the tools they have taken from a given theory to the needs and demands of their own 
study’. This is also the position I adopt in this study.  
 
Secondly, it is possible to combine the theories from SFL and Cognitive Linguistics in 
discourse analysis. For instance, Widdowson (2004:97) and Hart (2005:5) hold the 
view that CDA can integrate functional linguistics with other borrowed approaches 
(cognitive linguistics, corpus linguistics, etc.) into a theoretically coherent model. In 
particular, Functional Linguistics and Cognitive Linguistics are complementary in 
their concerns and it is possible to integrate them (Nuyts 2007:552; Langacker 
1994:593).  
 
In sum, linguistic analysis is of great significance for PDA because it can not only 
help us explain the text itself but also help us reveal the values behind it. SFL provides 
a useful tool for analysing the structure of political discourse in linguistic aspects, but 
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it needs cognitive theory to support its description and explain the production of texts 
in their social cognitive context. 
 
Above all, this research framework of modality in PDA will integrate theories from 
Halliday’s SFL and Cognitive Linguistics, with SFL analysing the text itself and 
Cognitive Linguistics studying text production and interpretation from a cognitive 
perspective, which can explore the whole process of discourse from different 
dimensions and bring new insights to PDA as well as CDA. The whole process of 
PDA (derived from Fairclough’s idea of the process of CDA; Fairclough 1995a11; also 
see Koller 2012) and the two linguistic theories I draw on for each stage are illustrated 
in Figure 1.9. 
 
 
Figure 1.9 Three stages of Political Discourse Analysis 
 
Combining both functional and cognitive linguistic perspectives, this study will 
mainly draw on the ‘value of modality’ in SFL and the idea of ‘the deictic centre’ in 
Chilton’s discourse space theory to establish my analytical framework of studying 
                                                        
11  According to Fairclough, there are three stages in CDA: Production, Description and 
























modality in political discourse.  
 
1.6 Summary  
This chapter has provided a general overview of previous studies on modality and 
evidentiality in political discourse. I first reviewed previous studies on defining and 
classifying modality and evidentiality both in linguistic studies and discourse studies. 
Then I discussed the definition and scope of ‘political discourse’ from different 
perspectives, particularly on political speeches as a genre. After that, I reviewed the 
most relevant studies on the functions of modality in political discourse in terms of 
stance, ideology, and legitimisation. Then I discussed the main frameworks from both 
functional and cognitive linguistic perspectives in order to show how my analytical 
research framework which emerges from these theories can be used in the analysis of 
political speeches in this thesis. Finally, I pointed out the unsolved or neglected 
problems of previous studies in this research area and put forward my solutions.  
 
Overall this chapter provides a necessary background for why and how I am going to 
approach modality in political discourse from a cognitive-functional perspective, 
interacting with evidentiality. In the following chapter, I will introduce the research 
data, method and analytical framework for the study of modality and evidentiality in 















2.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the most relevant literature on modality and 
evidentiality in both semantics and discourse studies, particularly focusing on PDA. In 
this chapter, I will first propose an analytical framework for studying modality in 
political discourse on the basis of the previous chapter. Then I will introduce the data 
collection and background. After that, I will discuss the method of data analysis from 
both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. In particular, I will discuss the main 
functions of modality and illustrate how they relate to each other in political discourse, 
in order to lay a foundation for the specific functions of each modal type to be 
addressed in the following chapters. I will also define and classify modality and 
evidentiality by taking a data-driven approach in the section on research methods.  
 
2.2 An Analytical Framework of Modality and Evidentiality in 
Political Discourse 
In this section, I will propose an analytical framework of modality and evidentiality to 
investigate their functions in political discourse from a cognitive-functional 
perspective.  
 
The theoretical foundation of the framework is a combination of Cognitive Linguistics 
and Functional Linguistics, including image schemas of space (Lakoff 1987), 
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Langacker’s epistemic model (Langacker 1991) and Chilton’s model of discourse 
space (Chilton 2004；2014), and the ‘value of modality’ in SFL (Halliday 1994) which 
were each discussed in Chapter One.  
 
In this model, modality is classified into three types: epistemic modality, deontic 
modality and volitional modality (See Section 2.4.1 for the explanations for defining 
and classifying modality). Each type of modality can be treated with respect to three 
levels of modal values (high, intermediate, and low) with corresponding three levels  
of distance (close, near, distant) to the centre of Necessity, Certainty and Willingness. 
In other words, values of three types of modality are fundamentally conceptualized in 
terms of space, displayed on a figure combining the CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema 
and the NEAR-FAR schema, together with the three dimensions: space, time and 
evidentiality. The centre circle represents ‘Here’ in terms of space, ‘Now’ in terms of 
time, ‘Necessity’ in terms of deontic stance, ‘Certainty’ in terms of epistemic stance, 
and ‘Willingness’ in terms of volitional stance. The deictic centre signalled by the 
shaded circle dot in the centre circle represents the speaker (viz. the speaker’s self, ‘I’ 
or ‘we’). The functions of modality in political discourse will be addressed from three 
aspects: value of modality, modal distance (deontic distance / epistemic distance / 
volitional distance), and strength of evidence, with each graded in three levels (see the 















Figure 2.1 A cognitive-functional analytical framework for analysing modality and 
evidentiality in political discourse 
 
2.2.1 Dimensions of Space, Time and Evidentiality 
The dimension of space in this model is metaphorical, which is different from the 
geographical space. As Chilton (2004:58) points out that:  
it is not that we can actually measure the ‘distance’ from Self; rather, the idea is 
that people tend to place people and things along a scale of remoteness from the 
self, using background assumptions and indexical cues.  
 
Put another way, the space dimension provides a scale for us to evaluate different 
levels of modal values in terms of deontic distance, epistemic distance and volitional 
distance.   
 
High (required)   





High (determined)  










Intermediate (supposed)  






Strength of Evidence  




Time can also be conceptualized in terms of distance, as Chilton claims that ‘[B]oth 
past and future can be remote’ (2004:58). Langacker (1991:246) further convincingly 
argues that verbs like will and can encode a stronger degree of obligation or 
possibility than their distal counterparts like would and could. That is because the 
former ones are closer to reality, while the latter ones are more remote. The dimension 
of time here is represented by tense, which can also ‘signal epistemic distance’ (Evans 
and Green 2006:394). From the perspective of mental spaces, Fauconnier (2007:370) 
claims that:  
‘tenses are used not just to reflect local time relations between neighbouring 
spaces, but also to reflect epistemic distance, that is, whether a space is 
hypothetical or counterfactual with respect to its parent space. The coding system 
remains the same, and a particular tense sequence may reflect both time and 
epistemic distance’  
 
Here are some examples offered by Sweetser (1996:323): 
a. If you have Triple-A, then if you go to a telephone, you can solve your 
problem. 
b. If you had Triple-A, then if you went to a telephone, you could solve your 
problem. 
c. If you had had Triple-A, then if you’d gone to a telephone, you could have 
solved your problem. 
 
We can interpret the above three conditional constructions in terms of tense. Then the 
embedded tenses (‘go’, ‘went’, ‘had gone’, and ‘can solve’, ‘could solve’, ‘could have 
solved’) reflect the full epistemic and time path from the Base. If we put them on the 
timeline of my model of modality according to the time these tenses indicated, we will 
find that the modal closer to the centre (now/ reality) has stronger epistemic stance 
than those remote ones, viz. can solve＞could solve＞could have solved. It works in 




Evidentiality is traditionally defined in terms of ‘the source of the information’ (e.g. 
Jakobson 1957; Chafe 1986; Willett 1988; Saeed 2003; Nuyts, 2010). It is especially 
significant in strategic discourse because text-consumers can recognize the force of 
evidence, ‘even if they have no confidence at all in the communicator’ (Sperber 
2006:184). 
 
Previous studies argue that evidentiality is closely related to epistemic modality (cf. 
section 1.2 in Chapter One). They are both concerned with the justification and 
reliability of assertions. Evidentiality affects the speaker’s epistemic evaluations and 
provides justifications (viz. legitimisation) for his/her assertions (Hart 2010, 2011; 
Marín-Arrese 2011b). That is to say, speakers often make choices of epistemic 
modality in terms of certainty according to the evidence available to them. The 
speaker can be more certain when he/she has stronger evidence, or less certain when 
he/she has weaker evidence (Nuyts 2010).  
 
In this study, I propose that apart from epistemic modality, evidentiality also provides 
evidence for deontic and volitional evaluations. In the case of deontic modality, the 
speaker needs to provide various forms of evidence in the support of the modalization 
of the proposition. He/she tends to use a deontic modal marker of high value with the 
support of strong evidence such as laws or obligations, and vice versa. In the case of 
volitional modality, the speaker also needs to explain why someone wants to do 
something based on the evidence showing the necessity or possibility to do so.  
 
I assume that ideally the speaker tends to use a modal device of higher value when 
he/she has stronger evidence in support of the proposition. Similarly, if the speaker 
has weaker evidence, then he/she is supposed to use a modal device of lower value. 
Therefore, we could check whether the value of modality that the speaker has chosen 
is consistent with the strength of evidence that he provides in his speech. If they do 
not match well, then it means the speaker is more likely to manipulate his audience 
during his process of legitimisation. At the same time, the speaker’s choices of 
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different evidentials as well as modal markers also encode his/her stance and ideology.  
 
In a word, all the three dimensions of space, time and evidentiality pertain to the 
positioning and analysis of different categories of modality, setting the stage for this 
model. 
 
2.2.2 Modality as Distance 
In this study, the criteria of classifying modal values derive from Halliday’s SFL 
(Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:147). For example, deontic modality can be divided 
into three levels of semantic meanings: be required to, be supposed to, be allowed to, 
with corresponding three levels of modal value (high, intermediate, and low), as 
shown in Table 2.1. Epistemic modality and volitional modality
12
 also have three 
levels of semantic meanings in terms of modal values: high (be certain), intermediate 
(be probable), low (be possible); high (be determined to), intermediate (intend to), low 
(be willing to).  
 
Table 2.1 The classification of modal values  
 
      Modal value       
Type 
  High value Intermediate  
   Value 
Low Value 
Deontic Modality  be required to  be supposed to be allowed to 
Epistemic Modality    be certain    be probable  be possible 
Volitional Modality be determined to   be intended to  be willing to 
 
Within the framework, different levels of epistemic modal values which encode 
various degree of certainty can be demonstrated by their distance to the centre of 
certainty. This distance has been treated as epistemic distance in previous studies. For 
example, Evans and Green claims that epistemic distance is concerned with ‘the 
                                                        
12 The criteria of classifying volitional values are adapted from Halliday’s semantic criteria for ‘degrees of 
inclination’, while those of epistemic modality and deontic modality draw on the criteria for ‘degrees of probability’ 
and ‘degrees of obligation’ respectively (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:147).  
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speaker’s metaphorical “distance” from a particular state of affairs: the speaker’s 
“position” or judgment regarding the likelihood of a particular situation coming about’ 
(2006:395).  
 
There is solid evidence for epistemic distance from spatial metaphoric expressions, for 
example, we can find expressions like ‘far from the truth’, ‘remotely possible’, ‘close 
to the truth’, and ‘approach the truth’ for epistemic ‘remoteness’ (cf. Chilton 2004:59). 
Besides, conditional constructions are found to be one of the essential forms encoding 
modality in this research, which can also be explored from the perspective of time 
dimension as they indicate ‘the remote part of the modality scale’ (ibid.; also see 
Gabrielatos 2010).  
 
Similar to epistemic modality, deontic modality can also be addressed in terms of 
distance as it has ‘a proximity-remoteness structure’ (Frawley 1992:421-3). Chilton 
similarly states: ‘that which is morally or legally “wrong” is distanced from Self’ 
(2004:60). Nuyts claims that deontic modality may be defined as ‘an indication of the 
degree of moral desirability of the state of affairs expressed in the utterance’ (2010:9). 
The notion of ‘degree’ indicates that: 
    [modality] involves a gradual scale going from absolute moral necessity via the 
intermediary stages of (on the positive side of the scale) desirability, acceptability 
and (on the negative side of the scale) undesirability, to absolute moral 
unacceptability. (Nuyts 2010:9)  
 
In other words, deontic modality can indicate the deontic distance of a proposition 
from the speaker’s concept of rightness (necessity). This is reflected in polysemous 
expressions such as ‘he has gone too far’, ‘outside the norms of convention’, and 
‘within the bounds of decency’ (Chilton 2004:60). This provides strong evidence for 
this model because ‘deontic distance’ proposed here is positioned on the image 
schemas of CENTRE-PERIPHERY and NEAR-FAR (Lakoff 1987) (see Section 1.4.2 




In this study, the notion of deontic distance is not restricted to the ideological 
disparities between the political parties. Rather it can refer to the ideological diversity 
both individually or collectively and nationally or internationally. In this model, the 
term is adopted to represent the distance between the deontic stance (encoded by three 
levels of modal values) expressed by the speaker and the centre of necessity / 
rightness of the speaker. That is because deontic modality can illustrate the distance to 
legal or moral necessity / rightness, which is mostly ideological. For example, if 
someone says ‘we should pay taxes’, then the speaker probably holds the belief (a 
kind of ideology) that ‘paying taxes’ is legally or morally right. And here the modal 
auxiliary ‘should’ can be positioned in terms of deontic distance in this model. In this 
case, the deontic stance is positioned near to the centre (necessity) with regard to 
deontic distance because ‘should’ is of intermediate modal value. Therefore, the 
ideology (political, social, moral values) reflected in this example can be identified as 
near to the speaker’s core values.  
 
Similarly, volitional distance is a new term coined here to indicate the metaphorical 
distance between the volitional stance (expressed by volitional modals) and the centre 
of willingness. Volitional distance is also concerned with the metaphorical volitional 
‘distance’ of a particular state of affairs towards the centre of willingness: the 
speaker’s willingness regarding realizing a proposition. That is to say, the different 
degrees of volitional modal markers can be evaluated in terms of volitional distance. 
For example, the volitional marker ‘be determined to’ can be used to express the 
degree of stronger willingness / commitment than ‘want to’, while ‘be willing to’ is 
weaker than ‘want to’ in terms of the degree of willingness / commitment. Therefore, 
‘be determined to’ is closer to the centre of ‘willingness’ than ‘want to’, whereas ‘be 
willing to’ should be farther than ‘want to’ from the perspective of volitional distance.  
 
Volitional modal markers are often adopted based on the necessity or possibility of 
realizing the propositions indicated. Put another way, stronger willingness / 
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commitment often indicates a higher necessity or possibility of realizing the 
proposition.  
 
Overall, all the three types of modality in this study (epistemic modality, deontic 
modality and volitional modality) can be addressed from the perspective of distance, 
namely epistemic, deontic and volitional distance. Within the framework, the value of 
all three types of modality (including high, intermediate and low) is represented by 
three corresponding levels of distance: close, near, and distant, as shown in Figure 2.1.  
  
2.2.3 Evidentiality as Distance 
The term ‘strength of evidence’ is adopted to evaluate the validity or the persuasive 
force of evidential markers in the research framework. It refers to the degree of 
reliability of evidential markers, indicating the differences among various sources of 
evidence (cf. Hart 2011). It plays an important role in this model because it can not 
only help us judge the (inter)subjectivity or objectivity of modality, but also assist 
modality in (de)legitimising propositions or proposals.  
 
In this model, the strength of evidence can also be conceptualized in terms of distance, 
graded in relation to three levels (strong, intermediate, and weak) with the 
corresponding distance: close, near and distant (See Section 2.4.1 for detailed 
classification of evidential markers and Chapter Six for the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of evidentials). That means weak evidence indicates ‘the 
remoteness’, that is, ‘the distance between the reference point and located point is 
relative large’ (Frawley 1992:413). For example, for the category of perceptions, the 
evidential markers ‘I’ve seen’ is stronger than ‘I’ve heard’ as to strength of evidence, 
as the former shows the speaker is closer to the certainty or truth (the centre). 
Similarly, the latter one indicates stronger evidence than that of ‘I feel’. As to the 
category of outside source (external information), evidentials indicating ‘report’ is 
stronger than those of ‘hearsay’ with respect to strength of evidence (ibid.). In other 





2.2.4 Functions of Modality  
Based on previous studies and observations in the three case studies, I argue that the 
modals mainly function as stance-taking acts. However, different types of modals 
function differently pertaining to expressing stance. 
 
With regard to stance-taking acts, epistemic modality expresses knowledge-based 
stance and deontic modality encodes value-based stance, while volitional modality 
marks emotion-based stance, as shown in Table 2.2. This is because these three types 
of modality are adopted based on the speaker’s knowledge, values and emotions 
respectively (see Sections 3.3.1, 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 for details).  
 
Table 2.2 Functions of modality  
 
Modality      
Functions 
 Epistemic Modality  Deontic Modality Volitional Modality 







Furthermore, modality can also be adopted to serve the speaker’s purpose of 
persuasion/ (de)legitimisation during the discourse production process. Stance-taking 
acts contribute to (de)legitimisation at two different levels, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.  




Figure 2.2 Functions of modality at the propositional and discourse levels 
 
The functions of modality with respect to stance-taking acts are explicit and can be 
identified in the text. However, its functions of reflecting ideology and legitimisation 
are relatively implicit, and can only be inferred from a cognitive perspective. However, 
we can infer the ideology of the speaker and his/her (de)legitimisation process through 
stance-taking acts.   
 
In other words, stance-taking acts can reflect the speaker’s ideology in one way or 
another. As mentioned previously, three different types of modality encode three 
different kinds of stance, which means they reflect the speaker’s ideology from 
different perspectives. According to van Dijk (1998:18-19), ideologies are the 
products of judgements based on values or knowledge. Similarly, Verschueren (2012: 
8, quoted in Koller 2014:243) notes that modality (both epistemic and deontic forms) 
serves ideology in that it ‘balances description and prescription [and] involves theories 
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hand, emotion can also form part of ideologies for the socially situated nature of 
ideology means that it involves ‘affect and stance’ (Verschueren 2012:9). Drawing on 
Koller’s work, ideology here is defined as a (metaphorical) network of beliefs that 
based on values, knowledge and emotions about events, ideas and people (Koller 
2014:239). In this sense, epistemic modality reflects the speaker’s ideology based on 
his/her knowledge pertaining to what is possible or impossible to be realized (cf. van 
Dijk 2011, 2014) and deontic modality reflects the speaker’s ideology based on his/her 
values concerning what should be done or not, while volitional modality reflects the 
speaker’s ideology based on his/her emotions with regard to what/who is willing or 
unwilling to take actions.   
 
Stance-taking acts contribute to the function of (de)legitimisation at the propositional 
level. That is to say, the stance expressed by different types of modality helps 
(de)legitimise the assertion or action stated in the proposition itself. This thesis will 
argue that epistemic stance can be used to (de)legitimise assertions (see Hart 2010, 
2011; Marín-Arrese 2011a, 2011b), while deontic and volitional stance can 
(de)legitimise actions (For details, see Sections 3.3.1, 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 respectively). 
Consider the following example. 
 
Indeed, that Britain must be both; that we are stronger with the US because of our 
strength in Europe; that we are stronger in Europe because of our strength with the US. 
(T. Blair; 15 December 1998) 
 
The deontic modal marker ‘must’ in this example expresses Tony Blair’s deontic 
stance that ‘It is necessary for Britain to establish stronger relationship with both the 
US and Europe’. By using the deontic modal ‘must’, he makes demands on which way 
to take as to this issue. During the process of analysing stance and (de)legitimisation, 
we can also infer his belief (as part of his ideology) that ‘Britain benefits from the 




On the other hand, stance-taking acts also contribute to the function of 
(de)legitimisation at the discourse level. They help the speaker to (de)legitimise the 
proposals (or beliefs) indicated in the discourse context, not the assertion or action 
stated in the proposition itself (for details, see Sections 3.3.2, 4.3.2 and 5.3.2).  
 
In the different contexts, the same modal marker may function differently or differ in 
its modal stance or force. To illustrate this, I propose that epistemic / deontic / 
volitional stance usually change from positive, favourable, neutral to negative, 
according to different social or ideological distance between the speaker and different 
subjects (namely, Speaker-Subject Distance), which can be roughly divided into four 
groups
13
: the speaker (including the people, institution or country he represents); his 
friends (people, institutions or countries share similar ideologies or opinions), others 
(people, institutions, or countries have different ideologies or opinions) and his 
opponents (people, institutions or countries have conflictive ideologies or opinions), 
as shown in Figure 2.3.   
 
Figure 2.3 Interaction between speaker-subject distance vs. stance & value of modality 
 
For example, deontic modality is often adopted to make proposals when the subject is 
                                                        
13 This division is similar to Koller’s work (2014) of in-group, affiliated group and out-group. 
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related to the speaker, and used to give suggestions as to his friends or others, but used 
to give warnings in referring to his enemies. Similarly, epistemic modality is adopted 
to express expectations when the subject is related to the speaker, and used to explain 
possibilities concerning his friends or others, but used to make predications of threats 
in referring to his enemies. Volitional modality is adopted to show one’s determination 
when the subject is the speaker, and used to express wishes as to his friends or others, 
but used to describe direct threats in referring to his enemies.  
 
At the same time, according to the research framework, three different levels of 
Speaker-Subject Distance represent three levels of modal value (including high, 
intermediate, and low
14
). This means that the same modal may express different levels 
of stance due to different Speaker-Subject Distance, varying from strong, intermediate, 
to weak, as shown in Figure 2.3.   
 
Overall, modality is context-dependent and the possible interpretations of the same 
modal marker should not be restricted to those mentioned above, which needs to be 
examined carefully together with evidentiality in given contexts. 
 
2.3 Data Collection and Background  
As mentioned previously, this research will combine quantitative and qualitative 
research methods to data analysis. That means it is necessary to collect a certain 
amount of data which will enable me to do corpus linguistic analysis as well as 
detailed qualitative analysis in contexts. Authentic political speeches by three 
politicians from different countries (by former British premier Tony Blair, US 
President Barack Obama, former Iran president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) were 
collected to do a comparative study. Each case consists of a corpus of ten speeches 
(around 26,000 words in total) from the same politician, with topics ranging from war, 
racism, education, economy, election, to foreign relations and climate change.   
                                                        
14 The distance of opposite is represented by negative modals (e.g. will not, must not and be unwilling to) and its 




I chose political speeches by three politicians from three different countries in order to 
see their similarities and disparities of using modality and evidentiality in different 
social, political and cultural contexts.  
 
There are mainly three reasons why I chose these three politicians. First and foremost, 
for the purpose of comparisons and contrasts in terms of ideology and stance, I 
deliberately chose two politicians from countries which share similar value systems 
and interests (former British premier Tony Blair and US president Barack Obama), 
and another politician from a country that has a different value system (Iran’s former 
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad). It will be very interesting to see how the speakers 
with similar or different value systems express their stance, reflect their ideology, and 
legitimise their propositions through modality and evidentiality.  
 
Secondly, these speakers have been recognized as among the most influential political 
speakers. Tony Blair was elected as British prime minister three times and Barack 
Obama has won twice in US presidential elections. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is 
known for his controversial positions on human rights, 9/11 event, nuclear 
development and Israel, also won the position of Iranian president twice. It is, 
therefore, interesting to investigate how these political speakers persuade or 
manipulate their audiences, including through modality and evidentiality.  
 
Lastly, this research focuses on ‘English’ in terms of language, which is another 
important reason why I chose political speakers from English-speaking countries such 
as Tony Blair and Barack Obama. It is important to point out that Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s English speeches in the data are not original, but translated versions. 
There are mainly two reasons why it is worthwhile to include these translated 
speeches in the data. First of all, although translation could be a mediating factor in 
this study, the English texts are the ones presented to the world. When Ahmadinejad 
made speeches at international meetings, his audience (for those who do not know 
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Farsi) can only know his ideas through these translated English speeches. In other 
words, it is the only way through which he can convey his opinions or stance to the 
people all over the world. Secondly, these English versions are all downloaded from 
his official website, which means they are authoritative and supposed to be translated 
by expert translators who master Farsi and English very well. If these translated 
speeches were not good enough, they would have been criticized and improved as 
they are available to the public. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to take the political, 
cultural and language differences into account when discussing and interpreting the 
results.  
 
In what follows, I will briefly introduce the background to the political speeches from 
the three politicians. As the focus of this thesis is more on the in-depth linguistic 
analysis of modal and evidential markers, I am not going to provide much information 
about the historical contexts of the three speakers.  
 
2.3.1 Tony Blair’s Speeches  
Tony Blair was the leader of the British Labour Party, who won three general elections 
as British prime minister, i.e. the 1997, 2001 and 2005 elections. Thus, Blair was 
inevitably an important political figure in the UK. That is the main reason he was 
chosen as one of the three speakers for the data collection. His main policy is known 
as ‘the third way’. The key elements of ‘the third way’ are: a belief in the value of 
community; a commitment to equality of opportunity; an emphasis on responsibility; a 
belief in accountability
15
.   
 
The speeches of Tony Blair in the data cover the years from 1998 to 2009, with 26,354 
words in total. The most significant theme of his speeches is ‘the war on Iraq’ (No. 2 
and 7 speeches). Blair was criticized violently and nicknamed as ‘Tony Bliar’ and 
“Bush’s poodle’ because of his foreign policy in ‘the War on Terror’ (Casey 2009: 12). 
                                                        
15 This information was retrieved from the following website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/458626.stm, [accessed on 
March 16th, 2014].  
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In particular, to back up the US, Blair persuaded the British Members of Parliament to 
attack Iraq. But no weapons of mass destruction were found after they destroyed the 
regime of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, it should be interesting to see how Blair adopts 
modality and evidentiality to persuade the British parliament members in his speeches. 
Similarly, Blair, in a speech in Chicago in 1999 (No.3 Speech in the data), claims that 
the war on Kosovo is ‘a just war’, which is also controversial. According to ‘The 
Kosovo Report’ conducted by Independent International Commission on Kosovo, ‘the 
NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate’. However, some criticised ‘the 
NATO intervention as a political diversionary tactic’ so as to replace the news 
coverage of ‘the Monica Lewinsky scandal’, while the Yugoslav government and a 
number of international pressure groups claimed that NATO had carried out war 
crimes, notably the bombing of the Serbian TV headquarters in Belgrade on April 23, 




The second crucial theme of his speeches is about the UK’s relationship with Europe 
and the US. His main belief is that ‘Britain must be both; that we are stronger with the 
US because of our strength in Europe; that we are stronger in Europe because of our 
strength with the US’ (No. 1 and No. 5 speech). 
 
Asylum and immigration is another important theme in Blair’s speeches (No. 8 
speech). His main proposal about this is ‘to tighten the asylum system further’. Blair’s 
other important speeches about the New Deal, the CBI (the Confederation of British 
Industry), Common Sense Culture, Climate Change have also been included in the 





                                                        
16 This information was retrieved from the following website: 




Table 2.3 Tony Blair’s speeches17 
 
NO.  Time Place Theme/Title Listeners Words  
1 15/12/1998 London Foreign Affairs British People 1506 
2 17/12/1998 London On Iraq Members of Parliament 2988 






4 30/11/2000 London New Deal Participants of the New 
Deal Conference 
793 





6 18/11/2003 Birmingham CBI Speech Participants of CBI 
Conference 
2461 
7 20/03/2003 London War with Iraq British People 671 
8 22/04/2005 London Asylum and  
Immigration 
British People 4150 
9 26/05/2005 London Common Sense 








10 13/12/2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Participants of the 
Climate Change  
Summit 
1595 




                                                        
17 All of Tony Blair’s speeches listed here can be found at the following two websites:  




2.3.2 Barack Obama’s Speeches 
Barack Obama is the current US president and the leader of American Democratic 
Party, who won the 2008 and 2012 general elections. Because of his unusual family 
background, his success has come to be seen a typical example of the American dream. 
In the preface to the 2004 edition of Dreams from My Father, Obama (2004) 
expressed his firm belief that the story of his family ‘might speak in some way to the 
fissures of race that have characterized the American experience, as well as the fluid 
state of identity…that mark our modern life.’  
 
The Obama Administration has a comprehensive and detailed policy agenda. Among 
many important domestic and foreign policy objectives, priorities of the Obama 
Administration include:  
a plan to revive the economy; provide affordable, accessible health care to all; 
strengthen our public education and social security systems; define a clear path to 
energy independence and tackle climate change; end the war in Iraq responsibly 
and finish our mission in Afghanistan; work with our allies to prevent Iran from 




The speeches of Barack Obama in the data cover the years from 2002 to 2012, with 
26,476 words in total. The initial success of Obama’s candidacy for president owed 
much to an anti-war speech he gave in October 2002 (No. 1 speech in the data), when 
he was a relatively unknown state senator from Illinois. In this speech, he ‘regarded 
the impending war in Iraq as a politically motivated war designed to distract the 
attention of the American people from pressing problems at home – social inequality 
and a looming economic depression’ (Pedersen 2009:152). The reason why this 
speech is of interest to me is that it can be a good source of a comparative study with 
Blair’s pro-war speeches, albeit given from different positions.    
 
The second interesting theme of Obama’s speeches is about race (No. 2 speech: ‘a 
                                                        
18 This information was retrieved from the following website on March 16th, 2014: http://change.gov/agenda/. 
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more perfect union’). In this speech, Obama addressed the subjects of racial tensions, 
white privilege, as well as race and inequality in the United States. His speech closed 
with a plea to move beyond America’s ‘racial stalemate’ and address shared social 
problems.  
 
As to the theme of Immigration (No. 8 speech), his main belief in this speech is that 
‘immigration reform is an economic imperative’ and ‘reform will also help to make 
America more competitive in the global economy’.    
 
Obama’s other important speeches about election victory, the economy, his 
inauguration, US-China relations, climate change, and immigration have also been 






















Table 2.4 Barack Obama’s speeches19 
  
NO.  Time Place Theme/Title Listeners Words  
1 26/10/2002 Chicago Against the Iraq 
War 
U.S. People 803 
2 18/03/2008 Philadelphia A More Perfect 
Union 
U.S. People 4916 




U.S. People 1949 
4 08/01/2009 George 
Mason 
University 
On the Economy U.S. People 2677 
5 20/01/2009 The White 
House 
Inaugural Address U.S. People 2413 




President Hu of China 2419 




Participants of the 
Climate Change  
Summit 
963 
8 10/05/2011 El Paso On Immigration U.S. People 4113 
9 08/09/2011 The White 
House 
On Jobs Members of Congress 4019 
10 07/11/2012 Chicago Election Night 
Speech 
U.S. People 2204 
        Total number of words 26,476 
 
 
                                                        
19 All of Barack Obama’s speeches listed here can be found at the following two websites: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks. and http://obamaspeeches.com/. [accessed on 
April 8th, 2012]. 
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2.3.3 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Speeches 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the former president of Iran, who won two presidential 
elections in 2005 and 2009. He is a populist who is often regarded as a representative 
of conservatives. His radical remarks about the US, Israel and the Holocaust in his 




His incendiary remarks about Israel, the Holocaust and the West coupled with 
Iran’s continued development of nuclear power and its support of Hamas in 
Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon make Ahmadinejad the focal point of a 
seemingly more dangerous Iran with outsized ambitions.  
 
Ahmadinejad believes that it is possible to end US hegemony if Iran works together 
with other international partners. So Ahmadinejad insists on his assertive foreign 
policy (e.g. defying the Western big powers) in order to create a more balanced, 
multipolar system (Warnaar 2013). 
 
The speeches of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the data cover the years from 2005 to 
2012, with 25,453 words in total. His opposition to Israel is the most common topic of 
his speeches. For example, in 2005, at an Islamic Student Associations conference, 
Ahmadinejad made a speech titled as ‘The World without Zionism’ (No. 1 speech in 
the data), in which he said Israel should be “wiped off the map.”  
 
Another crucial theme of his speech is racism (No. 4 speech). In this speech, 
Ahmadinejad associated racism to Zionism and criticized the practice of the U.N. 
Security Council on this issue. Ahmadinejad’s other important speeches about his 
address to the APA (the Asian Parliamentary Assembly) second general assembly, 
climate change, before 65
th
 and 66th session of the U.N.G.A. (the United Nations 
General Assembly), the 1st International Conference on Disarmament and 
                                                        




Non-Proliferation, the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT) and 16th NAM (the Non-Aligned 
Movement) Summit have also been included in the data, as shown in Table 2.5.  
 
Table 2.5 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speeches21 
 
NO.  Time Place Theme/Title Listeners Number 
of words  
1 26/10/2005 Tehran The World without 
Zionism 




2 29/11/2006 Tehran  Message to American 
Nation 
 
People of America 
2086 
3 19/11/2007 Tehran Address to APA 
second general 
assembly 
Participants of APA 
second general assembly 
2180 
4 21/04/2009 Geneva U.N. Conference on 
Racism 
Participants of U.N. 
Conference on Racism 
2916 
5 17/12/2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Participants of the 
Climate Change Summit 
2084 




Participants the 1st 
International Conference 
on Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation 
2252 
7 23/09/2010 New York Remarks Before the 
U.N.G.A. 
Participants of the 65th 
Session of the U.N.G.A. 
3494 
8 22/09/2011 New York Remarks Before the 
U.N.G.A. 
Participants of the 66th 
Session of the U.N.G.A. 
2973 
                                                        
21 All of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speeches listed here can be found at the following website: 
http://www.president.ir/en/. [accessed on April 8th, 2012]. 
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9 30/05/2012 New York NPT of Nuclear 
weapons 
Participants of the Review 
Conference  
3556 
10 30/08/2012 Tehran 16th NAM Summit Participants of the 16th 
NAM Summit 
2821 
        Total number of words 25,453 
 
2.4 Method of Data Analysis 
Traditionally, many researchers in discourse studies have adopted methods of 
qualitative research (see e.g. Fairclough 1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1995a, 1995b, 2003; 
Fowler 1991; van Dijk 1988). There are several advantages to qualitative research in 
discourse studies. First, there are fewer restrictions for the form or amount of data in 
qualitative research. Second, qualitative research enables us to study the context of the 
data, which is essential for discourse analysis. Third, qualitative research allows us to 
study a great variety of data in terms of differences. However, qualitative research 
necessarily deals with a smaller amount of data compared with quantitative research, 
thus facing the problem of generalizing or replicating the findings (Brannen 1992). 
 
Similarly, quantitative research also has its advantages and disadvantages. It can 
surely benefit a lot from larger amounts of data, which allows us to generalize our 
findings more convincingly (Hammersley 1992). Besides, quantitative research makes 
it possible for us to deal with the data efficiently and systematically. Nevertheless, it 
also has its own weaknesses, such as the neglect of context and the lack of in-depth 
analysis. It is therefore more descriptive and unable to test research hypotheses 
(Hardman 2008:45).  
  
Previous studies show that it is possible to mix quantitative research with qualitative 
research (see e.g. Bryman 1988, 2004; Brannen 1992, 2005; Koller and Mautner 
2004). Therefore, I shall adopt a mixed approach to conduct this research, with 
quantitative research facilitating qualitative research. This means, just as Koller did in 
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her study (2004), this thesis will do quantitative analysis before qualitative analysis. 
Quantitative analysis will be treated as ‘a valuable starting point’, providing ‘a sound 
empirical basis’ (Koller 2004:43) to support the subsequent qualitative analysis of the 
functions of modality and evidentiality in particular contexts. Also, I need to find out 
which modal markers or evidential markers occur most frequently in the data and 
deserve close attention in the qualitative analysis.   
 
Quantitative research here refers to the quantitative calculations of the distributions 
and frequencies of different modal and evidential markers in each case study and the 
comparisons among the three speakers with a corpus linguistic approach. In Section 
2.4.1, I will demonstrate the steps of quantitative analysis for this thesis, with a sample 
of quantitative analysis of modality.  
 
Qualitative research involves close analysis of the functions of modality and 
evidentiality within the contexts, namely how modals and evidentials are used by 
politicians to persuade or manipulate their audience. In Section 2.4.2, I will briefly 
explain the method of studying the functions of modals and evidentials within the 
analytical framework. 
 
2.4.1 Quantitative Analysis: A Corpus Linguistic Approach 
Corpus linguistic approaches seem to be gradually gaining popularity among PDA 
researchers (see, e.g., Baker 2008; Fairclough 2000b; Flowerdew 1997; Gabrielatos 
and Baker 2008; Partington 2003). It helps ‘uncover ideologies and evidence for 
disadvantage’ in political texts (Baker 2006:5; see Hunston 2002:109-23 for a 
summary). Mautner, for example, explores how corpus linguistics can contribute to 
CDA and how to ‘use a reference corpus to support interpretation in CDA’ (2009:133).  
 
There are several reasons why a corpus linguistic approach can be a useful tool in 
discourse studies. One major advantage is that this approach is concerned with 
empirical data, which ‘enable the linguist to make statements which are objective and 
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based on language as it really is rather than statements which are subjective and based 
upon the individual’s own internalized cognitive perception of the language’ 
(McEnery and Wilson 2001:103; see also Koller  and Mautner 2004). Similarly, 
Baker claims that a corpus linguistic approach enables us ‘to place a number of 
restrictions on our cognitive biases’ (2006:12).  
 
A second advantage is that ‘corpus analysis clearly provides a vast amount of textual 
fact’ (Widdowson 2004:123). It can serve as the evidence of the distinctiveness about 
‘the occurrences of the linguistic features, lexical and syntactic, in particular texts, by 
referring them to a more general norm of usage’ (ibid.).  
 
A third advantage is that evidence from ‘corpus, concordance and collocation’ 
(Sinclair 1991) can help explain ‘class, codes and control’ (Bernstein 1990) in 
discourse studies. This is important because all the linguistic choices of speakers and 
writers reflect their representations of the world (Stubbs 1996:194). By examining the 
linguistic frequencies and collocations in the texts, we can see the links between 
linguistic features and social life, which can help us uncover the ideology encoded in 
the texts in terms of modality and evidentiality.  
 
Another advantage of corpus analysis is that it can be ‘a means of constraining the 
under-interpretation and over-interpretation of text’ through checking the intuition of 
discourse analysts with corpus evidence (O’Halloran and Coffin 2004). As they argue:  
In assessing how a text positions its target audience, we as analysts have to try to 
check the prospect of over-interpretation and under-interpretation, and especially 
so if the target audience does not include us as analysts. Totally removing the 
values we bring as analysts to the text in question is difficult to achieve if indeed it 
is possible at all. But if we make no attempt to keep these in check, our analysis 
runs the risk of being merely narcissistic and would then lack generalizability – 
that is, we would only be analysing from our own perspective and so could not 
really claim that we are interpreting text positioning from the perspective of the 
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general target readership. 
                                            (O’Halloran and Coffin 2004:293-4) 
 
There are two basic approaches in corpus study: a corpus-driven approach and a 
corpus-based approach. A corpus-based approach uses a corpus ‘as a source of 
examples to check researcher intuition or to examine the frequency and/ or plausibility 
of the language contained within a smaller data set’ (Baker 2006:16; also see 
Tognini-Bonelli 2001). That is to say, in this approach, a corpus is used as a reference 
corpus to compare its lexical frequencies or collocations with those within the data. 
Therefore, the corpus alone is not the data in a corpus-based approach. A case in point 
is in the study of Stubbs (1996), in which he compares the word ‘happy’ in two texts 
of Baden-Powell with that of the LOB corpus (a corpus of 1.5 million words of 
spoken and written English).  
 
However, a corpus-driven analysis takes a more inductive approach – ‘the corpus 
itself is the data and the patterns in it are noted as a way of expressing regularities 
(and exceptions) in language’ (ibid.). For example, Baker claims that most his case 
studies are examples of corpus-driven analyses, that is, ‘each one uses a particular 
corpus as the main or only source of data’ (Baker 2006:16).  
 
Based on previous studies, this research will adopt a data-driven approach
22
, in which 
I will not only treat the three small corpora as the data for deriving the linguistic 
expressions (expressions of modality and evidentiality in this research), but also do 
quantitative analysis to compare the three politicians’ linguistic choices.  
 
 
                                                        
22
 This approach can be named as corpus linguistic approach, which is different from traditional corpus-based 
approach or corpus-driven approach. That is because it uses the corpora as the only data and generates examples 
from them, but at the same time the author uses these examples to check her research framework which is 
established on the basis of previous literatures.  
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Procedures of Quantitative Studies     
Modality is a very complex domain and there is no agreed definition or typology for it 
(see van der Auwera and Plungian 1998:80; Nuyts 2010:5). This means I have to 
define and classify modality before moving on to retrieve the information I need in the 
data for detailed analysis. Then I have to identify the corresponding forms for each 
type of modality in political discourse. In addition, because the same modal marker 
can encode different meanings in different contexts, I will have to code the data 
manually before starting the quantitative analysis. Based on these principles, I divide 
the procedures of quantitative data analysis into four steps: 
 
 Defining and classifying modality and evidentiality 
 Retrieving forms of modality and evidentiality 
 Coding the data and adapting the classifications of modality and evidentiality23 
 Analysing the data quantitatively  
 
(1) Defining and classifying modality and evidentiality 
Traditionally, there are two perspectives with respect to the semantic study of modality. 
One is ‘a top-down perspective’ and its main concern is ‘one of conceptual 
clarification of modal categories and modal functions’, viz. a ‘function-to-form’ 
approach. The other is ‘a bottom-up perspective’ and its main concern is to ‘trace the 
path from linguistic form to contextually conditioned functions’, viz. a 
‘form-to-function’ approach (Klinge and Hoeg Muller 2010:2). 
 
The approach of ‘form-to-function’ is ‘the classical linguistic way of investigating 
language, viz. to start out from a particular linguistic structure (i.e. the modal 
auxiliaries) and try to account for its linguistic features’ (Nuyts 2001a:24). Most the 
studies in modality adopt this perspective. For example, Palmer’s early works (e.g. 
1974) study modal auxiliaries from the perspective of ‘form-to-function’. Another 
                                                        
23 This step actually has taken place several times during the step of coding the data, though I will not discuss it 
separately. Instead, it is better to be discussed in the first step in order to support the new classification of modality.  
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typical example is that almost all the corpus studies on modality take this approach for 
one obvious reason, that is, the object of study (form of modal expressions) should be 
chosen before the corpus studies start. Krug (2000), for instance, studies English 
quasi-modals (viz. semi-modals) from the perspective of grammaticalization. Besides, 
there are many researchers who study specific modal expressions (e.g. modal adverbs, 
modal adjectives, perception verbs, etc.) to explore their meaning (viz. function) in 
different contexts (see, e.g. Paradis 2003; Klinge 2010).  
 
Although those studies with a perspective of ‘form-to-function’ are ‘essential to 
uncovering central elements to the formulation of more adequately delineated 
categories’ for modality (Klinge and Hoeg Muller 2010:4), this approach ‘potentially 
leads to a biased view of the “matching” problem in language’ and needs to ‘be 
systematically complemented by a “function-to-form” approach’ (Nuyts 2010:14). 
 
The approach of ‘function-to-form’ refers to the approach in which ‘one takes the 
perspective of the meaning categories expressed in language and looks at the range of 
possibilities to realise them formally in the language’ (Nuyts 2010:14). It seems to be 
impossible to conduct a purely function-to-form approach in this research as it is hard 
to define and delimit the functions of modality.   
 
In sum, it is difficult to adopt either of these two approaches exclusively (see Palmer 
1979:1). There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, if we take a purely 
‘form-to-function’ approach, it would confine us to looking for other modal 
expressions which may be of significance in the study of modality. It is evident that 
there are many other modal expressions in addition to modal auxiliaries. On the other 
hand, a purely ‘function-to-form’ approach is concerned with the problem of defining 
the term of modality precisely, which as we know is extremely difficult.  
 
Thus, as Palmer (1979:2) suggested, we have to take into account both form and 
meaning/function, that is, integrating these two perspectives. In fact, the process of 
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defining and classifying modality and evidentiality is a two-directional process in this 
study. In the context of political discourse, I have to first define and classify modality 
and evidentiality based on previous studies before retrieving the forms and tagging 
them, but I also have to modify their classifications several times during the process of 
retrieving the forms and tagging the data.  
 
Modality 
In this thesis, modality is classified into four types: Deontic Modality, Epistemic 
Modality, Volitional Modality and Dynamic Modality. It is essential to note that the 
process of tagging the data is also an effective way to check and modify the 
classification of modality. Moving between data and theory, the classification 
presented has been modified several times during this process. However, in contrast to 
the other three categories, all the modal markers of dynamic modality, such as ‘can, be 
able to, capable’, are of intermediate value. This makes it difficult to fit into the 
research framework of this study. That is because the framework involves three modal 
values and three corresponding levels of distance, and other three types of modality all 
have modal markers in three modal values (See Section 2.2.2 in this chapter). 
Therefore, the category of dynamic modality will not be addressed in detail in this 
thesis, although it will be discussed when necessary.  
 
There are a number of reasons for having volitional modality as a distinct category. 
Volitional modality is different from deontic modality or dynamic modality in 
semantic meaning; it should become a separate category, because it expresses the 
subject’s desires, intentions or willingness to take action. However, in deontic 
modality the participant (indicated by the subject) is often imposed upon to take 
actions by the obligations, necessities or permissions conferred by an outside source. 
In dynamic modality, on the other hand, the participant is often ‘the source of the 
ability’ (see Nuyts 2010:13). Dynamic modality, therefore, is not a part of deontic 
modality, as traditionally dynamic modality is regarded as part of ‘root modality’ (cf. 





As discussed in Section 2.2, this thesis takes a cognitive-functional perspective on 
modality. Modality is conceptualized in terms of distance (cf. Chilton 2004) and 
treated as a scalar phenomenon pertaining to modal values (cf. Halliday 1994). The 
primary function of modality is expressing stance (Biber and Finegan 1989; 
Marín-Arrese 2011a). The types of modality express epistemic stance, deontic stance, 
and volitional stance respectively.  
 
Therefore, in this thesis modality is classified according to the scalar force 
(illocutionary force) of the speaker’s epistemic, deontic or volitional stance indicated 
in the utterance where its force is evaluated in terms of its distance towards the centre 
of certainty, necessity or willingness. For example, an epistemic modal of high value 
is close to the centre of certainty, thus it expresses the strongest force of the speaker’s 
epistemic stance. Similarly, a deontic modal of low value is distant from the centre of 
necessity; therefore it encodes the weakest force of the speaker’s deontic stance. 
Volitional modality is very much similar to the other two types of modality in this 
respect.    
 
In this way, epistemic modality is defined as a semantic domain with which speakers 
express their force of epistemic stance involving certainty, possibility, or predications 
indicated in the utterance; this force is evaluated in terms of epistemic distance 
towards the centre of certainty. Deontic modality is defined as a semantic domain with 
which speakers express their force of deontic stance involving necessity, obligations, 
or permission indicated in the utterance; this force is evaluated in terms of deontic 
distance towards the centre of necessity/rightness. Volitional modality is defined as a 
semantic domain with which speakers express their force of volitional stance 
involving willingness, desirability or intentions indicated in the utterance; this force is 





In contrast to previous studies on the typology of evidentiality (cf. Willett 1988; 
Palmer 2001; Marín-Arrese 2011a), evidentiality in this thesis is treated as persuasion 
strategies and therefore its classification includes both the most typical evidential 
categories (e.g. perceptions and hearsay evidentials) and some marginal evidential 
categories (e.g. evidentials inferred from results or common knowledge). The former 
is widely acknowledged in the previous studies (see e.g. Chafe 1986:263; Willett 
1988:57; Palmer 2001:56; Aikhenvald 2007:211; Marín-Arrese 2011a:206; Hart 
2011:760), while the latter has also been treated as evidentials from different 
perspectives, such as  OBVIOUSNESS and PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (Bednarek 
2006a), or beliefs (Chafe 1986:263; equivalent to personal evidentiality in 
Marín-Arrese’s study, Marín-Arrese 2011a:206), or results and reasoning (cf. Hart 
2011b:758) (See Chapter Six for detailed explanations). 
 
Thus, in this thesis evidentiality is defined as the linguistic marking of source of 
knowledge (information) used as persuasion strategies. Following Squartini 
(2008:918), I propose a framework of English evidentiality which integrates source of 
information and modes of knowing. The linguistic markers (evidentials) indicating 
sources of information are divided into three categories, depending on whether the 
locus of information is from an ‘outside source’, ‘shared source’ or ‘inside source’. 
The distinction of outside source and inside source lies in whether the information is 
external or internal with respect to the speaker (Squartini 2008:917-947), while shared 
source is proposed here to refer to the information known to both the speaker and his 
addressees (often presupposed by the speaker). They can be further classified into two 
categories in each source according to different modes of knowing: ‘the process 
leading to the acquisition of the information (directly visual, indirectly through 
inferences, reports’ (Squartini 2008:917). 
 
In this framework, therefore, the evidential markers can be classified into six types, 
including Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.); Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.); 
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Shared Perceptual Evidentials (S.P.); Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge 
(S.K.); Personal Perceptual Evidentials (P.P.); Inferential Evidentials from Personal 
Knowledge (P.K.)
24
, as illustrated in Table 2.6.  
 





1. Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.) 
(e.g. some reports indicate, the result shows; the figure reveals)  
2. Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.) 





3. Shared Perceptual Evidentials (S.P.) 
(1) sensory perception (e.g. we’ve seen; you’ve heard) 
(2)Mental perception or inference (e.g. clearly, it was clear that; 
obviously, it seems, apparently) 
4. Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge (S.K.) 
(e.g. in fact; actually; it is evident that; evidently; there’s no doubt 




5. Personal Perceptual Evidentials (P.P.)  
 (e.g. I saw; I heard; I feel) 
6. Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge (P.K.) 
(e.g. I know; I am convinced; I’ve learned; I realize; I believe; I 
think; I suppose; in my opinion; I have no doubt; I am confident) 
 
(2) Retrieving forms of modality and evidentiality  
For the second step, I adopted a data-driven approach to retrieve the various forms of 
modals and evidentials from the data. Based on the previous classification and 
definitions of modal types, I identified four main categories of modal forms in the data 
(including Modal Verbs, Semi-Modals, Modal Adjectives and Modal Adverbs), 
                                                        
24 These six types of evidentials are identified manually in the data and then will be annotated and analyzed both 
quantitatively and qualitatively in Chapter Six. 
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encoding three main modal semantic categories mentioned above (Deontic Modality, 
Epistemic Modality, and Volitional Modality) and three corresponding values 
(including High, Intermediate, and Low), as illustrated in Table 2.7.  
 
Table 2.7 Categories of modal forms, meanings and values in political discourse 
 





















have got to  
need to, be to 




































not have to 











must, will, shall 
 
be to  
be going to  
























must not  
will not 
 




may not  





















be going to 
be determined to  
would, should, may 
intend to 




be willing to 
 
 
Negative will not  
be not going to 
        
would not 
not intend to 
not want to 
 
be unwilling to 
  
 
The situation is very complicated, especially for modal verbs. Here I divided each 
modal form into both positive and negative forms because some modal markers have 
different modal values when they are negative. For example, ‘possible’ is of low value, 
while its negative form ‘impossible’ indicates the opposite meaning of ‘certain’, and 
therefore demonstrates a high value. However, while ‘certain’ is of high value, its 
negative form ‘uncertain’ indicates a low value because ‘uncertain’ manifests a low 
possibility of the proposition. Besides, the values of those modals modified with 
intensified or mitigated adverbs such as ‘extremely unlikely’ or ‘definitely impossible’ 
will only be decided according to the modals themselves, though there is no doubt that 
they are intensified when compared with ‘unlikely’ or ‘impossible’. Moreover, as some 
modal markers encode different modal meanings, they appear several times. For 
example, there are mainly ten modal verbs, including ‘must’, ‘can’, ‘could’, ‘will’, 
Chapter Two 
 93 
‘would’, ‘may’, ‘might’, ‘shall’ , ‘should’ and ‘ought (to)’. Most modals have two 
different readings such as ‘will’ or ‘can’, while ‘shall’ ‘should’ and ‘may’ can have all 
three readings. 
 
I identified the five most frequent semi-modals as ‘have (got) to’, ‘want to’, ‘be to25’, 
‘be going to’, and ‘need to’; and six less frequent semi-modals including ‘intend to’, 
‘be required to’, ‘be supposed to’, ‘be allowed to’, ‘be determined to’ and ‘be willing 
to’ in the data. While ‘be to’ can have all the three different modal meanings and ‘be 
going to’ has both epistemic and volitional meanings, other semi-modals have only 
one reading; ‘have (got) to’, ‘need to’, ‘be required to’, ‘be supposed to’ and ‘be 
allowed to’ only have a deontic reading; ‘want to’, ‘intend to’, ‘be determined to’ and 
‘be willing to’ only have a volitional reading. In addition, each of the modal adjectives 
and adverbs only encode one specific modal meaning. Overall, it is obvious that we 
cannot match each category of modal form with one specific semantic meaning, which 
is also the main reason why we have to analyse modality in its context.  
 
Compared with modals, it is much easier to retrieve the evidential markers in the data 
as each of them only falls into one category, based on the criteria which are shown in 
Table 2.6. Note that the evidentials identified in the data are not restricted to those 
listed in the table. As discussed previously, covert (zero-marked) modals and 
evidentials will not be taken into account in this thesis because it is impossible to 
count them as they are almost everywhere.  
 
(3) Coding the Data 
After retrieving all the forms of modality from the data, I started to read through all 
the speeches in the data line by line to identify and decide each modal marker or 
evidential marker with its relevant types and value in its context. At the same time, I 
                                                        
25 ‘Be to’ has a number of different meanings. Some have modal readings including deontic, epistemic and 
volitional readings, but many have no modal meanings. For example, ‘be to’ only expresses the result of ‘hiring 
teachers to reduce class size’ in the example of ‘Therefore, perversely, hiring teachers to reduce class size is to 
reduce productivity’. Thus, we only deal with the cases with modal meanings in this research.  
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coded all the forms, types, values of modal markers; sources and strengths of evidence 
in the data manually with their abbreviated forms to make it easier for analysing them 
quantitatively and qualitatively, as shown in brackets in Table 2.8.  
 
Table 2.8 Abbreviations of modal markers and evidential markers 
 
 
I will employ a colour coding scheme throughout as follows: 
 
Modal marker < form / type / value > 
Evidential marker < source / type > 
 
Consider the following examples taken from the coded data: 
[1] We need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > modernise the way we do business in 
Europe. Otherwise, far from speeding the pace of change, enlargement would < 
                                                        


















































    









M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > make the system grind to a halt. (T. Blair; 18 November, 
2003) 
[2] But I also believe < Inside / P.K. > America at its best is a powerful force for good 
in the world; one of a few countries willing < M.semi. / V.M. / Low. > and able to 
stand up for what it believes. (T. Blair; 15 December 1998) 
[3] We will < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > certainly < M.adv. / E.M. / High. > be better 
placed after this military strike than if we had to < M.semi. / D.M / High. > go on 
dealing with a Saddam Hussein whose military capability had not been weakened 
and with an UNSCOM increasingly impeded from any serious work. (T. Blair; 17 
December 1998) 
 
In Example [1], the yellow codes < M.semi. / D.M. / High > after the modal 
marker-need to indicate it is a semi-modal, a deontic modal marker and of high value. 
Similarly, the yellow codes < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > after the modal marker-would 
indicate it is an epistemic modal verb of intermediate value.  
 
In Example [2], the blue codes < Inside / P.K. > after the evidential marker-I also 
believe indicate it is an inside evidential marker inferred from personal knowledge. 
Besides, the yellow codes < M.semi. / V.M. / Low. > after the modal marker-willing 
(to) show it is a volitional semi-modal of low value. 
 
In Example [3], the yellow codes < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > after the modal 
marker-will show it is an epistemic modal verb of high value and those codes < 
M.adv. / E.M. / High. > after the modal marker-certainly indicate it is an epistemic 
modal adverb of high value. Likewise, the codes < M.semi. / D.M / High. > after the 







(4) Analysing the Data Quantitatively   
Quantitative data analysis involves the calculations of the distributions, concordances 
and collocations of different modal and evidential forms in each case and the 
comparisons among the three speakers with a corpus linguistic approach.  
 
Based on the previous classifications of modal types, values and forms and the tagged 
data, I will first calculate the distributions of modal types in the three cases and then 
make a comparison of their frequencies, followed by the calculations and comparisons 
of modal values and forms respectively. Then I will explore the distributions and 
frequencies of the three modal types with regard to values, forms and top-ten modal 
markers among the three speakers in the following three chapters, respectively. After 
that, I will investigate the frequencies and distributions of evidentials among the three 
speakers from the perspectives of sources, types and top-ten evidential markers in 
Chapter Six. In Chapter 7, I will examine the distributions of the co-occurrence of 
modality and evidentiality in the three cases from the perspective of the interaction of 
three modal types and three sources of evidentials. Following the sections of 
quantitative analysis in each chapter, there will be a section focusing on the discussion 
of results and implications.  
 
In what follows, I will give a sample of quantitative data analysis by demonstrating 
the use of types, values and forms of modality among the three speakers.  
  
(i) Types of Modality 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.9 and Figure 2.4, the distributions of modal types are very 
similar among the three speakers. Epistemic modality takes the first place among three 
types of modality in all three cases, taking up approximately half of the total. The 
frequency of deontic modality ranks second in all three cases, followed by that of 




Table 2.9 The Distribution of Types of Modality in the three cases 
 










No. Per cent No. Per cent No. Per cent 
 E.M. 373 51.66% 479 59.43% 208 51.11% 
D.M. 200 27.70% 177 21.96% 140 34.40% 
V.M. 149 20.64% 150 18.61% 59 14.49% 
 Total  722 100% 806 100% 407 100% 
   
   
 
Figure 2.4 The distribution of types of modality in the three cases 
 
In order to compare the frequencies of modal types among the three cases, I also 
worked out the figures of per thousand words (henceforth, ptw) for each modal type 
and their average figures based on the original size of data
27
, as shown in Table 2.10 
and Figure 2.5. It is obvious that Obama uses far more epistemic modality with a 
frequency of 18.09 ptw than the two other speakers with 14.15 ptw (Blair) and 8.17 
ptw (Ahmadinejad) respectively. He also ranks first in the use of volitional modality 
(5.67 ptw). However, Blair (7.59 ptw) uses more deontic modals than the other two 
speakers. Compared with the two other speakers, Ahmadinejad adopts far fewer 
                                                        
27 The total number of words of the data is 78,793 words, with 26, 354 words in Blair’s speeches, 26,476 words in 
















modals in all the three types, with only half of their figures of epistemic modality & 
volitional modality and two-thirds of that of deontic modality. Overall, the differences 
of three types of modality among the three speakers are all significant, though 
statistical analyses shows Blair and Obama
28
 have no significant differences in the 
use of deontic modality and volitional modality.  
 
Table 2.10 A comparison of types of modality in the three cases 
 

















 No. ptw No. ptw 
 E.M. 373 14.15 479 18.09 208 8.17 < 2.2e-16 Yes 
 D.M. 200 7.59 177 6.69 140 5.50 0.01324 Yes 
 V.M. 149 5.65 150 5.67 59 2.32 7.083e-10 Yes 
 Total  722 27.40 806 30.44 407 15.99 < 2.2e-16 Yes 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 
three speakers is significant.) 
 
Figure 2.5 A comparison of types of modality in the three cases 
                                                        
28 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of  
deontic modals (P-value: 0.2372) and volitional modals (P-value: 0.968). 
29 ‘SoD’ is the abbreviation of ‘significance of difference’. 











(ii) Values of Modality 
 
With respect to the values of modality, the percentages of different modal values 
present a similar pattern among the three cases. As can be seen in Table 2.11 and 
Figure 2.6, the numbers of high value and intermediate value are more or less similar 
in all three cases, occupying almost 90% of the whole. It is interesting to see that there 
are more modal markers of high values than intermediate values in all three cases. In 
addition, the percentages of low value are also very similar, with each taking up 
around 7% in all three cases.  
 
Table 2.11 The distribution of values of modality in the three cases 
 











No. Per cent No. Per cent No. Per cent 
High  359 49.72% 370 45.91% 191 46.93% 
Inter. 308 42.66% 367 45.53% 185 45.45% 
Low  55 7.62% 69 8.56% 31 7.62% 
Total  722 100% 806 100% 407 100% 
   
   
 
















In terms of the frequencies of modal values, Obama takes up the first position in all 
the categories, as illustrated in Table 2.12 and Figure 2.7. It is surprising that all the 
figures in the case of Ahmadinejad are about half of the other cases. Although there 
are significant differences with regard to all the three values of modality among the 
three cases, the results between Blair and Obama have no significant differences in the 
use of modals in high and low values
31
.   
 
Table 2.12 A comparison of values of modality in the three cases 
 

















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
High  359 13.62 370 13.97 191 7.50 1.749e-13 Yes 
Inter. 308 11.69 367 13.86 185 7.27 3.043e-12 Yes 
Low  55 2.09 69 2.61 31 1.22 0.001592 Yes 
Total 722 27.40 806 30.44 407 15.99 < 2.2e-16 Yes 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 
three speakers is significant.) 
 
                                                        
31 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of 





Figure 2.7 A comparison of values of modality in the three cases 
 
(iii) Forms of Modality 
As can be seen in the Table 2.13 and Figure 2.8, modal verbs take up more than 70% 
in all the cases. Interestingly, all the speakers use modal forms in a very similar way, 
with far more semi-modals than the other modal markers, followed by modal 
adjectives and modal adverbs, though Ahmadinejad uses more modal adjectives than 
semi-modals and modal adverbs.    
 
Table 2.13 The distribution of forms of modality in the three cases 
 









No. Per cent No. Per cent No. Per cent 
M.verb. 528 73.13% 620 76.92% 324 79.61% 
M.semi. 142 19.67% 134 16.63% 36 8.85% 
M.adj. 39 5.40% 37 4.59% 44 10.81% 
M.adv. 13 1.80% 15 1.86% 3 0.74% 










   
 
Figure 2.8 The distribution of forms of modality in the three cases 
 
As demonstrated in Table 2.14 and Figure 2.9, Obama uses far more modal verbs than 
the other speakers, with a striking figure of 23.42 ptw. Blair uses more semi-modals 
than the other two speakers, with a frequency of 5.39 ptw. It is interesting to note that 
Ahmadinejad ranks first in the use of modal adjectives (1.73 ptw), although he uses 
far fewer modal markers in all the other forms. Except for modal adjectives, all the 
other modal forms have significant differences among the three speakers. However, 
the differences of modal forms between Blair and Obama are only significant in the 
category of modal verbs
32












                                                        
32 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of 


















Table 2.14 A comparison of forms of modality in the three cases 
 
















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
 M.verb. 528 20.03 620 23.42 324 12.73 < 2.2e-16 Yes 
 M.semi. 142 5.39 134 5.06 36 1.41 1.921e-14 Yes 
M.adj. 39 1.48 37 1.40 44 1.73 0.6056 No 
M.adv. 13 0.49 15 0.57 3 0.12 0.02294 Yes 
Total 722 27.40 806 30.44 407 15.99 < 2.2e-16 Yes 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 




Figure 2.9 A comparison of forms of modality in the three cases 
 
Overall, the distributions of modal types, values and forms in the three cases 
demonstrate quite a similar pattern. However, it is important to note that Obama ranks 
first in most categories, particularly for epistemic modality with respect to modal 
types, intermediate value in terms of modal values, modal verbs as to modal forms, 
with a strikingly high frequency of total number of modal markers. Blair comes after 










more semi-modals and modal adjectives than Obama. Compared with the other two 
speakers, Ahmadinejad uses far fewer modal markers in almost every category, 
although he uses the most modal adjectives.  
 
2.4.2 Qualitative Analysis: A Cognitive-functional Approach 
The qualitative analysis in this thesis refers to the analysis of functions of modality 
and evidentiality in the context of political discourse. Based on the 
cognitive-functional analytical framework proposed in this chapter (see Section 2.2) 
and the quantitative results in Section 2 of Chapters 3-7 (viz. Sections 3.2, 4.2, 5.2, 6.2 
and 7.2), the functions of three types of modality and six types of evidentiality will be 
addressed in Sections 3 of Chapters 3-6 respectively (viz. Sections 3.3, 4.3, 5.3 and 
6.3). Besides, the co-occurrence patterns of modality and evidentiality will be 
discussed in Section 7.3. 
 
In the first sub-section of qualitative analysis in Chapters 3-5, the functions of 
modality will be first examined as stance-taking acts, followed by the investigation of 
its functions in terms of ideology and legitimisation. The last subsection will be the 
detailed analysis of the most frequent modal markers of three modal values (high, 
intermediate and low, corresponding with three levels of distance) among the three 
cases. Each type of modality encodes its distinctive stance and ideology (see section 
2.2.5 for details).    
 
The qualitative analysis of evidentiality is quite different from the study of modality. 
The functions of evidentiality will be addressed in Section 6.3 from the perspectives 
of making commitments, marking (inter)subjectivity and encoding ideology in the 
first subsection. The second subsection will investigate the functions of six types of 
evidential markers with respect to their sources and modes of knowing.  
 
In Section 7.3, the functions of the interaction of modality and evidentiality at both 
sentential and discourse levels will be addressed with respect to the co-occurrences of 
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In conclusion, this chapter has proposed a cognitive-functional analytical framework 
for studying modality (and evidentiality) in political discourse, introduced data 
collection and background, as well as discussed the method of data analysis from both 
quantitative and qualitative perspectives.  
 
In particular, I have illustrated the research framework of analysing modality in 
political discourse, explaining some key concepts including the dimensions of time, 
space and evidentiality, deontic distance, epistemic distance, volitional distance, value 
of modality and strength of evidence. I have also discussed how the functions of the 
three types of modality in political discourse can be investigated at both propositional 
and discourse levels within the research framework. I have defined and classified two 
key terms (modality and evidentiality) in the section of method of data analysis. 
Furthermore, I have illustrated the method of quantitative data analysis by analysing 
the types, values and forms of modality used among the three speakers.  
 
On the basis of the framework, data and methods which have been described in this 
chapter, the following three chapters will explore the forms, values and functions of 

















 ‘Epistemic stance’ has been studied widely in discourse analysis and Cognitive 
Linguistics where it has been theorised in terms of ‘epistemic distance’ (e.g. Chilton 
2004; Sweetser 1990; Langacker 1991). Epistemic distance is concerned with ‘the 
speaker’s metaphorical “distance” from a particular state of affairs: the speaker’s 
“position” or judgment regarding the likelihood of a particular situation coming about’ 
(Evans and Green 2006:395). On the other hand, according to Halliday, modality is 
regarded as ‘the intermediate degrees between the positive and negative poles’ and its 
work is ‘to construe the region of uncertainty that lies between “yes” and “no”’ 
(Halliday and Matthiessen 2004:147). In other words, different degrees of epistemic 
modality indicate its distance from certainty.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, epistemic modality is defined as a semantic domain 
with which speakers express their force of epistemic stance, involving possibility, 
predications or capabilities as indicated in the utterance; this force is evaluated in 
terms of epistemic distance towards the centre of certainty. Supported with evidence 
from various sources and of different strengths, it is also possible for political speakers 
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to legitimise their own political proposals/actions or delegitimise their opponents’ 
proposals/actions.   
 
In this chapter, I will demonstrate how epistemic modality functions in political 
discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively. As has been discussed in Section 2.4.1 
of Chapter Two, this thesis will put quantitative data analysis before qualitative data 
analysis as the former can provide empirical evidence for claims in the latter (Koller 
2004).  
 
3.2 Quantitative Analysis of Epistemic Modality 
In this section, I shall calculate and compare the frequencies and distributions of 
epistemic modality from the perspectives of values and forms in the three cases. In 
addition, I will compare the top-ten modal markers of epistemic modality in the three 
cases. After that, I will discuss the results and implications of how different political 
speakers use epistemic modality in their speeches.   
 
3.2.1 Values of Epistemic Modality 
As we can see in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1, the distribution of values of epistemic 
modality in the three cases presents a very similar pattern, particularly in the cases of 
Blair and Obama. Overall the percentage of intermediate value takes the first position, 
followed by high value and low value in the cases of Blair and Obama, while 
Ahmadinejad has a higher percentage of high value than that of intermediate value. 
Compared with the two other speakers, Ahmadinejad adopts far fewer epistemic 
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Table 3.1 The distribution of values of epistemic modality in the three cases 
 









No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
High  154 41.29% 188 39.24% 102 49.04% 
Inter. 180 48.26% 239 49.90% 79 37.98% 
Low  39 10.46% 52 10.86% 27 12.98% 
Total  373 100% 479 100% 208 100% 
 
   
 
Figure 3.1 The distribution of values of epistemic modality in the three cases 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2, Obama ranks first in all the categories in 
terms of epistemic modal values, followed by Blair and Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad 
uses far fewer epistemic modals than those of the other two speakers in every category. 
In particular, for epistemic modals of high and intermediate values, Ahmadinejad 
adopts only half of those of Obama. Overall, the differences of the frequencies of 
modal values among the three speakers are significant, though there are no significant 
differences between Blair and Obama with respect to the use of epistemic modals of 





                                                        
33 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in the use of 
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Table 3.2 A comparison of values of epistemic modality in the three cases 
 















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
High  154 5.84 188 7.10 102 4.01 1.491e-05   Yes 
Inter. 180 6.83 239 9.03 79 3.10 < 2.2e-16   Yes 
Low  39 1.48 52 1.96 27 1.06 0.02938   Yes 
Total 373 14.15 479 18.09 208 8.17 < 2.2e-16   Yes 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 




Figure 3.2 A comparison of values of epistemic modality in the three cases 
 
3.2.2 Forms of Epistemic Modality 
As can be seen in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3, the distribution of epistemic modal verbs 
takes up the first position in all three cases with an average of 87%, followed by 
modal adjectives, semi-modals and modal adverbs. Surprisingly, although 
Ahmadinejad uses 13.46% modal adjectives, he uses very few modal adverbs (1.44%) 
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Table 3.3 The distribution of forms of epistemic modality in the three cases 
 





Barack Obama Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad 
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
M.verb. 334 89.54% 432 90.19% 177 85.10% 
M.semi. 11 2.95% 12 2.51% 0 0 
M.adj. 20 5.36% 24 5.01% 28 13.46% 
M.adv. 8 2.14% 11 2.29% 3 1.44% 
Total  373 100% 479 100% 208 100% 
 
   
 
Figure 3.3 The distribution of forms of epistemic modality in the three cases 
 
In Table 3.4 and Figure 3.4, we can see that all three speakers use far more modal 
verbs than other forms, which is probably the reason why many previous studies focus 
on modal verbs only when discussing epistemic modality. It is surprising to see that 
Obama uses a lot more modal verbs (16.32 ptw) than Blair (12.67 ptw) and 
Ahmadinejad (6.95 ptw), though he adopts very similar numbers of semi-modals, 
modal adjectives and adverbs to Blair. Compared with Blair and Obama, Ahmadinejad 
adopts more modal adjectives, with far fewer modal verbs and modal adverbs, and no 
semi-modals. Overall, the differences of the frequencies of epistemic modal verbs and 
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Blair and Obama, only modal verbs are significantly different
34
.   
 
Table 3.4 A comparison of forms of epistemic modality in the three cases 
 















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
M.verb. 334 12.67 432 16.32 177 6.95 < 2.2e-16 Yes 
M.semi. 11 0.42 12 0.45 0 0 0.003806 Yes 
M.adj. 20 0.76 24 0.91 28 1.10 0.4387 No 
M.adv. 8 0.30 11 0.42 3 0.12 0.1248 No 
Total 373 14.15 479 18.09 208 8.17 < 2.2e-16 Yes 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 








                                                        
34 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of 
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3.2.3 Top-10 Modal Markers of Epistemic Modality 
As can be seen in Table 3.5, the list of the most frequent modal markers among the 
three cases presents a very similar pattern (See Table A1-A3 in the Appendix for 
details). Firstly, the three speakers share most of the ten top-modal markers regardless 
of their ranks, such as ‘will’, ‘can’, ‘would’, ‘could’, and ‘possible’. Secondly, 
epistemic modal markers ‘will’, ‘can’ and ‘would’ take up the first three positions in 
all three cases.  
 
However, the results show that there are more disparities than similarities. First of all, 
Blair and Ahmadinejad use far more ‘will’ than ‘can’ with 123 counts vs. 94 counts 
and 81 counts vs. 20 counts respectively, while the situation is reversed in the case of 
Obama (161 counts vs. 167 counts). Second, Obama uses ‘can’ (167 counts) and ‘will’ 
(161 counts) far more frequently than Blair and Ahmadinejad (with 94 and 50 counts 
in the use of ‘can’; 124 and 82 counts in the use of ‘will’). Besides, he adopts more 
‘could’ (32 counts), ‘may’ (20 counts) and ‘be going to’ (11 counts) than the other two 
speakers. Third, Blair uses more ‘would’ (62 counts), and ‘be to’ (6 counts), compared 
with Obama and Ahmadinejad (37 and 30 counts in the use of ‘would’; 1 and 0 counts 
in the use of ‘be to’).  
 
Interestingly, Ahmadinejad uses far fewer modal verbs than the other two speakers, 
particularly for ‘will’ and ‘can’, though he adopts more ‘possible’ (22 counts), and 
‘shall’ (4 counts).  
 
Overall, all three speakers use far more modal verbs in epistemic modality, such as 
‘will’ , ‘can’ , ‘would’ and ‘could’, though each speaker has different preferences in 
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Table 3.5 A comparison of top-10 modal markers of epistemic modality in the three 
cases 
 












 No.  Modal 
Markers 
 No.  Modal 
Markers 
 No.  
1 will
35
 124(8) can 167(31) will 82(7) 
2 can 94(20) will 161(13) can 50(8) 
3 would 62(4) would 37(6) would 30(5) 
4 could 22(3) could 32(4) possible 22(9) 
5 possible 12(1) may 20(4) could 12(2) 
6 may 11 possible 13(1) may 5 
7 might  6 be going to 11 shall 4 
8 be to 6 might 5 certainly 3 
9 be going to 5(1) shall 4 sure 2 




3.2.4 Discussions and Implications 
In sum, this section has illustrated and compared the distributions and frequencies of 
the values and forms of epistemic modality among the three cases. It has also showed 
ten most frequent epistemic modal markers in each case and discussed their 
similarities and differences among the three speakers. The most striking results and 
their implications are as follows: 
 
(i) On the whole, the distributions and frequencies of epistemic modality in the three 
cases present quite a similar pattern in terms of values and forms, particularly in 
                                                        
35 The numbers in the brackets of Table 3.5 & 3.6 indicate the numbers of the negative forms of corresponding 
epistemic modal markers, which have been included in the total numbers, e.g. ‘124’ is the total number of 
epistemic marker ‘will’ used by Tony Blair, and ‘8’ is the number of its negative form. 
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the cases of Blair and Obama. As to the total number of epistemic modal markers, 
Obama comes first with 479 counts, followed by Blair with 373 counts, while 
Ahmadinejad uses only about half of their figures (208 counts). This difference 
could derive from the issue of their distinctive rhetorical styles, or cultural 
differences or the translation issue (particularly in the case of Ahmadinejad).   
 
(ii) With regard to modal values, Obama uses the most epistemic modals both in total 
and in all the categories, followed by Blair and Ahmadinejad. The percentages of 
intermediate value are higher than those of high value in the cases of Blair and 
Obama, but this is reversed in the case of Ahmadinejad. That is probably because 
making assertions in intermediate force allows the speakers to evade the potential 
responsibility if their epistemic judgments turn out to be wrong (Hart 2014:58).  
 
(iii) Modal verbs take up the first position in all the cases, with over 85%. That means 
other modal forms account for about 15%. That is probably the reason why 
previous studies of epistemic modality often focus on modal verbs only. However, 
there are also some interesting results about other modal forms, such as 
‘certain/certainly’, and ‘possible/ impossible’.  
 
(iv) The differences among the three cases are significant in all the modal values, as 
well as modal verbs and semi-modals. As Obama and Blair are similar in the 
frequencies of most forms and values of epistemic modals
36
, it is the results of 
high and low values as well as semi-modals and modal adjectives in 
Ahmadinejad’s case that make these differences significant. So it gives us a hint 
that these disparities might be the differences of using epistemic modal markers 
between English native speakers and foreigners. Therefore, it is important to 
examine these values and forms of epistemic modals in political discourse in more 
detail.  
                                                        
36 I calculated the P-value of the differences in the use of epistemic modals between Obama and Blair in every 
category and found no significant differences in high and low values, as well as most modal forms except 
modal verbs. 




(v) Epistemic modals ‘will’, ‘can’ and ‘would’ take up the first three positions in all 
three cases, although the order of ‘will’ and ‘can’ is reversed in the case of Obama. 
One major reason for this fact is that all of them convey several different semantic 
meanings, which make it easier for the speakers to conceal their real intentions and 
evade responsibilities.  
 
(vi) Besides the similarities, each speaker also has his own preferences in using 
epistemic modals. For example, Obama uses far more ‘can’ and ‘will’ than the 
other two speakers, while Blair uses more ‘would’ & ‘be to’ and Ahmadinejad 
uses more ‘possible’ & ‘shall’.  
 
However, before making generalizations about the functions of epistemic modals in 
political discourse, it is essential to take context into consideration. Therefore, it is 
necessary to look at how these modal markers used in the context and consider why 
they may have been chosen to serve specific purposes. In particular, it is important to 
explore their various functions under different circumstances. For these reasons, in the 
next section, I am going to address epistemic modality qualitatively with various 
examples retrieved from the three cases.   
 
3.3 Qualitative Analysis of Epistemic Modality 
As mentioned previously in Chapter Two (see Section 2.2.4), modality is treated as a 
stance-taking act and contributes to the function of (de)legitimisation.  
 
In the first sub-section, I will discuss how epistemic modality functions as 
knowledge-based stance and reflecting ideology, and then illustrate its contribution to 
the process of (de)legitimisation at the propositional level. In the second sub-section, I 
shall explore how different expressions of epistemic modality function in different 
contexts from the perspectives of epistemic distance, and value of modality through a 
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detailed qualitative analysis.   
 
3.3.1 Epistemic Modality as Knowledge-based Stance 
Previous studies show that modality is an important way of expressing stance. For 
example, Biber and Finegan treat modals as ‘stance markers’, which express ‘attitudes, 
feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a 
message’ (1989:93). Following Marín-Arrese (2011b:195), epistemic stance here 
refers to: 
the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the knowledge concerning the 
realization of events, to the ways in which the speaker/writer carries out a stance 
act aimed at estimating the likelihood of an event and/or judging the validity of a 
proposition designating the event.                                                                      
 
Indeed, epistemic modality can be adopted to make epistemic judgments and express 
epistemic stance with reference to knowledge (see van Dijk 1998, 2011, 2014). Put 
another way, epistemic stance is mainly knowledge-based. That is because epistemic 
modality is used to express the speaker’s stance towards the possibility of the 
realization of events, based on the knowledge he/she has. This knowledge often 
depends on the speaker’s interest (van Dijk 2011:38) and reflects his beliefs about 
truth or reality (as part of his ideology). This knowledge can be from different sources 
(including outside, shared or inside source), which are often marked by evidential 
markers (see Chapter Six for details). For instance, if the knowledge of Saddam’s 
threat is described as certain with high-value epistemic modals, then attacking Iraq 
will be the right choice, but not when used with epistemic modals of low value or in 
their negative forms. The use of epistemic modals, then, can be seen as ‘knowledge 
grading’ which is a key strategy of managing knowledge in public discourse 
(Facchinetti et al. 2003). In other words, the knowledge relating to high-value 
epistemic modal should be graded as certain knowledge, as it is positioned close to the 
centre of certainty, while that used with low value should be graded as possible 
knowledge as it is positioned distant from the centre (see Section 3.3.2 for details).  




Epistemic modals are, then, dealt with as encoding different illocutionary force 
involving the speaker’s knowledge (including certainty, possibility, predication) 
towards the actualization of propositions. Therefore, epistemic stance can be classified 
into three levels of force corresponding to three levels of modal value, semantic 
meaning and epistemic distance: High-certain-close; Intermediate-probable-near; 
Low-possible-distant. It means an epistemic modal marker with a higher value 
typically expresses a stronger epistemic stance because it is positioned as closer to the 
centre of certainty, and vice versa. For example, the epistemic modal ‘will’ in the 
example “He will come tomorrow.” (where will is an epistemic modal of high value) 
expresses much stronger stance than that of “He may come tomorrow.” (where may is 
an epistemic modal marker of intermediate value), and “He might come tomorrow.” 
(where might is an epistemic modal marker of low value).  
 
Unlike the function of expressing stance, the function of reflecting ideology in terms 
of epistemic modality is implicit, though it can be inferred from its stance. Epistemic 
stance reflects the speaker’s ideology based on his/her knowledge concerning what is 
possible or impossible to be realized. And the epistemic stance made by the speaker 
usually involve his common sense/ knowledge about what is likely or unlikely to be 
actualized (cf. van Djik 1998), which often reveals the speaker’s beliefs (as part of his 
ideology) about what is common knowledge in the context of political discourse. This 
common knowledge is not necessarily shared by others, but held by the speaker 
himself. Consider the following example:  
 
It is crystal clear that < Shared / S.P. > such a management is to the disadvantage of all 
nations and even themselves. The continuation of such a management is definitely 
impossible < M.adj. / E.M. / High >. (M. Ahmadinejad; August 30, 2012) 
 
The epistemic modal marker ‘impossible’ in this example indicates the speaker’s 
strong negative epistemic stance towards the continuation of the management system 
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of UN. This epistemic stance is taken based on his knowledge (reflecting his ideology) 
towards the system. The evidential marker ‘it is crystal clear that’ also indicates that 
Ahmadinejad treats this as a shared fact that can be seen via visual perception.      
 
The three different levels of epistemic stance taken by political speakers can be used 
to (de)legitimise assertions by saying something is certain, probable and possible to be 
realized based on the speaker’s knowledge or expertise (Reyes 2011b, 2014). The 
evidentials in the context help the political speaker to explain how far the proposition 
is from certainty in terms of epistemic distance. This will be further elaborated in 
detail in Section 3.3.2.  
 
3.3.2 Markers of Epistemic Modality in the three cases  
In this section, the functions of epistemic modality will be examined in detail through 
a variety of epistemic modal expressions from the perspectives of value of modality 
and epistemic distance. It will also be interesting to see how the speakers’ beliefs and 
opinions are formulated and graded into different levels of force or knowledge (certain, 
probable, possible or impossible) in terms of epistemic modals during the persuasion 
process (van Dijk 2011:41).  
 
3.3.2.1 High Value: Close-certain  
Within the analytical framework, epistemic modality of high value is often used when 
the speaker is certain about the status of affairs, which means the subject matter is 
positioned close to the centre of certainty by the speaker pertaining to epistemic 
distance. In terms of knowledge grading, epistemic modals of high value are used to 
indicate strong illocutionary force and certain knowledge.  
 
According to Table 3.5, the most frequent epistemic modal markers of high value 
among the three cases are ‘will’ and ‘shall’. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how 
and why the three speakers use these epistemic modal markers in different contexts.  
        




According to the quantitative analysis, ‘will’ is the most popular epistemic marker 
adopted by all three speakers (Obama: 161 counts; Blair: 124 counts; Ahmadinejad: 
82 counts), as shown in Table 3.5. That is mainly because the modal ‘will’ is quite 
vague in terms of its semantic meanings (cf. Klinge 2010), so it can be used to convey 
either the meaning of volition/intention as volitional modality, or the meaning of high 
possibility in the future as epistemic modality (it traditionally refers to simple 
future-time reference
37
), or both of them. However, the meaning of volition/intention 
can only occur when the subject is a person. So an impersonal subject can only be 
followed by ‘will’ with an epistemic meaning unless in the use of metaphor. Consider 
the following examples:  
             
[1] I also understand < Inside / P.K. > concern over immigration controls. We will < 
M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > put in place strict controls that work. They will < 
M.verb. / E.M. / High. > be part of our first legislative programme if we are 
re-elected on May 5. These controls will < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > include the 
type of points system used in Australia, for example, to help ensure our economy 
gets the skills we need. (T.Blair; 22 April 2005) 
[2] I know < Inside / P.K. > that even a successful war against Iraq will < M.verb. / 
E.M. / High >require a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined 
cost, with undetermined consequences. (B. Obama; October 26, 2002) 
[3] Nations and many governments will < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / High > be on our 
side on this path. (M. Ahmadinejad; 28 August 2006) 
[4] Mr Howard says he will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > introduce a quota on both 
immigrants and asylum seekers. But he won't < M.verb. / E.M. / High > give 
numbers, though we were promised months ago that there would (past form of 
will) < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > be numbers for these quotas in their manifesto. 
Nor will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > he say the basis on which either of these 
                                                        
37 Because future time reference often implies a potential or possibility of realizing the proposition, ‘will’ with this 
reading can be treated as epistemic modality.  
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quotas will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be calculated. (T.Blair; 22 April 2005) 
 
As can be seen in Example [1], while the first ‘will’ can be interpreted both as a 
volitional marker and an epistemic marker, the other two instances of ‘will’ can only 
have the epistemic reading. Blair legitimises his point of view by affirming the 
assertions with three epistemic modal markers of high value - ‘will’. These firm 
assertions also help to establish his identity as an authoritative leader (Fairclough 
2000a:100) and show his confidence in his expertise on this issue (immigration 
policy). By using the evidential - “I also understand”, Blair tries to legitimise his 
proposal of putting in place strict controls because he believes his knowledge about 
immigration is certain.  
 
In Example [2], US president Barack Obama expresses his strong epistemic stance 
through the high value modal verb ‘will’ and indicates his source of evidence coming 
from his personal knowledge through an evidential marker-‘I know’. Both the modal 
marker and the evidential reveal his certain knowledge (as part of his ideology) that 
the war on Iraq will bring a great loss to the US. By doing so, he manages to 
legitimise his proposal by demonstrating that the consequences/threats of war are 
close (viz. certain) pertaining to epistemic distance (see Hart 2014).  
 
‘Will’ in Example [3] can also be interpreted both as an epistemic modal marker and a 
volitional modal marker. In terms of its epistemic meaning, Ahmadinejad expresses 
his strong epistemic stance to ‘the Nations and many governments… be our side on 
this path’ by affirming the assertion. This modal marker also helps to establish 
solidarity between the speaker and his audience (Simon-Vandenbergen 1997:353). 
However, with respect to volitional meaning, it is less convincing in expressing strong 
volitional stance since the subject is not the speaker himself. In other words, if 
Ahmadinejad takes this volitional reading, he is presupposing that the Nations and 
many governments are surely to be on their side. However, it is unclear whether ‘will’ 
in this example takes a volitional reading or an epistemic reading, or both. This 
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example is typical in reflecting the speaker’s ideology based on his knowledge in 
terms of epistemic modality (van Dijk 2011) or expectations (emotions) in terms of 
volitional modality.  
 
As we can see in Example [4], Blair uses ‘will’ of negative form twice to deny the 
possibility that Mr Howard will “give numbers of the quota” and “say the basis on 
which either of these quotas be calculated.” By doing so, Blair tries to justify or 
legitimise his view that Mr Howard’s policies aren’t practical, which has been 
illustrated in many other ways in the speech. In other words, Blair manages to 
delegitimise Mr Howard’s policies by denying the possibility in providing the details 
of his plan. 
 
(2) Shall  
‘Shall’ is not very popular in political speeches, as each speaker adopts it just four 
times. According to the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary(2008)38, “‘shall’ is 
used instead of ‘will’ when the subject is ‘I’ or ‘we’, often used to say that something 
certainly will or must happen, or that you are determined that something will happen”. 
In this sense, ‘shall’ is stronger than ‘will’ in stance-taking, conveying three different 
readings in different contexts, either as ‘high possibility’ in terms of epistemic 
modality, or ‘strong necessity’ in terms of deontic modality, or ‘strong determination’ 
in terms of volitional modality. Consider the following examples:  
 
[5] On Sunday, along with other nation’s leaders, including President Clinton, I shall < 
M.verb. / E.M. & V.M. / High. > take part in a discussion of political ideas. (T. 
Blair; 24 April 1999) 
[6] After about one hundred years of domination, the system of capitalism and the 
existing world order has proved to be unable to provide appropriate solutions to 
the problems of societies and thus is coming to an end. I shall < M.verb. / V.M. & 
                                                        
38 This is cited from Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus © Cambridge University Press), 
which can be found on this website: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/would_1. 
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E.M. / High > try to examine the two main causes of this failure and picture some 
features of the ideal future order. (M. Ahmadinejad; 23 September 2010) 
[7] We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth; 
and because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and 
emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot < M.verb. / 
E.M. / Inter. > help but believe < Shared / Weak. > that the old hatreds shall < 
M.verb. / D.M. & E.M. / High > someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall < 
M.verb. / D.M. & E.M. / High > soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, 
our common humanity shall < M.verb. / D.M. & E.M. / High > reveal itself; and 
that America must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > play its role in ushering in a new era 
of peace. (B. Obama; 20 January 2009) 
 
As can be seen in Examples [5] and [6], ‘shall’ can convey both the meanings of ‘high 
possibility’ as epistemic modality and ‘strong determination’ as volitional modality 
when the subject is ‘I’. Example [7] is a case in point with regard to the meaning of 
‘high possibility’ in ‘shall’, as it indicates that the event certainly will happen, with the 
support of definite time and participants.  
 
On the other hand, the meaning of ‘strong determination’ can best be illustrated in 
Example [6], because there is no time reference to show it is something planned to do. 
The most interesting example is, however, Example [7], in which Obama adopts three 
‘shall’ after impersonal subjects to affirm and legitimise the assertions. Because of the 
impersonal subjects, ‘shall’ in this example can be interpreted as indicating both the 
meaning of ‘strong necessity’ and ‘high possibility’ instead of ‘‘strong determination’. 
In particular, Obama uses a shared evidential ‘we believe’ to presuppose the strong 
epistemic stance expressed here is shared by the hearers based on common knowledge. 
This clearly reveals the speaker’s ideology about what is believed or what is common 
knowledge. The three epistemic modals and the evidential marker all contribute to the 
legitimisation of his proposal of a stronger and more united nation of America in the 
context.  




3.3.2.2 Intermediate Value: Near-probable 
Epistemic modality of intermediate value is used when the certainty of the status of 
affairs is probable and the subject matter is positioned near the centre of certainty by 
the speaker pertaining to epistemic distance. In terms of knowledge grading, epistemic 
modals of intermediate value are used to indicate intermediate illocutionary force and 
probable knowledge. 
 
(1) Can  
‘Can’ is a modal verb conveying four different semantic meanings here39. It encodes 
two different semantic meanings as epistemic modality. One is its inherent meaning as 
‘the ability to do something’, while the other is the meaning of ‘intermediate 
possibility’. Because of its inherent meaning, it is often treated as dynamic modality40, 
or as part of root modality. Actually, ‘can’ also has two semantic meanings in terms of 
deontic modality in the data. One is ‘responsibility’, equivalent to the deontic marker 
‘should’; and the other is ‘permission’, similar to the meaning of ‘be allowed to’.  
 
Because of its multiple meanings, ‘can’ becomes the most popular modal used in the 
case of Obama with 167 counts. It also takes up the second position in the case of 
Blair (with 94 counts) and Ahmadinejad (with 50 counts). Interestingly, its negative 
form has been used far more than other modals, with 31 counts, 20 counts and 8 
counts respectively, as shown in Table 3.5. Consider the following examples:  
 
[8] For as much as government can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > do and must < M.verb. / 
D.M. / High > do, it is ultimately the faith and determination of the American 
people upon which this nation relies. (B. Obama; 20 January 2009) 
[9] The tyranny of the East and the West over the world must should < M.verb. / E.M. 
                                                        
39 If ‘can’ is to be used in a daily conversation, it could convey the meaning of ‘request’ or ‘offer’, For example, 
‘Can you tell me the way to the British Library?’ or ‘Can I help you?’ However, they are not applicable here.  
40 In this study, the meaning of ‘ability’ is treated as dynamic modality, though it will not be discussed here. See 
Section 4.1 in Chapter Two for details.  
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/ High > < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > end, but weak people who can < M.verb. / 
Dy.M. / Inter. >see only what lies in front of them cannot < M.verb. / E.M. / 
Inter. >believe this. (M. Ahmadinejad; October 26, 2005) 
[10] There is a simple reason why he can't < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > say which 
country would < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / Inter. > process UK asylum seekers. 
There isn't one. (T.Blair; 22 April 2005)  
 
In Example [8], ‘can’ conveys both meanings of ‘ability’ and ‘probability’ with 
intermediate epistemic stance towards the action. That means, by adopting the 
epistemic modal ‘can’, Obama claims the assertion whether the government has the 
possibility and ability to take designated action ultimately depends on ‘the faith and 
determination of the American people’. However, ‘can’ in Example [9] only has the 
meaning of ‘ability’ which can be interpreted as the ability of weak people only ‘see 
what lies in front of them’, while the negative form of ‘can’ encodes an epistemic 
reading. The use of the embedded modals ‘must should’ in this example is typical in 
revealing the speaker’s ideology. That is, ‘to end the tyranny of the East and the West 
over the world’ is not only suggested but also certain to be actualized, which is based 
on his political value and knowledge (as part of his ideology).   
 
The negative form of ‘can’ as shown in Examples [9] and [10], on the other hand, is a 
negative modal marker, which is often used to deny the assertions and delegitimizing 
the speaker’s unfavourable opinions. In Example [9], Ahmadinejad uses ‘cannot’ to 
deny the possibility of ‘weak people… believe this’. In Example [10], Blair adopts 




‘Would’ has also been used frequently in the data, with 62 counts (Blair), 37 counts 
(Obama) and Ahmadinejad (30 counts) respectively. ‘Would’ is the past form of ‘will’, 
indicating lower possibility and weaker epistemic stance than its original form 
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because it is farther from the centre of ‘now’ in terms of time and also farther to the 
centre of certainty pertaining to epistemic distance (Langacker 1991). ‘Would’ mainly 
conveys three semantic meanings in the data: first, it is used to refer to the past form 
of epistemic ‘will’ (In this sense, ‘would’ is of high value); second, it means 
‘intermediate possibility’ as epistemic modality, often indicating a kind of 
‘hypothetical knowledge where an outcome is predicated contingent on an unrealized 
condition’ (Chafe 1986:269); third, it is used to express the meaning ‘intermediate 
willingness’ or ‘wish’ in volitional modality.  
                            
[11] Imam [Khomeini] said Saddam must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > go and he said he 
would (past form) < M.verb. / E.M. / High > grow weaker than anyone could 
(past form) < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > imagine.  (M. Ahmadinejad; 26 
October 2005) 
[12] The documents are vital because they would < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > reveal 
how many weapons Iraq had and has and where they are or may < M.verb. / E.M. 
/ Inter. > be located. (T. Blair; 17 December 1998) 
[13] If it had been in Chicago, there would <  M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > have been 
more. (B. Obama; 10 May 2011) 
 
‘Would’ in Example [11] is a case in point for the past form of ‘will’, indicated by ‘he 
said’ (the typical phrase used in reported speech). In this sense, ‘would’ here is of high 
value, equals to its original form ‘will’ in terms of epistemic stance. That means if this 
is used in direct speech, ‘would’ can be replaced with ‘will’. Example [12], however, 
manifests how ‘would’ can be used to express ‘possibility’ as an epistemic modal 
marker of intermediate force. By adopting ‘would’, Blair claims that the documents 
are likely to ‘reveal how many weapons Iraq had and has…’ based on probable 
knowledge, thereby avoiding responsibility for providing evidence (Chafe 1986:269).  
 
‘Would’ in Example [13] is a case in point for indicating ‘hypothetical knowledge’, 
which used in a subjunctive mood as it is in an irrealis condition. So the epistemic 
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stance of ‘would’ in this example is much weaker than that of Example [12] as it 
encodes temporal distance which is correlated with epistemic distance (Chilton 2014). 
In fact, ‘would’ has been used far more frequently in this sense than in the other two 
meanings in the data. Its use as volitional modality will be discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
3.3.2.3 Low Value: Distant-possible 
When the speaker is not sure about the status of affairs, an epistemic modality of low 
value is typically used and the subject matter is positioned distant from the centre of 
certainty by the speaker pertaining to epistemic distance. In terms of knowledge 
grading, epistemic modals of low value are used to indicate weak illocutionary force 
and possible knowledge. 
 
(1) Could  
‘Could’ is the most frequent epistemic modal of low value. Obama ranks first in the 
use of ‘could’ with 32 counts, followed by Blair (22 counts) and Ahmadinejad (12 
counts). Similar to ‘would’, ‘could’ is the past form of ‘can’, indicating lower 
possibility and weaker epistemic stance than ‘can’ as it is positioned remoter from the 
centre of certainty. Like ‘can’, the semantic meaning of ‘could’ is also varied. It has 
four different meanings in the data
41
: first, it is used to refer to the past form of 
epistemic ‘can’ (In this sense, ‘could’ is of intermediate value); second, it means ‘low 
possibility’ in terms of epistemic modality, often used in a subjunctive sense; third, it 
means ‘intermediate necessity’ as deontic modality, which is equivalent to ‘should’; 
fourth, it is used to express the meaning of ‘permission’ as deontic modality of low 
value. Consider the following examples:  
 
[14] And how risible would < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be the claims that these were 
wars on Muslims if the world could < M.verb. / E.M. / Low. > see these Muslim 
nations still Muslim, but with some hope for the future, not shackled by brutal 
                                                        
41 In daily conversations, ‘could’ also has the meaning of ‘request’ or ‘suggestion’, For example, ‘Could you pass 
me the salt?’ or ‘You could go there by train.’ However, they are not applicable here.  
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regimes whose principal victims were the very Muslims they pretended to protect? 
(T. Blair; 17 July 2003) 
[15] One can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > imagine what standing some European 
countries could < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter.  >have had and what global role they 
could < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter.  > have played, if it had not been for this 
sixty-year old imposition. (M. Ahmadinejad; 28 August 2006) 
[16] It’s the answer told by lines that stretched around schools and churches in 
numbers this nation has never seen; by people who waited three hours and four 
hours, many for the very first time in their lives, because they believed < Outside 
/ H.E. > that this time must < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be different; that their 
voice could < M.verb. / E.M. / Low. > be that difference. (B. Obama, 4 
November 2008) 
 
The first meaning of ‘could’ has been demonstrated in Example [11], typically used in 
reported speech. In this sense, ‘could’ in this example is of intermediate value, equal 
to its original form ‘can’ in terms of epistemic stance. In example [14], Blair uses 
‘could’ in a conditional with weak epistemic stance towards the assertion. By doing so, 
he speculates that it is distant for them to see the truth.  
 
Similarly, ‘could’ in Example [15] is also used in a conditional, but in a subjunctive 
mood as it is opposite to the truth. Therefore, it seems that ‘could’ in this example 
expresses the weakest epistemic stance among the three examples (Sweetser 1996). 
That is because the designated situation will never be actualized as it has been past. 
Because of this, the epistemic modals of low value including ‘could’ are often used to 
play down the possibility, importance, relevance, etc. of those unwelcome opinions or 
propositions (disapproved by the speaker) (Simon-Vandenbergen 1997:353). In this 
sense, this type of epistemic modals can reflect the speaker’s belief (as part of his 
ideology) about what is not welcomed or unfavourable. In this example, the speaker is 
actually criticizing those European countries on their standing and their global role, 
which are not appropriate in the speaker’s eyes.   




‘Could’ in Example [16], however, has the strongest epistemic stance among the three 
examples here. Its other two meanings in terms of deontic modals will be treated in 
detail in the next chapter.  
  
(2) Possible 
‘Possible’ is the most popular epistemic modal of low value, which is often used to 
express the weak epistemic stance towards the actualization of a designated 
proposition. It is used 22 times in the case of Ahmadinejad, followed by Obama and 
Blair with 13 and 12 counts respectively, as shown in Table 3.5. As a modal adjective, 
the epistemic stance of possible may vary in different contexts. Consider the following 
examples: 
 
[17] At the same time, we and the Americans also gave the clearest possible < M.adj. / 
E.M. / Low. > warning that, should < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > Saddam break his 
word once more, there would < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be no further warnings 
or diplomatic arguments. (T. Blair; 17 December 1998) 
[18] If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all 
things are possible < M.verb. / E.M. / Low. >; who still wonders if the dream of 
our founders is alive in our time; who still questions the power of our democracy, 
tonight is your answer. (B. Obama, 4 November 2008)  
[19] They say < Outside / H.E. > it is not possible < M.adj. / E.M. / High >to have a 
world without the United States and Zionism. But you know < Shared / S.K. > 
that this is a possible < M.adj. / E.M. / Low > goal and slogan. (M. 
Ahmadinejad; 26 October 2005) 
[20] Unless we find a viable way of discussing these risks a mature national 
conversation on important policy questions like GM science will < M.verb. / E.M. 
/ High. > be impossible < M.adj. / E.M. / High >. (T. Blair; 26 May 2005) 
 
As can be seen in Example [17], ‘possible’ is used after a superlative ‘the clearest’, 
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thus together the phrase can be interpreted as ‘as clear as possible’. Therefore, here 
‘possible’ means ‘to its largest extent’. That means its epistemic stance is much 
stronger than those in the other two examples. By doing so, Blair tries to legitimise his 
proposal of attacking Iraq because they (i.e. ‘we and the Americans’) have given 
warnings that were as clear as possible.  
 
However, ‘possible’ in Example [18] implies the lowest possibility among all the three 
examples, therefore indicating a very low epistemic stance. That is because it is almost 
impossible to actualize the assertion that ‘America is a place where all things are 
possible’. The example supporting this is that Obama, an African American, was 
elected as the new US president.  
 
Example [19] manifests ‘possible’ (the second one) in its intermediate low possibility 
among three examples. Ahmadinejad tries to legitimise the assertion that there is a 
possibility that ‘have a world without the United States and Zionism’ by presupposing 
it as the truth with a shared evidential ‘you know’. Of course, for other actors, 
especially for the United States and Israel, it is impossible.  
 
The negative modal adjective ‘impossible’ is often used to delegitimise other people’s 
views (see ‘negative other-representation’ in Chilton 2004: 47), which are opposite to 
the speaker’s own opinion, as shown in Example [20]. It reflects the speaker’s 
knowledge (as part of his ideology) on ‘the prerequisites of a mature national 
conversation on important policy questions like GM science’. ‘Impossible’ can be seen 
as the opposite of certainty in terms of epistemic distance, which has a much stronger 
illocutionary force than its positive form- ‘possible’ (of low value). The first ‘possible’ 
with its negative form in [18] is also of high value, but it is much weaker in its force 
than that of [19].  
 
(3) Might 
‘Might’ is the past form of ‘may’, indicating a weaker epistemic stance than its base 
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form, because it is farther in terms of epistemic distance and time span (Langacker 
1991). It has not been used very frequently in the data, with only 11 counts in total 
(Blair: 6 counts; Obama 5 counts; Ahmadinejad: 0 counts). Consider the following 
examples:  
 
[21] So our choice is clear: back down and leave Saddam hugely strengthened; or 
proceed to disarm him by force. Retreat might < M.verb. / E.M. / Low. > give us 
a moment of respite but years of repentance at our weakness would < M.verb. / 
E.M. / Inter. > I believe < Inside / P.K. > follow.  (T. Blair; 20 March 2003) 
[22] Now, I understand < Inside / P.K. > that some might < M.verb. / E.M. / Low. > be 
skeptical of this plan. (B. Obama; 8 January 2009) 
       
In Example [21], Blair adopts an epistemic modal marker of low value -‘might’ to 
express his speculation for the assertion, thereby showing his weak epistemic stance 
towards it. It means the possibility is low pertaining to the actualization of the 
situation indicated. Put another way, Blair legitimises his proposition by using ‘might’, 
which is positioned as distant from the centre of certainty. Similar to Example [15], 
the use of ‘might’ in this example indicates ‘retreat’ is an unwelcome proposal for the 
speaker by treating it as a bad choice (Simon-Vandenbergen 1997:353), and therefore 
reveals the speaker’s true intention (as part of his ideology) that the war on Iraq is a 
better choice.  
 
Likewise, ‘might’ in Example [22] also reflects Obama’s own assumption that some 
people are skeptical of this plan, supported by an evidential marker- ‘I understand’. 
This evidential implies that the weak epistemic stance expressed by ‘might’ is based 
on his knowledge alone. By doing so, he makes a full commitment to this stance 
(Marín-Arrese 2011a).  
 
In sum, the qualitative analyses of epistemic modal markers show that different 
choices of epistemic modals are linked to the speakers’ different rhetorical styles 
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(Marín-Arrese 2011a) and reveal their different ideologies in terms of knowledge 
grading (certain, probable, possible and impossible knowledge). For example, Blair 
adopts much more ‘would’ than Obama and Ahmadinejad (62 counts vs. 37 counts vs. 
30 counts) (see Table 3.5). That implies that he is more prudent in making assertions, 
which helps him shirk those unfavourable consequences when the assertions are not 
actualized in the end. Take his speech ‘War on Iraq’ for example (No. 2 speech in 
Table 2.3), Blair uses ‘would’ 13 times to describe his predictions about the possible 
results of designated actions as well as the past expectations which have not been 
actualized.  
 
Obama, on the other hand, used far more ‘can’ than Blair and Ahmadinejad (167 
counts vs. 123 counts vs. 81 counts). Take his speech ‘on Immigration’ for example 
(No.8 speech in Table 2.4), he uses ‘we can’ 12 counts. That is probably because it 
helps him to gain the audience’s support by giving them hope and confidence. It also 
allows him to establish harmonious and intimate relationships with his audience, 
which might be one of the reasons why he won the general elections twice.   
 
Ahmadinejad uses more ‘possible’ than Obama and Blair (22 counts vs. 13 counts vs. 
12 counts). Take his speech ‘The World without Zionism’ for example (No. 1 speech 
in Table 2.5), he uses ‘possible’ 5 times (including its negative form 3 times). That 
means he might be an iconoclast, who would like to defy the authorities and take 
chances, such as claiming something as truth while others may totally disagree with 
him (as shown in Example [19]).  
 
It also manifests that the same modal marker indicates different semantic meanings 
and various degrees of force in different contexts. For example, both ‘will’ and ‘can’ 
have four different semantic meanings.  
 
In addition, negative epistemic modals are usually used to deny or delegitimise their 
opponents’ assertions. By using these epistemic modals, the speaker either wants to 
Chapter Three   
 
 132 
show it is not possible to happen, such as ‘will not’ in Example [4], or to manifest that 
what is impossible is actually what needs to be actualized, such as ‘impossible’ in 
Example [19] and [20]. Therefore, the epistemic modals in the former examples are 
used to delegitimise the designated assertions, while those in the latter examples are 
used to criticize the legitimation of the designated assertions. 
 
3.4 Summary 
In sum, this chapter demonstrates how different forms and values of epistemic 
modality express stance, reflect ideology and (de)legitimise assertions in political 
discourse from the perspective of epistemic distance, and interact with evidentiality.  
 
I first illustrated the distributions and frequencies of epistemic modality in terms of 
modal values and forms in the three cases, and then compared the similarities and 
differences of the top-ten epistemic modal markers used by the three speakers.  
 
I also examined the functions of epistemic modality in political discourse through 
stance-taking acts in different contexts, with annotated examples from the data. 
Generally, the epistemic modals of higher value are placed closer to the centre of 
certainty, therefore indicating higher possibility and stronger epistemic stance or 
illocutionary force towards the actualization of the actions. The most striking results 
are as follows: 
 
 Epistemic modals encode ideology and function as stance-taking acts which 
express three levels of knowledge-based stance corresponding to three values of 
modality. 
 Epistemic modality can also be treated as knowledge grading in terms of four 
levels: certain, probable, possible, impossible knowledge.  
 Stance-taking acts of epistemic modality contribute to the function of 
(de)legitimisation.  
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 The distributions and frequencies of epistemic modality in the three cases present 
a similar pattern in terms of values and forms, particularly in the cases of Blair 
and Obama. 
 Modal verbs are the most frequent forms in all the cases, of over 85%. But there 
are also very interesting results about other modal forms in the qualitative 
analysis.  
 The percentages of intermediate value are higher than those of high value in the 
cases of Blair and Obama, but the situation is reversed in the case of Ahmadinejad. 
That is probably because intermediate epistemic modal markers can help the 
speaker evade the responsibility of the stance-taking acts. 
 The differences of epistemic modals among the three cases are significant in high, 
intermediate and low value, as well as modal verbs and semi-modals, while there 
are no significant differences between Blair and Obama except for intermediate 
value and modal verbs.  
 Epistemic modals ‘will’, ‘can’ and ‘would’ take up the first three positions in all 
three cases, though the order of ‘will’ and ‘can’ is reversed in the case of Obama.  
 The three speakers’ choices of epistemic modals reflect their distinctive rhetoric 
styles and ideologies with regard to their different stance towards knowledge. 
 The epistemic modals of high value are often used in the legitimisation of the 
speaker’s own views or proposals (‘positive self-representation’), while those of 
low value can be adopted in the delegitimisation of the other’s views or proposals 
(‘negative other-representation’);  
 The same modal marker may indicate different semantic meanings and various 
degrees of force in different contexts. 
 
In the next chapter, I will examine the forms, values and functions of deontic modality 
in political discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively.
  
 








Deontic modality is defined as a semantic domain with which speakers express their 
force of deontic stance involving necessity, obligations or permission indicated in the 
utterance, and this force is evaluated in terms of deontic distance towards the centre of 
necessity/rightness. Deontic modality plays an important role in political discourse as 
it encodes the speaker’s ideology concerning his political values.  
 
In this chapter, I will demonstrate how deontic modality functions in political 
discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
 
4.2 Quantitative Analysis of Deontic Modality 
In this section, I shall calculate and compare the distributions of deontic modality 
from the perspectives of values and forms in the three cases. In particular, I will 
compare the top-ten modal markers of deontic modality among the three cases.  
 
4.2.1 Values of Deontic Modality 
As can be seen in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1, the percentage of high value deontic 
modals outnumbers those of intermediate value in all three cases, followed by that of 
low value. Interestingly, unlike epistemic modality, Blair adopts more deontic modal 
markers than Obama (200 counts vs. 177 counts), while Ahmadinejad only uses 70% 
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of that of Blair (140 counts).  
 
Table 4.1 The distribution of values of deontic modality in the three cases 
 





          
Barack Obama 
Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad   
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
High  116 58% 107 60.45% 72 51.43% 
Inter. 70 35% 63 35.59% 64 45.71% 
Low  14 7% 7 3.95% 4 2.86% 
Total  200 100% 177 100% 140 100% 
    
   
 
Figure 4.1 The distribution of values of deontic modality in the three cases 
 
In Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2, we can see a similar frequency of intermediate deontic 
modals among the three speakers, and Blair ranks first in all the three categories. 
Although Ahmadinejad adopts far fewer deontic modals of high value and low value, 
he uses more deontic modals with intermediate value than those of Obama. On the 
whole, there are significant differences in the distributions of deontic modals with 
high and low value among the three speakers, while the disparities of intermediate are 
not significant. However, the statistical analyses show no significant differences 
between the results of Blair and Obama in all the categories42.  
                                                        
 42 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences in all the categories between Blair and 

















Table 4.2 A comparison of values of deontic modality in the three cases 
 















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
High  116 4.40 107 4.04 72 2.83 0.009435 Yes 
Inter. 70 2.66 63 2.38 64 2.51 0.8176 No 
Low  14 0.53 7 0.26 4 0.16 0.04847 Yes 
Total 200 7.59 177 6.69 140 5.50 0.01324 Yes 
 (If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 
three speakers is significant.) 
   
 
 
Figure 4.2 A comparison of values of deontic modality in the three cases 
 
4.2.2 Forms of Deontic Modality 
As we can see in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.3, modal verbs come first in all three cases, 
with 62% on average. However, compared with that of epistemic modality (87% on 
average in the three cases), this figure is much smaller.  
                                                                                                                                                               












It is interesting to note that Blair and Obama present a similar pattern in the 
distributions of forms, while Ahmadinejad is different in a number of ways. For 
example, the former two both have the same order of distributions of modal forms, 
while the latter has a higher percentage of modal adjectives than semi-modals. 
Furthermore, though modal adverbs are quite rare and rank last in all three cases, it is 
surprising to see that their percentage is zero in the case of Ahmadinejad.  
 
Table 4.3 The distribution of forms of deontic modality in the three cases 
 









No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
M.verb. 100 50% 103 58.19% 109 77.86% 
M.semi. 77 38.5% 61 34.46% 15 10.71% 
M.adj. 18 9% 11 6.21% 16 11.43% 
M.adv. 5 2.5% 2 1.13% 0 0 
Total  200 100% 177 100% 140 100% 
 
   
 
Figure 4.3 The distribution of forms of deontic modality in the three cases 
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frequencies of modal verbs in terms of deontic modality, though their use of 
semi-modals varies greatly from 2.92 ptw (Blair) to 0.59 ptw (Ahmadinejad). In 
addition, Blair and Ahmadinejad use similar frequencies of modal adjectives, while 
comparatively Obama uses much fewer modal adjectives. Overall, three speakers 
show significant differences in the use of deontic semi-modals, whereas these 




Table 4.4 A Comparison of Forms of Deontic Modality in the three cases 
 
















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
M.verb. 100 3.79 103 3.89 109 4.28 0.648 No 
M.semi. 77 2.92 61 2.30 15 0.59 4.116e-09 Yes 
M.adj. 18 0.68 11 0.42 16 0.63 0.3995 No 
M.adv. 5 0.19 2 0.08 0 0 0.0707 No 
Total 200 7.59 177 6.69 140 5.50 0.01324 Yes 
 (If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 
three speakers is significant.) 
 
                                                        
43 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences in all the categories between Blair and 
Obama in the use of deontic modal forms: modal verbs (P-value: 0.9143), semi-modals (P-value: 0.1916) , modal 
adjectives (P-value: 0.2598) and modal adverbs (0.0.446). 
 





Figure 4.4 A comparison of forms of deontic modality in the three cases 
 
4.2.3 Top-10 Modal Markers of Deontic Modality 
Table 4.5 shows that there are some similarities and disparities among the three 
speakers in their choices of deontic modal markers (See Table A4-A6 in Appendix for 
details). The first similarity is that the ten top-modal markers are more or less the 
same in all three cases regardless of their ranks, with only a few exceptions. The 
second similarity is that ‘should’ (with 46, 39 & 44 counts) takes up the first position 
and ‘must’ (with 36, 38 & 39 counts) takes up the second position in all three cases.  
 
Still, there are more differences than similarities. While, the most frequent deontic 
modals among the three cases are ‘should’, ‘must’, ‘have (got) to’, ‘need to’, ‘can’,  
‘necessary’, ‘responsible’, and ‘be allowed to’. Their frequencies are quite different in 
each case. Firstly, Blair uses ‘need to’ (35 counts) and ‘necessary’(14 counts) more 
frequently than the other two speakers (with 24 and 7 counts for the use of ‘need to’; 9 
and 7 counts for the use of ‘necessary). Secondly, Obama uses ‘can’ for 19 counts, 
many more compared with the other two speakers (Blair: 16 counts vs. Ahmadinejad: 
11 counts). Thirdly, Ahmadinejad uses ‘shall’, ‘responsible’ and ‘be allowed to’ more 
often than the other speakers, with 7, 7 and 5 counts respectively.  
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first two positions in the three cases, especially in the case of Ahmadinejad. Besides, 
compared with Ahmadinejad, Blair and Obama use far more semi-modal markers and 
both have their preferences for particular forms.  
 
Table 4.5 A comparison of top-10 modal markers of deontic modality in the three 
cases 
 












 No.  Modal 
Markers 
 No.  Modal 
Markers 
 No.  
1 should 46 (7) should 39(8) should 44 (6) 
2 must 36(2) must 38(6) must 39  
3 need to 35 (1) have (got) to 35(1) can 13 (5) 
4 have (got) to 33(4) need to 24(2) shall 7 
5 can 16(10) can 19(9) need to 7 
6 necessary 14 (4) necessary 9(2) responsible 7 
7 responsible 5(1) shall 3 necessary  7 (1) 
8 be allowed to 4 responsible 2 be allowed to 5(3) 
9 be to  3 may/be 
to/necessarily 
1/1/1 have (got) to 2 
10 responsible/ 
responsibly 
3/3 be allowed 
to/responsibly/
ought to 
1 obliged 2 
 
4.2.4 Discussions and Implications 
In sum, I have demonstrated and compared the figures of the values and forms of 
deontic modality in the three cases. In particular, I demonstrated the top-ten modal 
markers in deontic modality and compared their similarities and disparities. The most 
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striking results are as follows:  
 
(i) Obama ranks first in the use of deontic modal markers with 200 counts, followed 
by Blair (177 counts) and Ahmadinejad (140 counts). Ahmadinejad uses notably 
fewer semi-modals than the other two speakers. This could be some evidence to 
support the study of deontic semi-modals in terms of expressing implicit deontic 
stance or manipulating the audience. 
  
(ii) The study of deontic modality in political discourse should not be restricted to 
modal verbs. Otherwise, many essential deontic modal meanings would be 
neglected. This is due to the fact that other modal forms take up around half of the 
total figure in the cases of Blair and Obama, as shown in Table 4.3. It is clear that 
other deontic modal forms are rather implicit in stance-taking, but they can still 
reflect the speaker’s deontic stance to some extent.  
 
(iii) Unlike epistemic modality, Blair and Obama use far more deontic modal markers 
of high value than those of intermediate value. That is mainly because both of 
them use a large number of semi-modals of high value, such as ‘have to’ and 
‘need to’. In terms of modal verbs, for example, ‘should’ has been used more 
frequently than ‘must’. 
 
(iv) Implicit deontic markers such as semi-modals are popular in political discourse. 
Semi-modals such as ‘have to’ (outside force) and ‘need to’ (inside force) are 
used very often in all three cases, especially in the cases of Blair and Obama. 
That is probably because these deontic markers can help the speakers to evade 
the responsibility of their stance-taking actions.  
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(v) The differences among the three cases are significant in high and low value, as 
well as semi-modals and the total figures. According to statistical analyses
44
, there 
are no significant differences in the use of deontic modals between Obama and 
Blair, so it is the results in Ahmadinejad’s case that make these disparities 
significant. This suggests that these disparities might be the differences of using 
deontic modal markers between English native speakers and Non-native speakers. 
Therefore, it is important to examine these values and forms of deontic modals in 
political discourse in more detail in further study.  
 
(vi) The deontic modals ‘should’ and ‘must’ take up the first two positions in all three 
cases, although each speaker has his own preferences in adopting deontic modal 
markers. For example, Blair uses far more ‘need to’ and ‘necessary’ than the 
other speakers, while Obama uses more ‘can’ and Ahmadinejad uses more ‘be 
allowed to’, ‘responsible’ and ‘shall’.  
 
Overall, the quantitative analysis of deontic modality in the three cases demonstrated 
both similarities and disparities in terms of values, forms and top-ten modal markers. 
It is therefore also essential to analyse them qualitatively in order to investigate the 
functions of these deontic modal markers and look at how these potential functions are 
realized in different contexts. Therefore, the next section will deal with deontic 
modality in the three cases from a qualitative perspective. 
 
4.3 Qualitative Analysis of Deontic Modality  
This section will take a close look at the functions of deontic modality through a 
qualitative analysis of the data. I will first introduce how deontic modality plays a role 
in expressing stance, encoding ideology and legitimisation in political discourse. Then 
I will demonstrate how different deontic modals with three values can contribute to 
the realization of these functions in the context. 
                                                        
44 I also calculated the P-value of the differences in the use of deontic modals between Obama and Blair in every 
category and found no significant differences in both values and forms.  




4.3.1 Deontic Modality as Value-based Stance  
Drawing on Marín-Arrese’s (2011:195) definition of epistemic stance, deontic stance 
refers to the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the necessity/rightness 
concerning the realization of events, to the ways in which the speaker/writer carries 
out a stance act aimed at determining or influencing the course of reality itself.  
 
Deontic modality is a typical way of representing the speaker’s deontic stance toward 
the actions and obligations of the target. Unlike epistemic modality, which indicates 
the speaker’s epistemic stance towards the possibility of propositions, deontic 
modality often reflects the speaker’s deontic stance towards the necessity or rightness 
of taking political actions. In other words, deontic stance is based on the speaker’s 
values
45
 towards whether one should or should not take specific actions. That means 
deontic modality can reflect the speaker’s ideology with regard to his political, moral 
and social values. In this sense, the stance expressed by deontic modality is mainly 
value-based, different from epistemic modality which expresses knowledge-based 
stance (cf. van Dijk 1998, 2011, 2014). As discussed in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter Three, 
the use of epistemic modals can be seen as ‘knowledge grading’ (Facchinetti et al. 
2003). The use of deontic modals, then, can be treated as ‘value grading’. In other 
words, a deontic modal of high value indicates the speaker’s core value (as part of his 
ideology) concerning the designated action, which is positioned close to the centre of 
necessity (rightness), while those of lower value show the speaker’s peripheral or 
marginal values, which are positioned distant from the centre.  
 
Deontic modals are, therefore, seen as encoding different force involving the speaker’s 
values (such as necessity/rightness, obligations, responsibilities) towards the 
actualization of actions. In this sense, deontic stance can be classified into three levels 
of illocutionary force, corresponding to three levels of modal value and distance. This 
                                                        
45 Here ‘value’ refers to the speaker’s political, social or moral value towards what is right or wrong to take 
actions.  
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means the speaker typically expresses a stronger deontic stance when he/she uses a 
deontic modal marker with a higher value, positioned as close to the centre of 
necessity/rightness, and vice versa. For example, the deontic stance in the example 
“We must take the actions now” (where must is a deontic modal of high value) is 
much stronger than “We should take the actions now” (where should is a deontic 
modal marker of intermediate value), and “We can/may take the actions now” (where 
can/may is a deontic modal marker of low value). This will be further elaborated in 
section 4.3.2. 
 
Compared with epistemic modality, the function of reflecting ideology in terms of 
deontic modality is more explicit, because deontic modality often reflects the 
speaker’s ideologies based on his values. Deontic modality is often used by the 
speaker to give instructions, which often implies that its force comes from specific 
political institutions (e.g. the government or a party). Normally, people give others 
instructions to take specific action (including demands or suggestions or permissions) 
only when they believe it is the right thing to do. Similarly, people only forbid others 
to do something when they think it is not right to do so, either morally, socially, or,   
here, as politically.  
 
Therefore, deontic modality can reflect the speaker’s values (as part of his ideology) 
about what is right and what is wrong. It also reveals what actions should or should 
not be taken, and who should or should not take designated action. That is why 
deontic stance is often value-based as deontic modals more or less reflect the 
speaker’s political, social or moral values. Consider the following example: 
 
And just as the terrorist seeks to divide humanity in hate, so we have to < M.semi. / 
D.M. / High. > unify it around an idea. And that idea is liberty. (T. Blair; 17 July 
2003) 
 
The deontic modal marker ‘have to’ in the example indicates the speaker’s strong 
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deontic stance of taking the designated action ‘unify it around an idea’. This stance 
reflects the speaker’s ideology of ‘humanity’ and ‘liberty’.   
 
With respect to the function of (de)legitimisation, different from epistemic modality, 
deontic modality is often used to (de)legitimise actions at the propositional level by 
placing the propositions on the scale of necessity (rightness). Evidentials can also be 
used to justify why it is necessary or not necessary to take certain action. 
 
The speaker often uses a deontic modal marker of high value when it is necessary to 
take actions and the subject matter is positioned close to the centre of necessity 
pertaining to deontic distance. For example, the deontic modal marker of high value 
‘have to’ in the example “But we know we have to tighten the asylum system further” 
(T.Blair; 22 April 2005) indicates it is the only solution that we can take if we want to 
solve the problem. By adopting ‘have to’, the speaker legitimises his proposed action 
as this modal marker is often used when there are no other choices.  
 
Similarly, a deontic modal marker of intermediate value is used when someone is 
supposed to take actions, which means the subject matter is positioned near the centre 
of necessity by the speaker in terms of deontic distance. When someone is allowed to 
take actions, a deontic modal marker of low value is typically used, which means the 
subject matter is positioned distant from the centre of necessity by the speaker with 
respect to deontic distance. However, negative deontic modals are only used when the 
subject matter is positioned opposite to the centre of necessity by the speaker 
concerning deontic distance, thus delegitimising specific actions.  
 
4.3.2 Markers of Deontic Modality in the three cases 
In what follows, the functions of deontic modality will be examined in detail through 
various deontic modal expressions, from the perspective of deontic distance and value 
of modality. It will also be interesting to see how the speakers’ values are presupposed 
and graded into three levels (core, peripheral, marginal values) in terms of various 
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deontic modals during the persuasion process, corresponding to three levels of 
illocutionary force.  
 
4.3.2.1 High Value: Close-required 
Within this research framework, deontic modal markers of high value are seen as 
expressing strong deontic stance towards the designated propositions, which are 
positioned as close towards the centre of necessity (rightness) from the perspective of 
deontic distance.  
 
According to Table 4.5, the most frequent deontic modal markers of high value among 
the three cases are ‘must’, ‘need to’, ‘have (got) to’ and ‘necessary’. Therefore, it is 
necessary to explore how and why the three speakers use these deontic modal markers 
to persuade their addressees in different contexts.  
        
(1) Must  
 
According to Leech (2003), modal verbs of high value such as ‘must’ and ‘shall’ have 
decreased by almost 30% and 40% over 30 years in both British English and 
American English (from 1961 to 1991). However, according to my quantitative 
analysis in the previous section, ‘must’ in political discourse still takes up a prominent 
position, varying from 39 counts (Ahmadinejad), and 38 counts (Obama), to 36 counts 
(Blair) in the three cases. Traditionally, ‘must’ has often been used to express the 
strongest modal force imposed by outside obligations or ‘active social pressure’ 
(Talmy 1988: 79). In this research, ‘must’ is regarded to be close to the centre of 
rightness (truth) pertaining to deontic distance, therefore it expresses a strong deontic 
stance and force, leaving no space for arguments. Consider the following examples: 
   
[1] To be a serious partner, Europe must < M.verb. / D.M. / High. > take on and defeat 
the anti-Americanism that sometimes passes for its political discourse. And what 
America must < M.verb. / D.M. / High. > do is show that this is a partnership built 
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on persuasion, not command. (T. Blair; 17 July 2003) 
[2] I believe < Inside / S.K. > that, among the Arab countries, the view expressed at 
their meeting in Doha in November, that Saddam must < M.verb. / D.M. /High. > 
bear the responsibility for what happens, holds good. (T. Blair; 17 December 
1998) 
[3] Our dear Imam said that the occupying regime must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > be 
wiped off the map and this was a very wise statement. (M. Ahmadinejad; 26 
October 2005) 
[4] And this change must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > begin in Washington. (B. Obama; 
8 January 2009) 
[5] We must not < M.verb. / D.M. / High > rest until it is reversed. (T. Blair; 24 April 
1999) 
 
Although the frequency of ‘must’ is similar in the three cases, ‘must’ can function 
differently when it comes to different subjects in different contexts. For example, the 
two instances of ‘must’ in Example [1] signal a strong deontic stance in expressing the 
necessity of taking the proposed actions. However, when ‘must’ is used after the 
speaker’s enemy or someone whose ideology is different from the speaker’s, it 
becomes a warning as it often indicates that the threats from whose enemies are very 
close (also see Cap 2008, 2011; Chilton 2004, 2014; Hart 2014), as shown in 
Examples [2] and [3]. These two deontic modals (‘must’) reveal the speaker’s political 
values (as part of his ideology) towards the designated actions respectively that it is 
politically right for Saddam to bear the responsibility for what happens and to remove 
the occupying regime (Israel). The speaker also tries to justify his strong deontic 
stance by attributing them to explicit outside sources such as ‘the view expressed at 
their meeting’ and ‘Our dear Imam said’.   
 
It is interesting to note that ‘must’ is used together with passive voice for 20 counts in 
Ahmadinejad’s speeches (half of the total number), which implies that the speaker 
may deliberately obscure the agency and evade the responsibility of the stance-taking 
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act (Fowler and Kress 1979; Hart 2014). Just as in Example [3], he does not mention 
who would wipe the occupying regime off the map by using the passive ‘must be 
wiped off’. Another example is the frequent use of the active voice of an impersonal 
subject such as ‘this change must begin in Washington’ or ‘this plan must begin today’, 
as shown in Example [4]. As we know that changes or plans will not begin by 
themselves, it needs someone to take action to make them happen. Thus, these 
examples probably reveal the attempt of evading personal responsibility for the action. 
In sum, ‘must’ is of the highest value in deontic modal markers, although its 
illocutionary force can be different in different situations. It is the strongest as a 
warning when the subject is the speaker’s enemy, the second strongest as a demand on 
oneself, and the weakest as a suggestion when used with one’s friends.      
  
However, when Blair uses the negative form of ‘must’ in Example [5], he strongly 
disagrees to stop NATO’s military action on Kosovo until the evil of ethnic cleansing 
is reversed. Here he clearly places this military action close to the centre of rightness, 
reflecting his political values (as part of his ideology) that the war on Kosovo is ‘a just 
war’46(Casey 2009). At the same time, he legitimises the war by claiming that ‘it is to 
reverse the evil of ethnic cleansing’. 
 
(2) Need to 
 
According to Table 4.5, ‘need to’ is a semi-modal used most often in Blair’s speeches 
(35 counts), followed by Obama (24 counts) and Ahmadinejad (7 counts). Compared 
with ‘must’, ‘need to’ implies that the force comes from one’s inside needs rather than 
outside obligations (Sweester 1990; Talmy 2000). That is partly the reason why ‘need 
to’ is used more after the plural person ‘we’ than ‘must’. By adopting ‘need to’, the 
speaker suggests that the actions he advises his people to carry out are not in 
accordance with his own will, but their own needs. Consider the following examples: 
 
                                                        
46 The term ‘a just war’ can be found in the context of the same speech.  
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[6] That's why we need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > act boldly and act now to reverse 
these cycles. That's why we need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > put money in the 
pockets of the American people, create new jobs, and invest in our future. That's 
why we need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > restart the flow of credit and restore the 
rules of the road that will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > ensure a crisis like this never 
happens again. (B. Obama; 8 January 2009) 
[7] The EU and the US need each other and need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High. > put 
that relationship above arguments that are ultimately not fundamental.  (T. Blair; 
24 April 1999) 
[8] Dear Friends, the United Nations is the key centre for coordinating the common 
global management. Its structure needs to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > be reformed 
in a manner so that all independent States and nations will < M.verb. / E.M. / 
High > be able to participate in the global governance actively and constructively. 
(M. Ahmadinejad; 23 September 2010) 
 
For example, Obama uses ‘need to’ three times in example [6] to show it is necessary 
for his people to take these actions in order to survive or reverse the financial crisis, to 
draw a vivid picture of urgent demand. That is to say, here ‘need to’ implies the close 
or urgent need of taking action to escape the threat of crisis. Interestingly, 
Ahmadinejad uses a passive voice of verb after ‘need to’ in Example [8], for similar 
reasons mentioned above.  
 
The adoption of the deontic semi-modal ‘need to’ is a useful persuasion/manipulation 
strategy in the sense that it puts the emphasis on one’s inside force instead of the force 
imposed by an outside source, which makes it more acceptable for the addressees. The 
speaker’s ideology can also be inferred from this type of deontic markers, though it is 
more implicit than ‘must’. For example, Blair adopts the deontic semi-modal ‘need to’ 
in Example [7] to emphasize that the cooperation between the EU and the US is due to 
their own needs. Actually this necessity also reveals his political values (as part of his 
ideology).  




(3) Have (got) to  
‘Have (got) to’ is another semi-modal used most frequently in Obama’s speeches with 
35 counts, followed by Blair (33 counts). However, Ahmadinejad uses it only twice. 
Unlike ‘need to’, the use of ‘have to’ often implies that the force comes from an 
external source (Sweester 1990:61). Consider the following examples: 
  
[9] The role of Government likewise has to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > adapt. If it can 
< M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > no longer pick winners, micromanage public services 
or act unilaterally in foreign affairs, it still has a vital enabling role to play. It has 
to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > set the macro-economic framework; it has to < 
M.semi. / D.M. / High > create the right environment for business; in skills, 
education, transport and the system of healthcare, its role for good or ill is vital. (T. 
Blair; 18 November 2003) 
[10] We have to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > make tough choices and smart investments 
today so that as the economy recovers, the deficits start coming down. (B. Obama; 
8 January 2009) 
 
In my data, ‘have to’ is often followed by verbs like ‘adapt’ (shown in Example [9]), 
‘accept’, ‘make tough choices’ (shown in Example [10]) and ‘live with it’, etc. It 
implies that ‘have to’ is often used when one is reluctant to take an action but is 
obliged to because there is no other choice. Just as Examples [9] and [10] manifest 
that it needs great efforts when one has to ‘adapt’ or ‘make tough choices’, the use of 
‘have to’ also excludes other options. Both speakers in these two examples legitimise 
their proposals by regarding their proposals as the only solutions. Therefore, in terms 
of illocutionary force, ‘have (got) to’ is similar to ‘must’, but much stronger than ‘need 
to’. From the perspective of proximisation (Cap 2008, 2011; Chilton 2004, 2014; Hart 
2014), ‘have to’ also implies that it is the only way to avoid the approaching threats or 
unfavourable consequences. So it often encodes the speaker’s ideology based on their 
political values.  




(4) Necessary  
 
‘Necessary’ is the deontic modal adjective used most often in the three cases, with 14 
counts (Blair), 9 counts (Obama) and 7 counts (Ahmadinejad) respectively. Its basic 
meaning is very similar to ‘need to’, which often indicates something is to be done 
according to one’s needs, as shown in Example [11], [12] and [13]. According to the 
data, ‘necessary’ is often used with the theme of economy in the cases of Blair and 
Obama, but used with the theme of international affairs in the case of Ahmadinejad. 
We can see from the examples that the illocutionary force of ‘necessary’ is weaker 
than ‘have (got) to’ because it implies that while it is a basic condition to realize a goal, 
it is not the only solution.  
 
[11] First of all, let my argument itself not lose its sense of balance. Health and safety 
legislation is necessary < M.adj. / D.M. / High. > to protect people at work. 
Food standards are necessary < M.adj. / D.M. / High. > to protect people from 
harm. Protections are necessary < M.adj. / D.M. / High. > for children from the 
danger of predatory adults. (T. Blair; 26 May 2005) 
[12] To improve the quality of our health care while lowering its cost, we will < 
M.verb. / V.M. / High > make the immediate investments necessary < M.adj. / 
D.M. / High > to ensure that within five years all of America's medical records 
are computerized. (B. Obama; 8 January 2009) 
[13] And secondly it is necessary < M.adj. / D.M. / High > to restructure the existing 
international organizations and their respective arrangements. (M. Ahmadinejad; 
21 April 2009) 
    
Overall, though the modal markers discussed here all indicate a high value of deontic 
modality, their illocutionary force and connotations are quite different. More 
importantly, the same modal marker can convey various meanings in different 
contexts, in particular when used with different kinds of subjects. Lastly, the amount 
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of high value deontic modal markers is more than two other types of modality, which 
explains political leaders’ authority in demanding their people to follow their 
instructions.   
 
4.3.2.2 Intermediate Value: Near-supposed 
 
Deontic modal markers of intermediate value are often used to express intermediate 
deontic stance, positioned as near towards the centre of necessity (rightness) with 
regard to deontic distance.  
 
According to Table 4.5, the most frequent deontic modal markers of intermediate 
value among the three cases are ‘should’ and ‘can’. Therefore, in this part I am going 
to discuss how the three speakers use these modal markers to express stance, reflect 




As can be seen in Table 4.5, ‘should’ ranks first in the list of top-ten modal markers, 
especially for Blair (46 counts) and Ahmadinejad (44 counts). It is also the most 
frequent deontic modal marker in the case of Obama, with 39 counts. From the 
perspective of force dynamics, ‘should’ often indicate the clash between the subject’s 
inner desires and a peripheral part representing the self’s sense of responsibility 
(Talmy 2000a:449). The fact that there are more instances of ‘should’ than ‘must’ in 
terms of modal verbs implies that suggestions may be more acceptable for hearers 
than demands. Consider the following examples:             
 
[14] I am sending this Congress a plan that you should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter.> pass 
right away. It’s called the American Jobs Act. There should < M.verb. / E.M. / 
Inter.> be nothing controversial about this piece of legislation.  (B. Obama; 8 
September 2011) 
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[15] The government of the United States should not < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > be a 
member of the Board of Governors that in addition to the use of atomic bombs in 
the war with Japan, deployed weapons, during the war in Iraq, with munitions 
made from weakened uranium. (M. Ahmadinejad; 30 May 2010) 
[16] We are a tolerant, decent nation. That tolerance should not < M.verb. / D.M. / 
Inter. > be abused. But neither should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > it be turned on 
its head. (T. Blair; 22 April 2005) 
 
Compared with ‘must’ (obligations), ‘should’ expresses a weaker force from an 
outside or shared source (responsibility or reasoning), as shown in Example [14], [15] 
and [16]. In Example [14], Obama advises Congress to support his plan through a 
reasoning process; he gave a lot of reasons using conditionals in his speech. However, 
‘should’ has a stronger illocutionary force when it is used in the negative form, as 
shown in Example [15] and [16]. Ahmadinejad makes a strong argument in Example 
[15] to legitimise his proposal by providing facts. Here ‘should’ functions more as a 
criticism than a suggestion. And in Example [16], Blair uses the negative form of 
‘should’ plus ‘neither’ to emphasize his stance on immigration controls, that is, neither 
too loose nor too tight. As a matter of fact, this may be intended to criticize the 




According to the data, ‘can’ is used most frequent in Obama’s speeches with 19 
counts, followed by Blair with 16 counts and Ahmadinejad with 13 counts. Compared 
with other modal markers, ‘can’ has been used more often in its negative forms (Blair: 
10 counts; Obama: 9 counts; Ahmadinejad 5 counts). Consider the following 
examples:  
 
[17] And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can < M.verb. 
/ D.M. / Inter. > no longer afford indifference to the suffering outside our borders; 
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nor can < M.verb. / D.M. /Inter. > we consume the world's resources without 
regard to effect. (B. Obama; 20 January 2009)  
[18] We cannot < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > refuse to participate in global markets if we 
want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > prosper. We cannot < M.verb. / D.M. / 
Inter. >ignore new political ideas in other counties if we want to < M.semi. / V.M. 
/ Inter. >innovate. We cannot < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. >turn our backs on 
conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still 
to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > be secure. (T. Blair; 24 April 1999) 
[19] How can < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > such a government be a member of the 
Board of Governors? (M. Ahmadinejad; 30 May 2010)  
   
As shown in Examples [17] and [18], ‘can’ indicates a stronger illocutionary force in 
its negative form. Similarly, ‘can’ is also stronger when used in rhetorical questions 
such as the one shown in Example [19] as it is then interpreted as ‘can’t’. In this 
example, Ahmadinejad suggests that the United States should not be a member of the 
Board of Governors because of the crimes it committed. It reveals his political 
ideology and deontic stance towards the United States.  
 
On the whole, the three speakers are quite similar in the use of deontic modal markers 
to give suggestions. However, the examples in the case of Ahmadinejad manifest that 
the same modal markers of intermediate value can also have different meanings in 
different contexts.  
 
4.3.2.3 Low Value: Distant-allowed 
 
Deontic modal markers of low value are often used to express weak deontic stance 
towards the designated proposition, and are positioned as distant from the centre of 
necessity (rightness) from the perspective of deontic distance.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4.5, the most frequent deontic modal markers of low value 
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among the three cases are ‘be allowed to’, ‘unnecessary’ and ‘not have to’. These 
modal markers are all of low value, used to give permission. Compared with other 
modal markers discussed, these ones express the weakest illocutionary force. Overall, 
the deontic modal markers of low value are less frequently used in the data.  
 
(1) Be allowed to 
 
‘Be allowed to’ is used most in the case of Ahmadinejad with 5 counts, followed by 
Blair with 4 counts. It is often used to indicate the authority that allows the 
participants to have more freedom in making their own choices, as shown in Example 
[20]. However, in some circumstances, this modal marker can have the meaning of 
neglecting one’s duty, as shown in Example [21]. In fact, Ahmadinejad uses ‘be 
allowed to’ in this example to indicate that the big powers neglect their responsibility 
in stopping the crimes in occupied Afghanistan, by providing the facts that ‘there has 
been a dramatic increase in the production of illicit drugs there’. Consider the 
following examples:  
 
[20] In another case, an inspection of the former Headquarters of the Special Security 
Organisation was eventually allowed to < M.semi. / D.M. / Low. > go ahead, but 
only after the building had been emptied not only of any relevant material, but 
also of its furniture and all equipment of any kind. (T. Blair; 17 December 1998) 
[21] Hypocrisy and deceit are allowed in order to < M.semi. / D.M. / Low > secure 
their interests and imperialistic goals. Drug-trafficking and killing of innocent 
human beings are also allowed < M.semi. / D.M. / Low > in pursuit of such 
diabolic goals. (M. Ahmadinejad; 22 September 2011) 
 
 (2) Unnecessary 
 
Since ‘necessary’ is something one needs, ‘unnecessary’ means something one does 
not need. Therefore, it often refers to something or to actions which are unfavourable 
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or negative. For example, we can see in the examples [22] and [23], ‘unnecessary’ is 
followed by ‘interference’, and ‘spending’. The use of ‘unnecessary’ clearly reveals 
the ideology of the speakers because those unnecessary things or actions are those 
they disapprove of. From the perspective of pragmatics, it is a means of 
presupposition. By using ‘unnecessary’, the speaker presupposes something is bad or 
unfavourable, therefore persuading the participants avoid it or allowing them not to do 
it.  
 
In this sense, this deontic modal can be a useful persuasion / manipulation strategy as 
it can help the speaker to avoid the responsibility of the stance-taking act. It also 
embeds the speaker’s political values (as part of his ideology) with regard to what 
kind of actions is negative or unnecessary. For example, ‘the interference of Europe’ 
in Example [22] and ‘the spending’ in [23] are both treated as unnecessary, and 
therefore disapproved by the speakers.   
 
[22] Europe has done itself more damage through what is perceived as unnecessary < 
M.adj. / D.M. / Low > interference than all the pamphlets by Eurosceptics could 
< M.verb. / E.M. / Low > ever do. (T. Blair; 26 May 2005) 
[23] And as I announced yesterday, we will < M.verb. / E.M. / V.M. / High > launch 
an unprecedented effort to eliminate unwise and unnecessary < M.adj. / D.M. / 
Low. > spending that has never been more unaffordable for our nation and our 
children's future than it is right now. (B. Obama; 8 January 2009) 
 
(3) Not have to 
 
Compared with its positive form, ‘not have to’ implies that the participants have more 
options, as ‘have to’ means there are no other options. It is often used with something 
unfavourable or negative, as shown in Examples [24] and [25]. In Example [24], 
Obama tries to convince the American people that they have more choices than 
realizing their dreams at the expense of others’ dreams. Similarly, Blair manifests that 
Chapter Four   
 
 157 
one can do business successfully without bribing or relying on favours from those in 
power.  
 
[24] It requires all Americans to realize that your dreams do not have to < M.semi. / 
D.M. / Low. > come at the expense of my dreams; that investing in the health, 
welfare, and education of black and brown and white children will < M.verb. / 
E.M. / High > ultimately help all of America prosper. (B. Obama; 18 March 
2008) 
[25] The lesson of the Asian crisis is above all that it is better to invest in countries 
where you have openness, independent central banks, properly functioning 
financial systems and independent courts, where you do not have to < M.semi. / 
D.M. / Low. > bribe or rely on favours from those in power. (T. Blair; 24 April 
1999) 
 
Overall, the use of deontic modal markers of low value is much less than those with 
high or intermediate values. However, they also have their distinctive meanings and 
functions. As can be seen from the previous examples, deontic modals of low value 
are often adopted to express those unwelcome / negative values or proposals 
(Simon-Vandenbergen 1997:353). 
 
In sum, the above qualitative analyses manifest that different choices of deontic stance 
suggest the speakers’ different rhetorical styles (Marín-Arrese 2011a) and reveal their 
different ideologies concerning different levels of values (core, peripheral, and 
marginal values). For example, Blair uses more deontic semi-modals – ‘need to’ (35 
counts) and modal adjectives –‘necessary’ (14 counts) than the other two speakers 
(Obama: 24 and 3 counts; Ahmadinejad: 7 and 7 counts, see Table 4.5). These two 
deontic modals allow the speaker to evoke and reinforce the audience’s belief that 
taking certain actions is in accordance with their internal needs instead of being forced 
by external powers. Take his speech ‘Doctrine of the International community’ for 
example (No.3 speech in Table 2.3), he uses ‘need to’ (11 counts) and ‘necessary’ (1 
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counts) to represent his core values such as ‘assist the war crimes tribunal in its work 
to bring to justice those who have committed these appalling crimes’, ‘find a new way 
to make the UN and its Security Council work’ and ‘ensure flexible labour markets, to 
remove regulatory burdens and to untie the hands of business’.  
 
Obama is very similar in the use of deontic modals to those of Blair, though he tends 
to use more ‘must’ and ‘can’. Take his Speech ‘On job bill’ for example (No. 9 speech 
in Table 2.4), Obama uses ‘should’ 21 times to legitimise his proposal of ‘passing the 
job bill’ by presupposing the designated action as a common practice and urges the 
audience (Members of Congress) to support him in order to meet their responsibility. 
At the same time, Obama uses ‘have to’ for 13 times to present this action as the only 
choice they can make.   
 
Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, ranks first in the use of deontic modals such as ‘must’ 
(39 counts), ‘shall’ (7 counts), and ‘be allowed to’ (5 counts). Take his speech ‘Before 
66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’ for example (No.9 speech in 
Table 2.5), Ahmadinejad uses ‘must’ in its passive form 8 times (12 times in total) and 
‘be allowed to’ for three times to mystify the actors and avoid the potential  conflicts. 
These modals in their passive forms may allow the speaker to delete the actor with 
regard to which person or what institution should be responsible for giving 
permissions for specific actions. The use of the passive form of ‘must’ suggests the 
strong necessity of taking designated actions, while the use of ‘be allowed to’ implies 
that those powerful nations who occupied Iraq are committing crimes. That is because 
what are allowed are actually crimes such as ‘hypocrisy, deceit, drug- trafficking and 
killing of innocent human beings’.  
 
The same modal marker also indicates different semantic meanings and various 
degrees of force according to different contexts. For example, when used with 
different kinds of subjects, ‘must’ can be either a demand or a warning. In addition, 
the negative deontic modals usually have stronger illocutionary force, which can be 
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used to delegitimise the political actions. For example, ‘must not’ or ‘shouldn’t’ are 
stronger in deontic stance than their original forms ‘must’ and ‘should’. By using these 
negative deontic modals, the speaker either wants to show it is not right to take these 
actions, or to show what has been forbidden is actually the right thing to do. For 
example, the negative deontic modals of ‘should’ in examples [15] and [16] are used 
to delegitimise the designated actions, while ‘can’t’ in examples [17] and [18] are used 
to criticize the designated actions. 
 
4.4 Summary 
Overall, this chapter has demonstrated how different forms and values of deontic 
modality express stance, reflect ideology, and (de)legitimise actions in political 
discourse from the perspective of deontic distance. 
 
I first illustrated the distributions and frequencies of deontic modality in terms of 
modal values and forms in the three cases, and then compared the similarities and 
differences of top-ten deontic modal markers used by three speakers. The quantitative 
results manifested that the distributions and frequencies of deontic modality in the 
three cases present a similar pattern in terms of values and forms, particularly in the 
cases of Blair and Obama.  
 
I also examined the functions of deontic modality in political discourse with respect to 
expressing deontic stance, reflecting ideology and legitimise or delegitimise actions. 
Generally, the deontic modals of higher value are placed closer to the centre of 
necessity (rightness), therefore indicating a stronger force towards the realization of 
the actions. The most striking results are as follows: 
 
 Deontic modals encode value-based ideology and function as stance-taking acts 
which express three levels of value-based stance corresponding to three values of 
modality.  
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 Deontic modality can also be treated as value grading in terms of four levels: core, 
peripheral, marginal, opposite values.  
 Stance-taking acts of deontic modality contribute to the function of 
(de)legitimisation.  
 Deontic modality reflects the speaker’s ideology in terms of what is right and 
what is wrong.  
 The study of deontic stance in political discourse should not be restricted to 
deontic modal verbs because they only account for about half of the total deontic 
stance markers.  
 Deontic semi-modals play an important role in expressing implicit deontic stance, 
which is very popular in the process of persuading or manipulating addressees. 
 Deontic markers of high value rank first among all three cases, followed by those 
of intermediate and low value. 
 The differences of deontic modals among the three cases are significant in high 
and low value, as well as semi-modals and the total figures, though there are no 
significant differences between Obama and Blair in all categories. 
 The same deontic modal marker can indicate different semantic meanings and 
various degrees of force in different contexts. 
 The deontic modals of high value are often used in the legitimisation of the 
speaker’s own views or proposals (‘positive self-representation’), while those of 
low value can be adopted in the delegitimisation of the other’s views or proposals 
(‘negative other-representation’); 
 The three speakers’ choices of deontic modals reflect their distinctive ideologies 
and rhetorical styles. 
 
In the following chapter, I will conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
volitional modality in political discourse with examples from the three cases.
  
 









Unlike epistemic modality and deontic modality, volitional modality has long been 
neglected in the previous discourse studies as well as semantic studies. Traditionally, it 
is treated as a sub-category of deontic modality (see Krug 2000:41) or dynamic 
modality (see Portner 2009:135). In this study, volitional modality is a paralleling 
category with deontic and epistemic modality. Volitional modality is defined as a 
semantic domain with which speakers express their force of volitional stance 
involving willingness, desirability, or intentions indicated in the utterance and this 
force is evaluated in terms of volitional distance towards the centre of willingness. 
Volitional modality can be adopted to make commitments and express volitional 
stance with reference to one’s emotions.  
 
Volitional modality also plays a role in legitimising actions in political discourse, 
because different values of volitional modality make it possible for a political speaker 
to make commitments in various degrees, such as making promises, making wishes, 
accepting and refusing requests or offers.  
 
In this chapter, I will illustrate how volitional modality functions in political discourse 
both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
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5.2 Quantitative Analysis of Volitional Modality 
This section is mainly about the quantitative analysis of volitional modality. First, I 
will calculate the distributions of volitional modal values and forms in each case. Then 
I will compare their frequencies in each category between three speakers. Besides, I 
will make a comparison of top-ten modal markers of volitional modality among the 
three cases.  
 
5.2.1 Values of Volitional Modality 
The distribution of volitional modal values among the three speakers shows much 
more disparities than that of epistemic and deontic modality, as shown in Table 5.1 
and Figure 5.1. Firstly, It is interesting to see that the percentage of high value is much 
higher than that of intermediate value in the cases of Blair and Obama, while the 
situation is reversed in the case of Ahmadinejad (High: 28.81% vs. Intermediate: 
71.19%). Secondly, in terms of volitional modals of low value, it takes up 6.67% in 
the case of Obama, while the figure is only 1.34% in the case of Blair and zero in 
Ahmadinejad’s case. Last but not least, Obama (150 counts) and Blair (149 counts) 
show great similarity in the use of volitional modal values, while Ahmadinejad uses 
only half of their figures with 59 counts.     
 
Table 5.1 The distribution of values of volitional modality in the three cases 
 









No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
High  89 59.73% 75 50% 17 28.81% 
Inter. 58 38.93% 65 43.33% 42 71.19% 
Low  2 1.34% 10 6.67% 0 0 
Total  149 100% 150 100% 59 100% 
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Figure 5.1 The distribution of values of volitional modality in the three cases 
 
In Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2, we can see that the frequencies of volitional modal values 
are also very different among the three cases. Blair ranks first in high value, while 
Obama has the highest frequency in intermediate and low value. Ahmadinejad, on the 
other hand, uses far fewer volitional modals in all the categories than the two other 
speakers, except for those of intermediate value. In particular, he does not use any 
volitional modal markers of low value. Overall, the differences of volitional modal 
values among the three cases are significant except for intermediate value, though the 
results between Blair and Obama indicate no significant disparities except for 














                                                        
47 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of 
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Table 5.2 A comparison of values of volitional modality in the three cases 
 


















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
High  89 3.38 75 2.83 17 0.67 1.080e-10 Yes 
Inter. 58 2.20 65 2.46 42 1.65 0.1248 No 
Low  2 0.08 10 0.38 0 0 0.001096 Yes 
Total 149 5.65 150 5.67 59 2.32 7.083e-10 Yes 
 (If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 




Figure 5.2 A comparison of values of volitional modality in the three cases 
 
5.2.2 Forms of Volitional Modality 
With respect to volitional modal forms, it is interesting to see that the distribution of 
three cases present a very similar picture in terms of percentage, ranking from modal 
verbs, semi-modals, to modal adjectives and adverbs, as shown in Table 5.3 and 
Figure 5.3. In particular, modal verbs and semi-modals take up similar percentages in 
all three cases, with an average of 61% and 37% respectively. All three speakers use 
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use any of these two categories.     
 
Table 5.3 The distribution of forms of volitional modality in the three cases 
 









No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
M.verb. 94 63.09% 85 56.67% 38 64.41% 
M.semi. 54 36.24% 61 40.67% 21 35.59% 
M.adj. 1 0.67% 2 1.33% 0 0 
M.adv. 0 0 2 1.33% 0 0 
Total  149 100% 150 100% 59 100% 
 
   
 
Figure 5.3 The distribution of forms of volitional modality in the three cases 
 
Table 5.4 and Figure 5.4 shows us that Blair and Obama use quite similar frequencies 
of volitional modal markers in all categories, while Ahmadinejad uses far fewer modal 
verbs & semi-modals than them and does not use any modal adjectives or adverbs. 
Obama ranks first in most categories, including semi-modals, modal adjectives and 
adverbs, while Blair adopts the most modal verbs. On the whole, the disparities of 
volitional modal forms among the three cases are not significant except modal verbs 
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Table 5.4 A comparison of forms of volitional modality in the three cases 
 















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
M.verb. 94 3.57 85 3.21 38 1.49 1.050e-05 Yes 
M.semi. 54 2.05 61 2.30 21 0.83 9.176e-05 Yes 
M.adj. 1 0.04 2 0.08 0 0 0.3805 No 
M.adv. 0 0 2 0.08 0 0 0.1413 No 
Total 149 5.65 150 5.67 59 2.32 7.083e-10 Yes 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 




Figure 5.4 A comparison of forms of volitional modality in the three cases 
 
                                                        
48 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of 
volitional modal forms in all the categories: modal verbs (P-value: 0.5288), semi-modal (P-value:0.5924); modal 
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5.2.3 Top-10 Modal Markers of Volitional Modality 
As can be seen in Table 5.5, the list of the most frequent volitional modal markers 
presents a similar pattern among the three cases (See Table A7-A9 in Appendix for 
details). Firstly, the three cases share six modal markers in the list, including ‘will’, 
‘want to’, ‘would’, ‘intend to’, ‘may’ and ‘shall’. Secondly, volitional modal markers 
‘will’, ‘want to’ and ‘would’ take up the first three positions in all three cases. Thirdly, 
Blair and Obama use nearly the same number of several modal markers, such as 
‘would’ (both 16 counts) and ‘want to’ (37 counts vs. 40 counts).  
 
However, compared with the other two types of modals, there are more differences 
than similarities among the three speakers in using volitional modal markers. For 
example, Blair and Obama use far more ‘will’ (72 counts vs. 63 counts) than ‘want to’ 
(37 counts vs. 40 counts), while Ahmadinejad uses far fewer in both modal markers 
(11 counts vs. 15 counts). Besides, Blair uses more ‘will’ (72 counts), ‘be to’ (5 counts) 
and ‘shall’ (4 counts), while Obama uses more ‘want to’ (40 counts), ‘be going to’ (10 
counts) and ‘be willing to’ (7 counts). Compared with the other two speakers, though 
Ahmadinejad uses far fewer ‘will’ and ‘want to’, he adopts more ‘would’ (19 counts) 
and ‘intend to’ (4 counts).  
 
Overall, all three speakers share some similarities and differences in adopting 
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Table 5.5 A comparison of top-10 modal markers of volitional modality in the three 
cases 
 












 No.  Modal 
Markers 
 No.  Modal 
Markers 
 No.  
1 will 72 (12) will 63(9) would 19(2) 
2 want to 37 (1) want to 40 want to  15 (2) 
3 would 16 would 16 (2) will 11 (1) 
4 be to 5 be going to 10 intend to 4 (1) 
5 be going to 5 (1) be willing to 7 may 4 
6 shall 4 may  4 shall 4 
7 be determined to  3 intend to 3 be determined to  2 
8 be willing to 2 willingly 2 /  
9 intend to 2 anxious 2 /  
10 may/should/ 
anxious 
1 shall/ be to 
/might 
1 /  
 
5.2.4 Discussions and Implications 
So far this section has discussed the distributions and frequencies of the values and 
forms of volitional modality in the three cases. It has also demonstrated and compared 
the similarities and disparities of the top-ten volitional modal markers among the three 
speakers. The most striking results are as follows: 
 
(i)  Blair and Obama adopt very similar numbers of volitional modal markers (with 
149 and 150 counts respectively), but Ahmadinejad only uses half of their figures  
(with 59 counts). That is mainly because Ahmadinejad uses much fewer modal 
verb ‘will’ and semi-modals ‘want to’, which both involve the future. It implies 
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that Ahmadinejad’s speeches focus more on past events, while the other two 
speakers talk about more about the future plans or policies. It could also be the 
evidence to support the study of his distinctive speech style.   
 
(ii) The study of volitional modality in political discourse should not be restricted to 
modal verbs. Otherwise, many essential volitional modal meanings would be 
neglected, especially for semi-modals. That is because modal verbs only account 
for 60% of the total figure on average, as shown in Table 5.3. It is true that other 
volitional modal forms are not obvious in stance-taking, but they can reveal the 
speaker’s volitional stance to certain degree.  
 
(iii) Both Blair and Obama use far more volitional modals of high value than those of 
intermediate value, though the situation is reversed in the case of Ahmadinejad. 
That is mainly because Ahmadinejad uses much fewer modal verbs such as ‘will’, 
which is a volitional modal of high value. Besides, he also uses more ‘would’ and 
‘intend to’ than the other two speakers, both of which are of intermediate value.  
 
(iv) The differences among the three cases are significant in high and low value, as 
well as modal verbs and semi-modals. However, further statistical analyses show 
that the differences between Obama and Blair in the use of volitional modals are 
not significant in most categories except for that of low value. That means these 
disparities among the three cases are mainly due to the results of Ahmadinejad’s 
case. It implies the possibility of the different use of volitional modal markers 
between English native speakers and foreigners or the distinctive speech style of 
Ahmadinejad. Therefore, it needs further investigations in the context of political 
discourse. 
 
(v) ‘Will’, ‘want to’ and ‘would’ rank top three in the cases of Blair and Obama, but 
this order is different in the case of Ahmadinejad (‘want to’ comes first, followed 
by ‘would’ and ‘will’). That is probably because Ahmadinejad uses much fewer 
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‘will’ than the other two speakers as he discussed more past events than future 
plans in his speeches.  
 
(vi) Despite of the similarities, there are also some differences between the speakers in 
their choices of volitional modal markers. For example, Blair uses more ‘will’, 
‘be to’ & ‘shall’ than the other speakers, while Obama uses more ‘want to’ & ‘be 
going to’ and Ahmadinejad uses more ‘would’ & ‘intend to’. 
  
In sum, the quantitative analysis of volitional modality among the three cases 
manifested much similarities and disparities in terms of values, forms and top-ten 
modal markers. Then it is also essential to analyse them qualitatively in order to 
investigate the functions of these volitional modal markers and look at how these 
functions are realized in different contexts. Therefore, the next section will address 
volitional modality qualitatively with examples from the three cases. 
 
5.3 Qualitative Analysis of Volitional Modality 
The section of quantitative analysis has illustrated the distributions and frequencies of 
volitional modality among the three cases in terms of values, forms and top-ten modal 
markers. In this section, I will focus on the functions of volitional modality and the 
most frequent expressions of volitional modality through a qualitative analysis of data.   
 
5.3.1 Volitional Modality as Emotion-based Stance  
Volitional modality is often used to make commitments by demonstrating one’s 
willingness, determination, promises, desires or intentions to take actions. Through 
various forms of volitional modal markers, the speaker intends to manifest the force of 
willingness in doing something, based on various evidences showing why someone is 
willing to do something. Therefore, volitional modality can be used to express 
volitional stance based on emotions
49
. As discussed previously, epistemic modals and 
                                                        
49 Emotions here refer to determination, intentions, wishes or willingness expressed by volitional modals.  
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deontic modals can be viewed as ‘knowledge grading’ (Facchinetti et al. 2003) and 
‘value grading’ respectively. In this sense, volitional modality can also be treated as 
‘emotion grading’. This means the use of volitional modals reflect the speaker’s 
different levels of emotions with regard to willingness. For instance, a volitional 
modal of high value is often used to indicate the speaker’s strong determination 
towards the actualization of the designated action as it is close to the centre of 
willingness within the research framework. However, those volitional modals of lower 
value often show the speaker’s weaker emotions/ intentions as they are more distant 
from the centre.  
 
Following epistemic stance and deontic stance in the previous chapters, volitional 
stance refers to the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to the 
willingness/commitment concerning the realization of events, to the ways in which the 
speaker/writer carries out a stance act aimed at determining or influencing the course 
of reality itself. Volitional stance is realized by volitional modality, which can also be 
addressed in terms of ‘volitional distance’. Like deontic distance and epistemic 
distance, volitional distance is also concerned with ‘the speaker’s metaphorical 
“distance” from a particular state of affairs: the speaker’s willingness regarding the 
realization a proposition. That is to say, the different degrees of volitional modal 
markers can be evaluated in terms of volitional distance.  
 
Volitional modals are, then, treated as encoding different commissive force involving 
the speaker’s or subject’s emotions (such as willingness/inclination, intentions, 
determination, commitments) towards the realization of events (Marín-Arrese 
2011:204). Therefore, volitional stance can be classified into three levels of 
commissive force (illocutionary force), corresponding to three levels of modal value 
and distance, which means, the speaker typically expresses a stronger volitional stance 
when he/she uses a volitional modal marker with a higher value, positioned as close to 
the centre of willingness, and vice versa. Similar to that of epistemic and deontic 
modals, high value of volitional modals in “I will lend him more money.” (where will 
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is a volitional modal of high value) often indicates stronger volitional stance than “I 
would like to lend him more money.” (where would like is a volitional modal marker 
of intermediate value) and “I am willing to lend him more money.” (Where am willing 
to is a volitional modal marker of low value). This will be further elaborated in section 
5.3.2. 
 
Similar to epistemic modality, the function of reflecting ideology concerning 
volitional modality is also implicit, though it can be inferred from the stance-taking 
acts to a certain extent. Volitional stance reflects the speaker’s ideology based on his 
emotions concerning who is willing or unwilling to take actions. Volitional modality is 
often used by the speaker to make commitments. And the commitments made by the 
speaker usually involve his emotions about who is expected (or determined, intended, 
willing) to take actions (cf. Koller 2014), which often reflect the speaker’s beliefs 
about what is right or possible to take actions in the context of political discourse. 
Consider the following example:  
 
This time we want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > talk about the men and women of 
every color and creed who serve together, and fight together, and bleed together under 
the same proud flag. (B. Obama; 18 March 2008) 
 
The volitional marker ‘want to’ in the example expresses the speaker’s volitional 
stance based on his intention (emotion). This intention of taking action ‘talk about the 
men and women … under the same proud flag’ is believed to be right by the speaker. 
In other words, this volitional stance reflects Obama’s ideology of ‘race’ to a certain 
degree.   
 
Similar to deontic modality, volitional modality can also be used to (de)legitimise 
actions at the propositional level by placing the propositions on the scale of 
willingness. Volitional modal markers of higher value indicate higher willingness of 
the participants to take actions and those of lower value imply lower willingness. 
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Evidentiality helps to explain one wants to do something because it is right or possible 
to do so (or one does not want to do something because it is wrong or impossible to do 
so). 
 
When someone is determined to take actions, a volitional modal marker of high value 
is often used, which means the subject matter is positioned close to the centre of 
willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance. Similarly, a volitional modal 
marker of intermediate value is used when someone is intended to take actions, which 
means the subject matter is positioned near the centre of willingness by the speaker in 
terms of volitional distance. When someone is willing to take actions, a volitional 
modal marker of low value is typically used, which means the subject matter is 
positioned distant from the centre of willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional 
distance. Negative volitional modals of high value are only used when the subject 
matter is positioned opposite to the centre of willingness by the speaker in terms of 
volitional distance. By saying someone is willing or not willing to take an action, the 
speaker is also suggesting either it is right to take this action or it is possible to realize 
this action. Meanwhile, with the support of evidential markers, it is possible for 
volitional modality to legitimise actions in political discourse. In this sense, the 
speaker can legitimise or delegitimise actions by adopting different values of 
volitional modal markers. 
  
5.3.2 Markers of Volitional Modality in the three cases 
In this section, the functions of volitional modality will be examined in detail through 
a variety of volitional modal expressions, from the perspective of value of modality 
and volitional distance. It would also be interesting to see how emotions are presented 
and graded into three levels (determined, intended, and willing) in term of various 
volitional modals during the persuasion process, with reference to three levels of 
commissive force.  
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5.3.2.1 High Value: Close-Determined 
A volitional modal marker of high value is often used when someone is determined to 
take actions, which means the subject matter is positioned close to the centre of 
willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance. Volitional modals of high 
value are used to make promises or express one’s resolutions, indicating a strong 
commissive force (Marín-Arrese 2011).  
 
(1) Will 
‘Will’50 has been used most in the data, with 60 counts (Blair), 54 counts (Obama) 
and 12 counts (Ahmadinejad) respectively. As I have mentioned in Chapter Three that 
the modal marker ‘will’ can both convey the meaning of volition/intention as 
volitional modality or the meaning of high possibility in the future. However, the 
former can only occur when the subject is a person because impersonal subjects can’t 
express their intentions, though different persons or contexts also influence its 
commissive force and volitional stance. Consider the following examples:  
 
[1] I will < M.verb. / V.M. / High. > pursue this new approach in Europe not because 
it is in Europe’s interests but because it is in Britain’s interests. (T. Blair; 15 
December 1998) 
[2] To finally spark the creation of a clean-energy economy, we will < M.verb. / E.M. 
& V.M. / High > double the production of alternative energy in the next three years. 
We will < M.verb. / E.M. & V.M. / High > modernize more than 75 percent of 
federal buildings and improve the energy efficiency of 2 million American homes, 
saving consumers and taxpayers billions on our energy bills. (B. Obama; 8 
January 2009) 
[3] I am confident < Inside / P.K. > that you, the American people, will < M.verb. / 
V.M. & E.M. / High > play an instrumental role in the establishment of justice and 
spirituality throughout the world. (M. Ahmadinejad; 29 November 2006) 
 
                                                        
50 These figures exclude the counts of its negative form, which will be dealt with in 7.3.2.4. 
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[4] Alternatively, if Saddam will not < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > see reason, 
then after this military operation is concluded, we will < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / 
High. > work to ensure that Saddam’s weakened military capability cannot < 
M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be rebuilt and that the threat he poses is fully contained. 
(T. Blair; 17 December 1998) 
 
In Example [1], Blair uses the volitional marker of high value - ‘will’ to express his 
determination to his audience in taking the action, and explains the reasons why he 
decides to do so. This determination reveals his ideology that pursuing this new 
approach in Europe is the right thing to do and it will certainly be actualized.  
 
‘Will’ in Example [2], however, can have both readings. That is to say, these two ‘will’ 
can be interpreted as both ‘we promise to take these actions’ in terms of volitional 
modality and ‘we are certain to do so’ in terms of epistemic modality. As there is a 
definite time reference (in the next three years), their epistemic meaning is more 
prominent in this example. Therefore, the volitional stance expressed here is much 
weaker than that of Example [3].  
 
Example [3], on the other hand, represents the lowest volitional stance among three 
examples. That is mainly because the volitional stance expressed here is not the 
speaker’s (Ahmadinejad), but only assumed by the speaker based on his own belief 
through an inside evidential ‘I am confident’.  
 
The negative form of ‘will’ in Example [4], on the other hand, places the volitional 
stance of the subject (Saddam) on the opposite centre of willingness through a 
conditional clause. This therefore enables the speaker to legitimise his proposal, that is, 
‘to ensure that Saddam’s weakened military capability cannot be rebuilt and that the 
threat he poses is fully contained.’ This proposition clearly presupposes the military 
threat from Saddam as real and gives a warning to the relevant parties. It also reveals 
Blair’s intention (as part of his ideology) that even after this military operation, we 
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will keep on controlling the military capability of Iraq.     
 
(2) Be determined to  
 
‘Be determined to’ is only used by Blair and Ahmadinejad, with 3 and 2 counts 
respectively. It is of the strongest volitional stance among all the volitional modals, 
which often indicates one’s strong desire or resolution to do something regardless of 
any difficulties. Therefore, it is only used when the speaker is very certain about that 
determination. However, it is not the case when used in the context. Consider the 
following examples:  
 
[5] Bertie Ahern, the Irish Taoiseach, and I are determined to < M.semi. / V.M. / High. > 
find a way through. The people will never < M.verb. / E.M. / High > forgive the 
politicians unless we resolve it. (T. Blair; 24 April 1999) 
[6] The God Almighty has promised that the day when nations are prepared and 
determined < M.semi. / V.M. / High >, this great cause and goal will < M.verb. / 
E.M. / High > be realized by the promised savior of nations, the real lover of 
humans and the true administrator of justice, Hazrat Mahdi (May < M.verb. / 
V.M. / Inter. > God Hasten His Reappearance) in the accompany of the Jesus 
Christ (PBUH) and all the other righteous and freedom and justice seekers of the 
world. (M. Ahmadinejad; 30 August 2012) 
       
In Example [5], Blair uses ‘be determined to’ to express his strong volitional stance in 
taking the designated action. By doing so, He also makes a promise that they will 
make it come true. However, the determination expressed by the same modal marker 
in Example [6] does not involve the speaker- Ahmadinejad himself, but from the 
promise of the God. Therefore, there is no doubt that the illocutionary force or 
volitional stance expressed in this example is much weaker than the previous one.  
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(3) be going to    
  
‘Be going to’ is the most frequent volitional semi-modal of high value in the data, used 
only by Obama (10 counts) and Blair (4 counts). It often refers to someone’s intention 
of doing something or something has been planned to take place in the near future. So 
it can also be used in the sense of ‘high possibility’ pertaining to epistemic modality. 
Compared with the previous semi-modal ‘be determined to’, ‘be going to’ is weaker in 
terms of illocutionary force. However, it often implies that the speaker has already 
planned in detail about how to make it happen. In this sense, this modal marker also 
indicates strong volitional stance towards the actualization of the designated action. 
Consider the following examples: 
 
[7] We all understand < Shared / S.K. > the need to ensure flexible labour markets, to 
remove regulatory burdens and to untie the hands of business if we are going to < 
M.semi. / V.M. / High. > succeed. (T. Blair; 24 April 1999) 
[8] So America is going to < M.semi. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > continue on this course 
of action no matter what happens in Copenhagen. (B. Obama; 18 December 
2009) 
[9] So we’re going to < M.semi. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > keep fighting for the 
DREAM Act. We’re going to < M.semi. / V.M. & E.M. / High. > keep up the 
fight for reform. (B. Obama; 10 May 2011) 
         
‘Be going to’ used in Example [7] is the weakest of all in terms of volitional stance 
among the three examples here. That is because this stance has been hedged by a 
conditional marker ‘if’, which leaves much space for the realization of the designated 
action. Example [8], on the other hand, shows Obama’s strong determination in taking 
the indicated action, because it is not only justified by a causal connective ‘so’ but also 
supported by the phrase ‘no matter what happens in Copenhagen’. That means he has 
good reasons to take this action and will spare no efforts to make it happen.  
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In Example [9], the speaker uses this modal marker repeatedly in a rhetorical way to 
express his strong volitional stance. By doing so, he legitimises his determination in 
passing the DREAM Act (the Job Bill) and also reflects his ideology that it is 
necessary and possible to be actualized. The interesting thing about this example is 
that the speaker adopts an exclusive ‘we’ to engage the audience and presuppose them 
as his supporters.  
 
5.3.2.2 Intermediate Value: Near-Intended 
A volitional modal marker of intermediate value is used when someone is intended to 
take actions, which means the subject matter is positioned near the centre of 
willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance.  
 
(1) want to  
 
‘Want to’ is the most popular semi-modal of volitional modality in the data. Obama 
comes first in the use of this modal marker with 40 counts, followed by Blair (37 
counts) and Ahmadinejad (18 counts). It is often used to express one’s intention or 
plan in taking designated actions, normally used after the first person. Consider the 
following examples: 
 
[10] I want incomes for middle-class families to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > rise 
again.  (Applause.)  I want prosperity in this country to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > 
be widely shared.  (Applause.)  I want everybody to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > 
be able to reach that American dream. And that’s why immigration reform is an 
economic imperative. (B.Obama; 10 May 2011) 
[11] Non -interference has long been considered an important principle of 
international order. And it is not one we would want to < M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. > 
< M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > jettison too readily. (T. Blair; 24 April 1999) 
[12] Recently they [the Israelis] tried a new trick. They want to < M.semi. / V.M. / 
Inter. > show the evacuation from the Gaza strip, which was imposed on them by 
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Palestinians, as a final victory for the Palestinians and end the issue of Palestine 
with the excuse of establishing a Palestinian government next to themselves. 
Today, they want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. >involve Palestinians with mischief 
and trick them into fighting with one another over political positions so that they 
would < M.verb. / V.M & E.M. / Inter. > drop the issue of Palestine. (M. 
Ahmadinejad; 26 October 2005) 
 
In Example [10], Obama uses the volitional semi-modal marker – ‘want to’ three 
times to express his intentions about ‘the incomes for middle-class families rise again’, 
‘prosperity in this country will be widely shared’ and ‘everybody is able to reach that 
American dream’. And all these intentions support or legitimise the action he proposes 
– ‘immigration reform’, which he believes is ‘an economic imperative’. The 
illocutionary force or volitional stance expressed here is the strongest among the three 
examples here, as this force or stance is directly expressed by the speaker himself.  
 
‘Want to’ in Example [11], however, has been hedged by another volitional modal of 
intermediate value. That is why its volitional stance is much weaker than the previous 
one. Similarly, the volitional stance indicated in Example [12] is not as strong as that 
of Example [10]. That is because this stance is only assumed by the speaker as the two 
subjects of the semi-modals are ‘they’ instead of the speaker himself (Ahmadinejad). 
It is also likely that he has some evidence to support his assumptions, though it is not 
clear in the context.  
 
‘Want to’ also encodes the speaker’s ideology in the sense that the speaker’s emotions 
(including willingness, determination, intentions, etc.) often implies his or her values 
(as part of his ideology) about what should be done or not, or his or her knowledge 
about what are possible or impossible to be actualized, as shown in Example [10] and 
[11]. However, if the emotions expressed by ‘want to’ belong to the speaker’s 
opponents, the values behind the emotions are normally negative or disapproved by 
the speaker, such as ‘they want to involve Palestinians with mischief and trick them 
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into fighting with one another over political positions’, as shown in Example [12]. 
This result is consistent to the previous studies of legitimisation and delegitimisation 
in terms of ‘positive self-representation’ and ‘negative other-representation’ 
respectively (Chilton 2004:46, 47).  
 
(2) would  
  
‘Would’ is the second most frequent volitional modal of intermediate value, used with 
very similar frequencies among the three speakers (Blair: 16 counts; Obama: 16 
counts; Ahmadinejad: 19 counts). ‘Would’ is the past form of ‘will’, it is therefore 
weaker in terms of commissive force as it encodes remote temporal distance as well as 
volitional distance than its bare form (Chilton 2014). In Chapter Five, the semantic 
meanings of ‘would’ have been discussed in terms of epistemic modality. As to its 
volitional meaning, it often means ‘intermediate willingness’ or ‘wish’. Consider the 
following examples: 
 
[13] And I’m pretty sure < M.adj. / E.M. / High > I know < Inside / P.K. > what most 
Americans would < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / Inter. > choose. (B. Obama; 8 
September 2011) 
[14] Nearly half the $124 billion US firms spent on foreign acquisitions last year went 
on British companies. We would like < M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. > it to be even 
more. (T. Blair; 24 April 1999) 
[15] Palestinian mothers, just like Iranian and American mothers, love their children, 
and are painfully bereaved by the imprisonment, wounding and murder of their 
children. What mother wouldn't < M.verb. / V.M. / Inter.  >? (M. Ahmadinejad; 
29 November 2006) 
 
The volitional stance expressed by ‘would’ in Example [13] has been supported by an 
inside evidential ‘I know’, which means the speaker (Obama) has expressed his 
self-commitment to this stance. However, the subject of ‘would’ is ‘most Americans’, 
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which means Obama assumed most Americans will make the right choice and pass his 
Job Bill. By doing so, he tries to persuade or influence his audience (the Americans) in 
making their choices. Therefore, the volitional stance indicated here is not very strong.  
 
‘Would’ in Example [14] is used together with ‘like’ as a set phrase, which means 
‘wish’ or ‘intention’, similar to ‘intend to’. It means Blair has the wish that this kind of 
investment will be more in Britain. By adopting this modal marker, he demonstrates 
his intermediate volitional stance towards the actualization of the designated action. In 
this case, his intention (as part of his ideology) is reflected through his knowledge 
about what is good for British economy. Here he believes that ‘Nearly half the $124 
billion US firms spent on foreign acquisitions last year went on British companies’ is a 
good tendency for British economy. As ‘would like’ has sort of subjunctive meaning, 
its stance is also weak in terms of the illocutionary force which makes the indicated 
action happen.  
 
The negative form of ‘would’ in Example [15], however, expressed the strongest 
volitional stance among all the three examples here. That is not only because it has 
been used in a rhetorical question, which often indicates the emphasis of the stance 
from the speaker, but also because it has been justified by the evidence in the context 
(The evidence here refers to the common knowledge shared by everyone, as shown in 
the previous sentence, though there is no evidential marker in the context.)  
 
(3) intend to  
‘Intend to’ is not used as frequently as ‘want to’ in the data, which has been used 7 
counts (Ahmadinejad), 3 counts (Obama) and 2 counts (Blair) respectively in the data. 
It typically refers to having a plan or purpose to take designated actions. Consider the 
following examples: 
 
[16] Whatever disagreements on particular issues, the partnership between us is 
essential and I intend to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > ensure it remains positive 
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and firm. (T. Blair; 18 November 2003) 
[17] You should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter.> pass it. And I intend to < M.semi. / V.M. / 
Inter. > take that message to every corner of this country. (B. Obama; 8 
September 2011) 
[18] The US administration has undermined the credibility of international 
organizations, particularly the United Nations and its Security Council. But, I do 
not intend to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > address all the challenges and calamities 
in this message. (M. Ahmadinejad; 29 November 2006) 
 
In Example [16], Blair uses ‘intend to’ to express his intention to ensure a positive and 
firm partnership with Europe. The volitional stance indicated by this modal marker is 
intermediate because the illocutionary force of realizing the designated action is not 
very strong. Similarly, ‘intend to’ in Example [17] expresses an intermediate volitional 
stance towards the indicated action and reveals the speaker’s intention (as part of his 
ideology) that it is the right thing to pass the job bill.  
 
In Example [18], however, Ahmadinejad uses the negative form of ‘intend to’ to 
justify his previous proposition by implying there are too many challenges and 
calamities that it is impossible to address all of them in this speech. It clearly reflects 
his volitional stance and ideology towards this issue.  
  
5.3.2.3 Low Value: Distant-Willing 
When someone is willing to take actions, a volitional modal marker of low value is 
typically used, which means the subject matter is positioned distant from the centre of 
willingness by the speaker in terms of volitional distance. Volitional modals of low 
value are used to express one’s willingness of taking actions, indicating a weak 
commissive force. 
 
be willing to  
‘Be willing to’ is only used by Obama and Blair, with 7 and 2 counts respectively. It 
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often means one is happy to take indicated actions or accept something needed. 
Consider the following examples: 
 
[19] We define ourselves as a nation of immigrants — a nation that welcomes those 
willing to < M.semi. / V.M. / Low. > embrace America’s ideals and America’s 
precepts. (B.Obama; 10 May 2011) 
[20] So we must < M.verb. / D.M. / High. > show the world that we are willing to < 
M.semi. / V.M. / Low. > step up to these challenges around the world and in our 
own backyards. (T. Blair; 17 July 2003) 
 
Example [19] manifests that the immigrants’ willingness of “embracing America’s 
ideals and America’s precepts” is appreciated by the speaker. By adopting the 
semi-modal ‘willing to”, Obama reveals his ideology that those immigrants are 
welcome in the USA as long as they can accept the ideals and precepts here, indicating 
the freedom of not being forced to do so.  
 
‘Be willing to’ used in Example [20], on the other hand, expresses a stronger volitional 
stance compared with that of Example [19]. That is because the stance indicated here 
has been reinforced by a deontic marker of high value. By doing so, Blair legitimises 
the action of ‘stepping up to these challenges around the world and in our own 
backyards’.  
 
In sum, different choices of volitional stance also reflect the speakers’ different 
rhetorical styles (Marín-Arrese 2011a) and reveal their different ideologies with regard 
to emotions. For example, Blair uses more volitional modals of high value than the 
other two speakers, such as ‘will’ (72 counts) ‘shall’ (4 counts), and ‘be determined 
to’(3 counts) to express his strong volitional stance towards the designated action. 
Take his speech ‘War on Iraq’ for example (No. 2 speech in Table 2.3), Blair uses 
volitional modals of high value for 9 counts to express his strong volitional stance and 
legitimise his proposal of attacking Iraq. They also reveal Blair’s ideology of 
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establishing a self-image as an authoritative leader with determination and strong will 
(Fairclough 2000a). 
 
Obama, on the other hand, uses more volitional modals of intermediate value than the 
other two speakers, such as the semi-modal ‘want to’ (40 counts, Blair: 37 counts; 
Ahmadinejad: 15 counts), to express his intentions of taking the designated actions. 
Take his speech ‘The Race Speech’ for example (No.2 speech in Table 2.4), Obama 
uses ‘we want to’ 9 counts to express his intentions or plans and at the same time 
presupposes what he intends to do is what his addressees want to do. That is probably 
because he believes that involving the audience into his intentions or plans will arouse 
the awareness of participation in the audience. It is, therefore, more likely to promote 
the interpersonal relations with them and win their support. 
 
With respect to volitional modals, Ahmadinejad takes a quite different speech style 
from the other two speakers. Ahmadinejad uses much fewer modal verbs ‘will’ and 
semi-modals ‘want to’, which both involve the future. It implies that Ahmadinejad’s 
speeches focus more on past events, while the other two speakers talk about more 
about the future plans or policies. However, he adopts more ‘would’ (19 counts) and 
‘intend to’ (4 counts). Take his speech ‘Before 66th Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly’ for example (No.9 speech in Table 2.5), Ahmadinejad uses a 
passive form of ‘intend to’ to presuppose other people’s or institutions’ intentions and 
delete the actor, as shown in the example ‘A move that triggered inflation worldwide 
and was intended to prey on the economic gains of other nations?’ from the speech. 
This may help him in avoiding his self-commitments and potential conflicts, though 
this style seems not very convincing in argumentation discourse, such as political 
speeches in this study. That is because it is often hard to prove other people’s 
intentions unless they express explicitly.   
 
It also shows that the same volitional modal marker indicates different semantic 
meanings and various degrees of force according to different contexts. Besides, the 
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volitional modals of high value can usually be used to delegitimise the political 
actions. For example, ‘will not’ is used to express the speaker’s negative volitional 
stance towards the designated action or to delegitimise it, as shown in Example [4]. 
 
5.4 Summary 
Overall this chapter illustrates how different forms and values of volitional modality 
express volitional stance, and (de)legitimise political actions in political discourse, 
interacted with evidentiality.  
 
I first illustrated the distributions and frequencies of volitional modality in terms of 
modal values and forms in the three cases, and then compared the similarities and 
differences of top-ten volitional modal markers used by three speakers. The 
quantitative results manifest that the distributions and frequencies of volitional 
modality in the three cases present a similar pattern in terms of values and forms, 
particularly in the cases of Blair and Obama.  
 
I also examined the functions of volitional modality in political discourse in terms of 
expressing volitional stance, reflecting ideology and legitimise or delegitimise actions 
through different values of volitional modal markers. Generally, the volitional modals 
of higher value are placed closer to the centre of willingness, therefore indicating a 
stronger force towards the realization of the actions. The most striking results are as 
follows: 
 
 Volitional modals encode emotion-based ideology and function as stance-taking 
acts which express three levels of emotion-based stance corresponding to three 
values of modality. 
 Volitional modality can also be treated as emotion grading in terms of three levels: 
determined, intended, and willing.  
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 Blair and Obama adopt similar numbers of volitional modal markers (with 149 
and 150 counts respectively), but Ahmadinejad only uses fewer than half of their 
figures, with 59 counts.  
 The study of volitional modality in political discourse should not be restricted to 
modal verbs. That is because modal verbs only account for 60% of the total figure 
on average. 
 Both Blair and Obama use far more volitional modals of high value than those of 
intermediate value, though the situation is reversed in the case of Ahmadinejad.  
 The differences in the use of volitional modals among the three cases are 
significant in high and low value, as well as modal verbs and semi-modals, while 
the differences between Obama and Blair are not significant in most categories 
except for that of low value.  
 ‘Will’, ‘want to’ and ‘would’ rank top three in the cases of Blair and Obama, but 
this order is different in the case of Ahmadinejad (‘would’ comes first, followed 
by ‘want to’ and ‘will’). 
 The same volitional modal marker indicates different semantic meanings and 
various degrees of force according to different contexts. 
 The volitional modals of low value can be adopted in the delegitimisation of the 
other’s views or proposals (‘negative other-representation’). 
 The three speakers’ choices of volitional modals often reflect their distinctive 
ideologies and rhetorical styles. 
 
In the next chapter, I will investigate the sources, types, and functions of evidentiality 
in political discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
  
 








The last three chapters have investigated the three types of modality in political 
discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively. They revealed interesting results about 
the frequencies and distributions of these modal markers among three case studies, 
particularly the functions of different modal types in expressing stance, reflecting 
ideologies and (de)legitimising actions within the research framework. It is interesting 
to note that evidentiality, which is closely related to modality, can provide evidence 
and justifications for the speakers in stance-taking and ideology-coding, particularly in 
the process of legitimisation in political discourse. So in this chapter I will examine 
evidentiality in political discourse from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives, 
aiming to explore how the speakers adopt different sources and types of evidential 
markers to persuade their addressees and explore the pragmatic functions of 
evidentials in the contexts of political discourse. 
 
As discussed in Section 2.4.1, evidentiality is defined as the linguistic marking of 
sources of knowledge as persuasion strategies. Drawing on Squartini’s locus of 
information (2008:917-947), the linguistic markers (evidentials) indicating sources of 
information are divided into three categories, depending on whether the information is 
from an ‘outside source’, ‘shared source’ or ‘inside source’. And each source includes 
two categories of evidentials from different modes of knowing (cf. Chafe 1986:263; 
Willett, 1988:57; Aikhenvald 2007:211; Marín-Arrese 2011a:206, 2011b:793; Hart 
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2011:760; Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014:392). Therefore, there are altogether three 
sources and six types of evidentials in this study (refer to Table 2.6 for details).  
 
Based on this classification of evidentials, in what follows evidentials will first be 
examined quantitatively in the three case studies. After that, the functions of 
evidentiality will be investigated in the context of political discourse, and some 
representative, highly frequent evidential markers of each type will be analysed 
qualitatively, with annotated examples from the three cases.  
 
6.2 Quantitative Analysis of Evidentiality 
In this section, I will first calculate and compare the frequencies and distributions of 
evidentials among three case studies in terms of sources of evidentials and types of 
evidentials. Then I will examine and compare the top-ten evidential markers among 
the three cases before discussing and summarising the results of the quantitative 
analysis. 
 
6.2.1 Sources of Evidentials 
With respect to the distributions of sources of evidentials, shared evidentials come 
first in the cases of Ahmadinejad (69.9%) and Blair (44.80%), as illustrated in Table 
6.1 and Figure 6.2. However, Obama is the only speaker who uses more inside 
evidentials than outside and shared evidentials, which also ranks first among the three 
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Table 6.1 The distribution of sources of evidentials in the three cases 
 










No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
Outside 35 22.73% 25 18.12% 21 20.39% 
Shared 69 44.80% 49 35.51% 72 69.90% 
Inside 50 32.47% 64 46.38% 10 9.71% 
Total  154 100% 138 100% 103 100% 
 
   
 
Figure 6.1 The distribution of sources of evidentials in the three cases 
 
As demonstrated in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2, Blair ranks first in terms of the 
frequencies of evidential sources both in total and in outside source. Following Blair, 
Obama comes second in the total number of evidentials, but he uses the most inside 
evidentials among the three speakers (2.42 ptw). It is interesting to see that although 
Ahmadinejad uses the least evidentials in all the other categories, he adopts more 
shared evidentials (2.83 ptw) than the other two speakers. Overall, the differences of 
inside evidentials and the total evidentials among the three speakers are significant, 
though further statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences 
between the results of Blair and Obama in all the categories
51
.  
                                                        
51 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of 
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Table 6.2 A comparison of sources of evidentials in the three cases 
 
















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
Outside 35 1.33 25 0.94 21 0.83 0.1750 No 
Shared 69 2.62 49 1.85 72 2.83 0.0571 No 
Inside 50 1.90 64 2.42 10 0.39 1.453e-08 Yes 
Total  154 5.84 138 5.21 103 4.05 0.01393 Yes 
 (If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 




Figure 6.2 A comparison of sources of evidentials in the three cases 
 
6.2.2 Types of Evidentials 
In terms of the quantitative analysis of evidential types, it can be seen in Table 6.3 and 
Figure 6.3 that evidentials of S.K. (Shared Knowledge) take up the first position in the 
cases of Ahmadinejad (44.66%) and Blair (33.12%). However, in the case of Obama, 
evidentials of P.K. (Personal Knowledge) ranks first (38.41%), followed by evidentials 
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of S.K., H.E. (Hearsay Evidentials) and other categories. Blair also uses more 
evidentials of P.K. and H.E. than other categories, taking up 27.27% and 13.64% 
respectively. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, adopts far more evidentials of S.P. 
(Shared Perceptual evidentials) than other categories. Besides, he does not use any 
evidentials of P.P. (Personal Perceptual evidentials).     
 
Table 6.3 The distribution of types of evidentials in the three cases 
 





  Tony Blair      
 
          
 Barack Obama       
     Mahmoud   
  Ahmadinejad    
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
I.R. 14 9.09% 3 2.17% 3 2.91% 
H.E. 21 13.64% 22 16.67% 18 17.48% 
S.P. 18 11.69% 16 11.59% 26 34.95% 
S.K. 51 33.12% 33 23.91% 46 44.66% 
P.P. 8 5.19% 11 7.97% 0 0 
P.K. 42 27.27% 53 38.41% 10 9.71% 
Total  154 100% 138 100% 103 100% 
 
   
 
Figure 6.3 The distribution of types of evidentials in the three cases 
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categories of evidential types in terms of frequencies, including the evidentials of H.E., 
P.P., and P.K., while Blair ranks first in the use of I.R. and S.K. evidentials. It is 
surprising to see that Ahmadinejad adopts far fewer evidentials in most types 
compared with the other speakers, though he uses the most S.P. evidentials (1.02 ptw). 
Besides, he also uses more S.K. evidentials than Obama.  
 
Overall, statistical analyses manifest that the differences of most evidential types 
among the three cases are significant except the categories of H.E., S.P. and S.K. 
evidentials. However, further statistical analyses show that the differences between 




Table 6.4 A comparison of types of evidentials in the three cases 
 
















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
I.R. 14 0.53 3 0.11 3 0.12 0.002701 Yes 
H.E. 21 0.80 22 0.83 18 0.71 0.8732 No 
S.P. 18 0.38 16 0.60 26 1.02 0.1911 No 
S.K. 51 1.94 33 1.25 46 1.81 0.1183 No 
P.P. 8 0.30 11 0.42 0 0 0.007307 Yes 
P.K. 42 1.59 53 2.0 10 0.39 1.392e-06 Yes 
Total  154 5.84 138 5.21 103 4.05 0.01393  Yes 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 
three speakers is significant.) 
 
                                                        
52 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in their use of 
evidential types in all the categories except for I.R. evidentials (P-value: 0.01488). H.E. evidentials (P-value: 
0.988), S.P. evidentials (P-value: 0.8532); S.K. evidentials (P-value: 0.06045), P.P. evidentials (P-value: 0.6535) 
and P.K. evidentials (P-value: 0.3152).  
 




Figure 6.4 A comparison of types of evidentials in the three cases 
 
6.2.3 Top-10 Evidential Markers 
After comparing the distributions and frequencies of evidential sources and types in 
the three cases, I am going to examine the top-10 evidential markers among the three 
cases and compare their similarities and disparities (see Table B1-B3 in Appendix for 
details).  
 
As we can see in Table 6.5, Blair and Obama share more similarities in adopting 
evidential markers than Ahmadinejad, though they also have their own preferences. 
For example, both ‘I believe’ and ‘I know’ take up the first two positions in the cases 
of Blair and Obama, but their positions are reversed (18 and 13 counts vs. 13 and 17 
counts). Surprisingly, the frequencies of both evidentials are much lower in the case of 
Ahmadinejad with only 3 and 1 counts. It is interesting that evidentials such as ‘It is 
clear that / clearly’ and ‘in fact’ rank first and second in Ahmadinejad’s list. In 
particular, Blair uses more times of ‘I believe’ (18 counts), ‘It seems’ (11 counts), and 
‘you know’ (9 counts), while Obama uses more ‘I know’(17 counts), ‘we 
know’(12counts) and ‘We’ve seen’ (8 counts), and Ahmadinejad uses more ‘It is clear 












Chapter Six  
 194 
Table 6.5 A comparison of top-10 evidential markers in the three cases 
 




   Tony Blair 
          
 Barack Obama 
Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad 
Evidentials No.  Evidentials No.  Evidentials No.  
1 I believe 18 I know 17 It is clear 
that/clearly 
13 
2 I know  12 I believe 13 in fact /as a 
matter of fact 
12 
3 (It) seems 11 We know 12 You know 5 
4 We know 10 We’ve seen /saw 
/seeing 
8 We see/ have seen 4 
5 You know 9 I have seen/ saw 6 It is (was) said 
that 
4 
6 In fact  6 I heard/hear  4 Undoubtedly 4 
7 Analysis shows 5 In fact  4 We know 3 
8 I heard  4 You know 4 It is evident 3 
9 Actually  4 seem 3 I have no doubt 3 
10 Reports suggest 4 I’m confident 3 I believe 3 
 
6.2.4 Discussions and Implications 
To sum up the quantitative results, it can be seen that the evidentials present a similar 
pattern among the three cases, particularly in the cases of Blair and Obama. However, 
we can also see some differences in detail. The most salient results can be summarised 
as follows:  
 
(i) Blair and Obama adopt very similar numbers of evidential markers (with 154 and 
138 counts respectively), but Ahmadinejad only uses about two thirds of their 
figures, with 103 counts. That is mainly because Ahmadinejad uses far fewer 
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Inside evidentials, such as ‘I believe’, and ‘I know’. This could be the result of 
different rhetorical styles or cultural differences.  
 
(ii) As to sources of evidentials, shared evidentials rank first in the cases of 
Ahmadinejad and Blair, at 69.90 % and 44.80% respectively, while inside 
evidentials take up the first position in Obama’s case. In addition, Blair adopts 
more outside evidentials than the other two speakers. Statistic analyses show that 
there are no significant differences among the three speakers except for the 
category of inside evidentials. It is due to the fact that Ahmadinejad uses far fewer 
inside evidentials than the other two speakers. 
 
(iii) With respect to evidential types, evidentials of S.K (Shared Knowledge) take the 
first position in the cases of Blair and Ahmadinejad, at 40% on average, while 
evidentials of P.K (Personal Knowledge) comes first in Obama’s case with 38.41%. 
Besides, Obama uses the most evidentials of H.E., P.P., and P.K., while Blair ranks 
first in the use of I.R. and S.K. evidentials. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, comes 
first in the use of S.P. evidentials (1.02 ptw).  
 
(iv) Statistical analyses manifest that the differences among the three cases are 
significant in Inside Source, I.R. evidentials, P.P. evidentials, P.K. evidentials and 
total figures, though there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama 
except for the use of I.R. evidentials. This means Blair and Obama share more 
similarities than disparities in the use of evidentials, while Ahmadinejad is 
different in some categories.  
 
(v) Although Blair and Obama have much common in the use of evidential markers, 
each speaker has his own preferences. For example, Blair uses far more ‘I believe’, 
‘it seems’, and ‘you know’ than the other two speakers, while Obama uses more ‘I 
know’, ‘we know’ and ‘we’ve seen’, and Ahmadinejad uses more ‘it is clear that/ 
clearly’, ‘in fact’ and ‘it is said that’.  
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Above all, the quantitative analysis of evidential markers among the three cases shows 
us their distributions and frequencies in the corpus, but the usages and functions of 
evidentials in specific contexts are still not clear. It is, therefore, also necessary to 
investigate what role evidentials can play in the context of political discourse. Thus, in 
the following section, I shall address evidentials qualitatively by examining their 
functions and expressions, particularly when they interact with modality in the 
persuasion process.  
 
6.3 Qualitative Analysis of Evidentiality 
In this section, I will first explore the functions of evidentiality, focusing on its 
relations with the speaker’s commitment, (inter)subjectivity and ideology in political 
discourse. After that, I will investigate the most salient evidential expressions in three 
sources and six types respectively. In particular, the functions of evidential markers as 
persuasion strategies will be addressed in the context of political discourse.  
 
6.3.1 Evidentiality as Expressing Commitment, (Inter)subjectivity and Ideology 
As mentioned previously in Chapter One, Evidentiality can be employed as 
‘legitimising strategies’ (Hart 2011) or ‘a form of language manipulation’ in political 
discourse (see Berlin and Prieto-Mendoza 2014).  
 
This section will explore the functions of evidentiality, though not restricted to 
legitimising strategies or manipulation strategies. In this study evidentiality indicates 
the linguistic marking of source and strength (validity/reliability) of information, 
working together with modality to persuade the addressees in political discourse. The 
functions of evidentiality are embedded in this process.  
 
6.3.1.1 Evidentiality as Making Commitment 
Evidentials from inside sources (e.g. I believe) explicitly signal the speaker’s sole 
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responsibility to his/her propositions as a conceptualizer (cf. Marín-Arrese 2011a:214). 
Therefore, they suggest the speaker’s strong commitment53to his/her stance-taking 
acts. Those evidentials from shared sources (e.g. we know) presupposed as shared 
facts or common knowledge can be seen as markers of shared commitment / 
responsibility among the speaker and the hearers.  
 
With the adoption of evidentials from outside sources (e.g. the figures show), however, 
the speaker is only implicit as a conceptualizer and less committed to the propositions 
than the former ones. That means the speaker can avoid the responsibility of his/her 
stance-taking acts.  
 
In sum, different sources of evidentials indicate the speaker’s different degrees of 
commitment/ responsibility to the propositions, particularly to the stance expressed in 
the designated context, including epistemic, deontic and volitional stance, as 








Figure 6.5 The scale of speaker’s commitment vs. the source of evidence 
 
Consider the following three examples:  
 
[1] I believe < Inside / P.K. > we and you have both been the subject of tyranny. They 
do not respect your rights and want us also to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > forego 
                                                        
53 Here commitments refer to the speaker’s involvement in his stance-taking acts by using evidentials. That means 
whether the speaker takes sole or shared responsibility for his stance or he distances himself from it.  
Outside Source 
(e.g. The figures show) 
Inside Source 
(e.g. I believe) 
Shared Source 
(e.g. We know) 
 
Strong Commitment Weak Commitment Shared Commitment 
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our rights. (M. Ahmadinejad; 28 August 2006) 
[2] But what we know < Shared / S.K. > -- what we have seen < Shared / S.P. > - is 
that America can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > change. (B. Obama; 18 March 2008) 
[3] In May 1997, we pledged that we would (past form of will) < M.verb. / V.M. / 
High. > get 250,000 young unemployed people off benefit and into work. The 
figures published today show that < Outside / I.R. > 254,520 young people have 
gone into work through our New Deal programme. (T. Blair; 30 November 2000) 
 
In Example [1], the evidential marker ‘I believe’ indicates that the stance expressed in 
the following sentence is the speaker’s own belief, which implies Ahmadinejad’s sole 
commitment to the volitional stance expressed by the modal marker ‘want to’. In 
Example [2], two evidential markers from shared source manifest that the speaker 
presupposes the epistemic stance (expressed by the epistemic marker ‘can’) is shared 
by the hearers, which represents a shared commitment between Obama and his 
audience. From the perspective of strength, the first evidential marker ‘we know’ is 
weaker than the second one ‘we have seen’ as the former indicates common 
knowledge while the latter indicates (metaphorical) visual perception. In Example [3], 
on the other hand, the evidential marker ‘The figures published today show that’ 
indicates that the evidence is from an outside source, which often implies that the 
speaker does not have to take the responsibility for his stance, therefore less 
committed to it.  
 
6.3.1.2 Evidentiality as Marking (Inter)Subjectivity  
The relationship between evidentiality and modality or epistemic modality has been 
discussed a lot from the perspective of (inter)subjectivity or objectivity (e.g. Lyons 
1977; Kratzer 1981; Langacker 1990, 1999; Nuyts 1992, 2001b; Traugott and Dasher 
2002; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004; Traugott 2006; Marín-Arrese 2006, 2011a; 
Portner 2009; Hart 2011). However, so far there has been no consensus on this issue 
(see Chapter One for more details). 
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Drawing on Portner (2009:131) and Verhulst et al. (2013:211), subjectivity refers to 
the speaker’s involvement/commitment to stance, and intersubjectivity refers to the 
shared involvement/commitment of speaker-hearer to stance. More precisely, the 
distinction between subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity lies in the degree of 
the speaker’s commitment to his/her stance, which can be judged by different sources 
of evidentials. If the speaker makes a sole commitment to his/her stance (with 
evidence from inside source), then the stance (here expressed by modal markers) he 
expressed is subjective. If the speaker shares a commitment with his/her hearers to 
his/her stance (with evidence from shared source), then the stance (here expressed by 
modal markers) he expresses is inter-subjective (Nyuts 2001; Marín-Arrese 2011a). If 
the speaker makes no commitment to his/her stance (with evidence from outside 
source), then the stance (here expressed by modal markers) he expresses is more 
objective. In this sense, the modals expressing the corresponding stance can be seen as 
subjective, or inter-subjective or objective modality.  
 
In this sense, this study addresses the distinction of (inter)subjective and objective 
modality from the perspective of the source of evidence, with can each be positioned 
on a scale, as demonstrated in Figure 6.8. It is clear in Figure 6.8 that modal markers 
supported by evidentials from inside source (e.g. I believe) are more subjective as the 
stance expressed by these modal markers is the speaker alone, while modals supported 
by evidentials from shared source (e.g. We know) are inter-subjective because the 
speaker assumes that the stance expressed by these modal markers is shared by his/her 
hearers. Similarly, modals justified by evidentials from outside source (e.g. The 
figures show) are more objective since the speaker is only implicit as the 
conceptualizer of the stance. It is necessary to point out that there is no absolute 
objective modality as all modals are subjective to a certain degree from the 
perspective of expressing the speaker’s or writer’s stance. Thus, the term ‘objective 
modality’ in this study is only used to differentiate and compare with subjective and 
inter-subjective modality.   




Figure 6.6 The scale of subjective, inter-subjective and objective modality vs. the 
source of evidence 
 
Overall, modal markers justified by evidentials from outside sources are more 
objective than those supported by shared sources and inside sources, and modals 
justified by strong evidentials are more objective than those supported by intermediate 
and weak evidentials. However, it is also important to note that sometimes modals are 
used without any evidentials. These modals can be treated as more subjective than 
those supported by inside evidentials because the stance expressed by these modals is 
the speaker alone but merely implicit.  
 
6.3.1.3 Evidentiality as Reflecting Ideology 
Some types of evidentials also reflect the speaker’s ideology concerning what or who 
is authoritative, what are facts, what is common knowledge, and what is believed, etc. 
Nevertheless, different from modal markers, not all evidential markers encode the 
speaker’s ideology. This section will discuss three types of evidentials, including H.E. 
(Hearsay Evidentials), S.K. (Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge) and P.K. 
(Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge). Consider the following two 
examples:  
 
[4] They say < Outside / H.E. > it is not possible < M.adj. / E.M. / High > to have a 
world without the United States and Zionism. But you know < Shared / S.K. > that 
this is a possible goal and slogan. (M. Ahmadinejad; 26 October 2005) 
[5] And I believe < Inside / P.K. > any alliance must < M.verb. / D.M. / High.> start 
Inside Source 
(e.g. I believe) 
Shared Source 
(e.g. We know) 
 
Outside Source 
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with America and Europe. (T. Blair; 17 July 2003) 
 
In Example [4], the speaker adopts an outside hearsay evidential ‘they say’ to 
delegitimise his opponents’ opinion, as the source of this type of evidentials is often 
implicit and inauthoritative, therefore the information is unreliable. Furthermore, he 
uses a shared evidential ‘you know’ to indicate that the proposition-‘this is a possible 
goal and slogan’ is a fact or common knowledge shared by the audience. However 
most shared knowledge is presupposed by the speaker (van Dijk 2011:37) and reflects 
the speaker’s own belief (as part of his ideology) about this issue. The inside 
evidential ‘I believe’ in Example [5], on the other hand, clearly shows that what 
follows is the speaker’s own belief.  
 
6.3.2 Markers of Evidentiality in the three cases 
In this section, evidentiality will be examined in detail in terms of its source and 
strength, particularly focusing on its functions and its interaction with modality. It 
means evidentiality will be dealt with from the perspective of its functions in making 
commitments, encoding ideology and the (inter)subjectivity of modality in the 
persuasion process.    
 
6.3.2.1 Evidentials from Outside Source 
 
Evidentials from outside source typically signal the lowest commitment from the 
speaker towards his/her stance, as the speaker is only implicit as a conceptualizer. 
They can also be used to justify/legitimise the speaker’s stance in a more objective 
way, compared with shared or inside evidentials. In what follows, I will examine the 
most typical expressions of these two types of evidentials from outside sources, 
particularly addressing their functions in specific contexts.  
 
(1) Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.)  
Inferential Evidentials from Results often refer to the linguistic markers indicating the 
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evidence inferred from results of the reports, analyses, figures or examples. Overall, 
this type of evidentials is often less reliable than perceptual evidentials as they are 
indirect evidence inferred from results. However, the credibility of the reports, 
analyses, figures or examples may vary in different situations according to the 
authoritativeness or explicitness of the source. Consider the following examples:  
 
[6] Iraq showed < Outside / I.R. > that when, never forget, many European nations 
supported our action. (T. Blair; 17 July 2003) 
[7] They are also creating paper assets and imposing continuous inflation on all the 
other nations. They plunder the wealth of other countries without making any 
efforts. Some reports indicate < Outside / I.R. > that the US government has 
created paper assets of more than 32,000 billion dollars. (M. Ahmadinejad; 30 
August 2012) 
 
The evidential marker ‘54Iraq shows’ in Example [6] is adopted to justify the 
speaker’s view that ‘when America and Europe are together, others will work with us’ 
(This view can be found in the context), therefore making it more objective in the 
stance-taking act. Similarly, the evidential marker ‘Some reports indicate’ in 
Example [7] demonstrates that the source of its following proposition comes from 
reports and provide evidence for the speaker’s stance -‘They plunder the wealth of 
other countries without making any efforts’, though it indicates lower credibility or 
weaker strength compared with the previous one, since it does not mention the source 
of the reports. The speaker (Ahmadinejad) may deliberately mystify the source of 
information to avoid the possible conflicts or use it as a persuasion strategy to evade 
the responsibility of the stance-taking act.  
 
(2) Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.)  
 
Hearsay Evidentials often refer to the linguistic markers indicating reportive evidence 
                                                        
54 Here ‘Iraq’ refers to the result of whether to start a war on Iraq.  
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from implicit sources and unnamed people, which have been regarded as ‘the most 
prominent form of indirect evidentiality’ (Whitt 2010:9). This type of evidentials has 
been seen as the least reliable as the origins of their sources are often unclear for 
various reasons or have been concealed deliberately by the speaker. According to 
Table 6.5, the most frequent evidential of this type is ‘it is said that’, adopted 4 times 
by Ahmadinejad. Consider the following examples:  
 
[8] Some in China think that < Outside / H.E. > America will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > 
try to contain China's ambitions; some in America think that < Outside / H.E. > 
there is something to fear in a rising China. I take a different view.  (B. Obama; 
27 July 2009) 
[9] It is said that < Outside / H.E. > the science around climate change is not as           
certain < M.adj. / E.M. / High. > as its proponents allege. (T. Blair; 13 
December 2009) 
     
The evidential markers in Example [8] and [9] are weak evidence because the speaker 
does not clarify who ‘some’ are and who ‘said that’, thereby making them less 
convincing and more subjective in persuasion process. They indicate that the sources 
of information have been mystified either by the speaker or by someone else during 
discourse event. Because of this, it becomes harder for the hearers to verify or check 
the information against its original source. That is why, from the perspective of 
outside source, this type of evidential is the less reliable in terms of strength of 
evidence and the most subjective in stance-taking. It is interesting to note that this 
type of evidentials can be used as a persuasion strategy to delegitimise other people’s 
view (Chilton2004:47), as illustrated in Example [8] (Obama explicitly said: ‘I take a 
different view’.) and Example [4].    
 
6.3.2.2 Evidentials from Shared Source 
‘Many evidentials reflect common ground between discourse participants and act as 
presupposition triggers’ (Hart 2010:95). This is most obvious in evidentials from 
Chapter Six  
 204 
shared source, which indicate truth or common knowledge presupposed to be shared 
by both the speaker and the hearers. Therefore, they typically signal shared 
commitment between the speaker and the hearers towards the stance expressed by 
modals. They can be used to justify/legitimise the speaker’s stance in an 
inter-subjective way. In what follows, I will examine the most typical expressions of 
these two types of evidentials from shared source, particularly addressing their 
pragmatic functions in specific contexts.  
 
(3) Shared Perceptual Evidentials (S.P.)  
Shared Perceptual Evidentials often refer to the linguistic markers indicating facts 
supported by shared perceptions. Perception is the most direct evidence one can have 
(Whitt 2010:8), especially for “visual and auditory perceptions” (Palmer 2001:43), 
and is therefore often seen as more reliable than indirect evidence. Perceptions can be 
classified into two categories (Greenbaum 1969:205; Bednarek 2006a:640):  
(1) Sensory perception (e.g. we’ve seen; you’ve heard) 
(2) Mental perception or inference (e.g. clearly, it was clear that; obviously, it seems, 
apparently) 
 
As to sensory perception, ‘we’ve seen’ is stronger pertaining to strength of evidence 
than ‘you’ve heard’ as the former is more direct than the latter. For the category of 
mental perception or inference, ‘clearly/ It was clear that’, ‘obviously’ and 
‘apparently’ are normally of higher strength than that of ‘it seems’. However, overall 
this whole category is weaker than sensory perception.   
 
However, different people from different cultures or with different value systems 
(ideologies) may see the same thing differently. That means a proposition is treated as 
fact or truth by the speaker may be seen as just opinion or fallacy by others. That is 
why this type of evidentials can also help reveal the speaker’s ideology and way of 
thinking during the process of discourse production. They can also be used as a 
powerful tool of persuading or manipulating addressees. Consider the following 




[10] You have certainly < M.adv. / E.M. / High > heard < Shared / S.P. > the sad 
stories of the Guantanamo and Abu-Ghraib prisons. The US administration 
attempts to justify them through its proclaimed "war on terror."  (M. 
Ahmadinejad; 29 November 2006)  
[11] So we’ve seen < Shared / S.P. > a lot of blame and a lot of politics and a lot of 
ugly rhetoric around immigration. And we’ve seen< Shared / S.P. > good faith 
efforts from leaders of both parties. (B. Obama; 10 May 2011) 
[12] You know, one thing I've learned < Inside / P.K. >about peace processes: They're 
always frustrating, they're often agonizing, and occasionally they seem < Shared / 
S.P. >, hopeless. (T. Blair; 17 July 2003) 
 
Example [10] is a case in point in terms of shared perception; the evidential marker 
‘you have certainly heard’ clearly reveals Ahmadinejad’s ideology in this issue. That 
means he treats ‘the sad stories of the Guantanamo and Abu-Ghraib prisons’ as facts 
and he presupposes that his audience must have heard it before. It is interesting to note 
that this kind of evidentials is often used as mental perceptions rather than sensory 
perceptions in our data. For example, the two evidential markers ‘we’ve seen’ in 
Example [11] are actually mental perceptions (metaphorical), presupposing the 
following propositions as facts (something available to see). It reveals the speaker’s 
ideology with respect to what can be seen as facts or reality and makes this ideology 
or viewpoint more acceptable for the audience. By doing so, this type of evidentials 
can be an effective strategy for persuading or manipulating one’s addressees. However, 
their strength is weaker than ‘we’re seeing’ in the example “We’re seeing it again 
right now with gas prices” (B. Obama; 10 May 2011). As shown in Example [12], the 
evidential marker ‘seem’ can also be treated as a kind of evidentials inferred from 
visual perceptions (Aijmer 2009; Whitt 2011), though it is less reliable than other 
perceptual evidentials such as ‘we’ve seen’, ‘we’ve heard’, and ‘clearly’.  
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However, as mentioned previously, this type of evidentials are only the linguistic 
markers used by the speaker to presuppose or manipulate the audience, what have 
been claimed as facts or truth (including shared perception) should not be treated as 
real facts or truth automatically. One still needs to differentiate which are real and 
which are not.   
 
(4) Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge (S.K.)  
 
This type of inferential evidentials often refers to the linguistic markers indicating 
common knowledge shared both by the speaker and the hearers. They have also been 
treated as ‘OBVIOUSNESS’ in Bednarek’s (2006a) study of evidence in British 
newspaper reporting. Consider the following examples: 
 
[13] In fact < Shared / S.K. >, in many cases in practice, the IMF and the World Bank 
are forced to justify the unilateral and opportunistic policies of certain states. (M. 
Ahmadinejad; 30 August 2012) 
[14] British business has always given strong support to our membership of the EU 
and for good reason. You understand < Shared / S.K. > that being in the EU 
brings us massive benefits in trade, jobs and prosperity. You know < Shared / 
S.K.> that the EU is the most effective way that Britain can < M.verb. / E.M. / 
Inter. > make its voice heard on global issues alongside the US and the growing 
Asian economies. You know < Shared / S.K. >that to be anti-Europe is to be 
anti-business. But you also know < Shared / S.K. > - and so do I - that a reform 
agenda for Europe is also vital. This is an area where we wholeheartedly 
welcome your engagement. (T. Blair; 18 November 2003) 
[15] There is no doubt that < shared / S.K. >the cost of this plan will < M.verb. / E.M. 
/ High > be considerable. It will certainly < M.verb. / E.M. / High > < M.adv. / 
E.M. / High > add to the budget deficit in the short term. (B. Obama; 8 January 
2009) 
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The evidential marker ‘in fact’ in Example [13] indicates that the speaker treats the 
following proposition as a fact (cf. Chafe 1986:271); therefore it is intersubjective (cf. 
Traugott and Dasher, 2002:155) as it involves the addressees into his judgments.    
 
In Example [14], Blair uses four S.K. evidentials (‘you understand’ has been used for 
once and ‘you know’ for three times) to presuppose what he said are common 
knowledge shared by his addressees, thereby persuading them to accept his proposal. 
Therefore, the stance expressed by modal marker ‘can’ is inter-subjective, legitimised 
by the assumed common knowledge. However, it is unknown or hard to verify 
whether the hearers actually know what he said or not. That is the reason why this 
type of evidential is not as strong as S.P. evidentials. The evidential ‘There is no 
doubt that’ in Example [15] implies there is solid evidence to prove the designated 
propositions as truth, but the speaker does not spell it out. Because of the evidential 
marker indicated here, the epistemic modal ‘will’ following it can be seen as 
intersubjective. Therefore, this type of evidential markers can also be used as a tool of 
manipulation in persuading the audience to accept them as truth.    
 
6.3.2.3 Evidentials from Inside Source 
Inside Evidentials often signal the speaker’s sole commitment towards his stance, as 
the source of the evidence comes from the speaker’s own knowledge. They are used to 
justify/legitimise the speaker’s stance in a more subjective way compared with 
evidentials from outside or shared sources, as this type of evidence is hard to test or 
check its origin. In what follows, I will examine the most typical expressions of these 
two types of evidentials from inside source respectively, particularly addressing their 
pragmatic functions in specific contexts. 
 
(5) Personal Perceptual Evidentials (P.P.) 
This type of evidentials often refers to the linguistic markers indicating the direct 
evidence from the speaker's own perceptions. This type of evidentials is used least of 
all, although they are direct evidentials and regarded as more reliable when compared 
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with the other type of inside evidentials. Consider the following examples:  
 
[16] I listened to these people, and what I heard < Inside / P.P. > was people working 
tirelessly to make our country and borders secure, but too often frustrated by a 
system that hampered them when it should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > have been 
helping them. It was from them that I heard < Inside / P.P. >about the problem of 
asylum seekers destroying their identity documents to prevent removal. (T. Blair; 
22 April 2005) 
[17] I am hopeful tonight because I have seen < Inside / P.P. > this spirit at work in 
America. I’ve seen < Inside / P.P. > it in the family business whose owners would 
rather < M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. > cut their own pay than lay off their neighbors 
and in the workers who would rather < M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. > cut back their 
hours than see a friend lose a job. I’ve seen < Inside / P.P. >it in the soldiers who 
re-enlist after losing a limb and in those SEALs who charged up the stairs into 
darkness and danger because they knew there was a buddy behind them watching 
their back. (Cheers, applause.) I’ve seen < Inside / P.P. > it on the shores of New 
Jersey and New York, where leaders from every party and level of government 
have swept aside their differences to help a community rebuild from the 
wreckage of a terrible storm. (B. Obama; 7 November 2012) 
[18] Members of Congress, I feel < Inside / P.P. > a most urgent sense of mission 
about today's world.  
 
In Example [16], Blair uses ‘I heard’ twice to make sole commitment to his stance. 
Generally evidentials indicating visual perception are more reliable than those of 
audio perception or touch. However, as shown in Example [17], here the four 
evidentials ‘I’ve seen’ is used in a rhetorical or metaphorical way, with the speaker’s 
own interpretations or opinions embedded into the evidentials. The reason is that one 
can not see spirit by one’s eyes as the word following ‘I’ve seen’ is ‘this spirit’ (three 
instances of metaphorical ‘it’ in the following sentences all refer to this spirit). In this 
sense, the strength of evidence for these evidentials is equivalent to those evidentials 
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of mental perception (Greenbaum 1969:205) such as ‘clearly, It was clear that; 
obviously’. The perceptual evidential marker ‘I feel’ in Example [18], however, is the 
weakest in this category with respect to the strength of evidence.  
 
(6) Inferential Evidentials from Personal Knowledge (P.K.)  
This type of evidentials often refers to the linguistic markers indicating the evidence 
inferred from the speaker's own knowledge, experiences, beliefs or thoughts. Those 
evidentials indicating the evidence from one’s knowledge (e.g. I know) or experiences 
(e.g. I realize) are often more reliable than those from beliefs (e.g. I believe) or 
thoughts (e.g. I think). Consider the following examples:  
 
[19] Now, I realize < Inside / P.K. > there are some in my party who don’t think we 
should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > make any changes at all to Medicare and 
Medicaid, and I understand their concerns.  (B. Obama; 8 September 2011) 
[20] And I know < Inside / P.K. >that every American wants her future to < M.semi. / 
V.M. / Inter. > be just as bright. (B. Obama; 7 November 2012) 
[21] So how do we decide when and whether to intervene. I think < Inside / P.K. > we 
need to < M.semi. / D.M. / High. > bear in mind five major considerations. (T. 
Blair; 24 April 1999) 
[22] I believe < Inside / P.K. > Britain is now facing important choices. (T. Blair; 30 
November 2000) 
[23] In my opinion < Inside / P.K. > we should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > find the 
reasons in the policies and measures of a number arrogant and ambitious power 
as well as in the inefficacy of NPT and its imbalanced provisions, and hence, I 
wish to highlight some of these reasons. (M. Ahmadinejad; 30 May 2010) 
  
The evidential marker ‘I realize’ in Example [19] and ‘I know’ in Example [20] often 
imply there is reliable evidence in the speaker’s mind. That is because ‘realize’ and 
‘know’ often refer to the cognitive process of getting to know the truth. Therefore, 
they are also very popular among the three speakers in the manipulation process by 
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presupposing the stance expressed in the context as truth, particularly for ‘I know’. It 
is interesting to see that Obama uses it 17 times and Blair uses it 12 times, but 
Ahmadinejad only uses it once. For example, ‘I know’ in Example [20] means ‘based 
on my past experience/ knowledge about the people of America’, implying the 
volitional stance (expressed by ‘want to’) is based on this knowledge. However, one 
can not see or testify the speaker’s knowledge, so the modal markers ‘should’ and 
‘want to’ can only be seen as subjective modality.  
 
The evidentials such as ‘I think’ in Example [21], ‘I believe’ in Example [22], and ‘In 
my opinion’ in Example [23] all state clearly that the stance-taking acts in the 
corresponding propositions are based on the speaker’s knowledge concerning his/ her 
thoughts, beliefs or opinions (Chafe 1986:264). That is why these evidentials are more 
subjective and less reliable than those in examples [19] and [20]. Therefore, the stance 
expressed by modal markers ‘need to’ and ‘should’ are more subjective.  
 
In sum, the qualitative analyses demonstrate that different sources of evidence reveal 
the speakers’ corresponding commitments toward their stance and reflect their 
different ways of persuasion or manipulation. For example, shared evidence has been 
used most in the cases of Blair and Ahmadinejad with over 50% on average, which 
reveals that it is a popular way of manipulation in political speeches. However, it is 
often not shared by both sides but presupposed as common knowledge. For instance, 
Ahmadinejad ranks first in the use of shared evidentials with 72 counts (Blair: 69 
counts; Obama: 49 counts). Take his speech ‘Message to American people’ for 
example (No. 2 speech in Table 2.5), Ahmadinejad uses S.P. evidentials for 6 counts to 
justify his stance, such as ‘you have heard’, ‘it became clear that’, ‘you are 
witnessing daily’ and ‘in fact’. By adopting these evidentials, he tries to present his 
opinions to American people as facts or truth.  
 
Adopting more evidentials from inside source often implies that the speaker is more 
willing to make high commitments to his/her stance or he/she has strong confidence in 
Chapter Six  
 211 
his/her own credibility. For example, Obama uses the most inside evidentials (64 
counts vs. Blair: 50 counts and Ahmadinejad: 10 counts) among the three speakers. He 
is the only one who uses more inside evidentials than shared or outside evidentials. 
Take his speech ‘2012 Election Night Speech’ for example (No. 10 speech in Table 
2.4), in which Obama uses inside evidentials 11 times, including ‘I have seen’ / ‘I saw’ 
(P.P. evidentials, 5 counts), ‘I believe’ (P.K. evidentials, 4 counts) and ‘I know’ (P.K. 
evidentials, 2 counts). This indicates that he is confident in his own credibility and 
makes a high commitment to his stance-taking acts. In this case, those evidentials help 
Obama to establish a more intimate relationship with his audience.  
 
By contrast, evidentials from outside source can often reflect the lowest commitments 
from the speaker towards his/her stance-taking. That means the speaker does not have 
to take the responsibility for his/her own stance. On the other hand, it also means the 
speaker takes a more objective and authoritative stance in his speech style. For 
example, Blair uses more evidentials from outside source (35 counts) than Obama (25 
counts) and Ahmadinejad (21 counts). Take his speech ‘War on Iraq’ for example 
(No.2 speech in Table 2.3), in which Blair uses outside evidentials 17 times to justify 
his proposal, such as ‘according to the relevant Resolutions of the Security 
Council’ (I.R. evidentials), ‘first reports from last night’s operations suggest’ (R.I. 
evidentials), ‘It was expected’ (H.E. evidentials) ‘There are suggestions’ (H.E. 
evidentials), and ‘There were some who thought’ (H.E. evidentials). This means he 
intends to distance himself from the stance-taking acts by providing authoritative 
quotes, reports or unspecific sources. The evidentials help him in winning the support 
from UK parliament members to a certain degree. At the same time, he also tries to 
persuade or manipulate the addressees by his presuppositions about common 
knowledge (e.g. we know, you know).    
 
Besides, different sources or strengths of evidence also reflect the (inter)subjectivity 
of modality. Generally, modal markers supported by evidentials from inside source 
(e.g. I believe) are more subjective as the stance expressed by these modal markers is 
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the speaker alone, while those modals supported by evidentials from shared source 
(e.g. We know) are inter-subjective because the speaker assumes that the stance 
expressed by these modal markers is shared by his or her hearers.  
 
Similarly, modals justified by evidentials from outside source (e.g. The figures show) 
are more objective since the speaker is only implicit as the conceptualizer of the 
stance (expressed by the modal markers). Furthermore, different strengths of evidence 
also imply the degree of (inter)subjectivity or objectivity of the sources, and the 
modals legitimised by strong evidentials are more objective than those supported by 
intermediate and weak evidentials. Those propositions without explicit evidentials in 
the context can be treated as being supported by zero-marked evidentials, which may 
be categorized as implicit P.K. evidentials, equivalent to ‘I think’ or ‘In my opinion’.   
 
Furthermore, evidentiality can also legitimise the speaker’s stance marked by modals. 
We can see from the qualitative analyses in this chapter that all types of evidentials 
can be used to legitimise the speaker’s stance expressed by deontic, epistemic and 
volitional modals. Normally, evidentials from outside or shared source can justify the 
speaker’s stance better than those from inside source. Similarly, the stance legitimised 
by evidentials with stronger strength seems more convincing than those supported by 
weaker evidentials.  
 
The qualitative analyses also show that the same evidential marker may be varied in 
terms of reliability or strength in different contexts. That is because the same 
evidential marker may indicate sources of different credibility in different contexts, 
such as the P.P. evidential marker- ‘I’ve seen’ in Example [17] has been used in a 
metaphorical way, which is equivalent to the use of metal perceptions, therefore it is 
weaker in strength than its use as visual perceptions. 
 
In particular, the study of evidentiality and modality should not be restricted to 
epistemic modality. That is because the qualitative analyses in this chapter manifest 
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that deontic modality and volitional modality are also closely linked to evidentials. 
 
6.4 Summary 
Overall, this chapter demonstrates how three speakers use different types of 
evidentiality in persuasion process, both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
 
I first illustrated the distributions and frequencies of evidentiality in terms of sources 
and types in the three cases, and then compared the similarities and disparities of 
top-ten evidential markers used by three speakers. The quantitative results show that 
the distributions and frequencies of evidentials in the three cases share more 
similarities than disparities, particularly for the cases of Blair and Obama. The results 
between these two speakers show no significant differences in all the categories 
except for the type of I.R. evidentials.  
 
I also examined the functions of evidentials in political discourse by looking at how 
the speakers make commitments to their stance, encode ideology, mark the 
(inter)subjectivity of modality and legitimise their stance through different types of 
evidential markers. The most striking results are as follows: 
 
 Overall, Blair takes the first position in the use of evidentials with 154 counts, 
followed by Obama (138 counts) and Ahmadinejad (103 counts).   
 Evidentials from outside source can often reflect the lowest commitments from 
the speaker towards his/her stance-taking. They enable the speaker to distance 
himself from these stance-taking acts.  
 Shared evidence has been used most in the cases of Blair and Ahmadinejad with 
over 50% on average, while inside evidentials take up the first position in 
Obama’s case. The qualitative analyses reveal that the use of evidentials from 
shared source is a popular strategy of manipulation in political speeches as it is 
often not shared by both sides despite being presupposed as shared knowledge. 
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 Adopting more evidentials from inside source often implies that the speaker is 
more willing to make commitments to his/her stance or he/she has strong 
confidence in his/her own credibility. 
 Evidentiality reveals the speakers’ conceptualization process of discourse 
production in terms of how they adopt different types of evidentials to persuade 
their addressees.  
 The adoption of different sources of evidence reveals the speakers’ corresponding 
commitments toward their stance and marks the subjectivity or intersubjectivity 
of their stance. 
 Some types of evidentials reflect the speaker’s ideology as they encode his 
presuppositions of authorities, facts or shared knowledge.  
 Hearsay evidentials can often be adopted in the delegitimisation of the other’s 
views or proposals (‘negative other-representation’).  
 
In the next chapter, I will investigate the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality 
in the three cases both quantitatively and qualitatively from different perspectives, 
particularly focusing on their interaction patterns during the process of persuasion or 
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Numerous studies manifest that evidentiality is closely related to modality both in 
linguistic studies (e.g. Palmer 2001; Nuyts 1992; Whitt 2010) and discourse studies 
(e.g. Hart 2010, 2011; Marín-Arrese 2011a, 2011b; van Dijk 2011). There are mainly 
four different views towards this issue. One view is that evidentiality is a sub-category 
of modality or epistemic modality (e.g. Palmer 2001; McCready and Ogata 2007). On 
the contrary, Chafe (1986:264-6) includes words that indicate the ‘degree of liability’ 
of a proposition in his discussion of evidentiality in English academic discourse. 
However, some others may argue that ‘the meanings in these domains often overlap’ 
(Whitt 2010:12; Anderson 1986:308-11). However, the more widespread view is that 
evidentiality is distinct from epistemic modality (e.g. De Haan 1999; Nuyts 1992; Hart 
2010) and it ought to be considered a (grammatical) category in its own right, and not 
a mere subcategory of some type of modality (Aikhenvald 2004:7-8). 
 
Based on the view that evidentiality and (epistemic) modality fall into two different 
semantic or grammatical domains, this chapter aims to explore the relationships 
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between modality and evidentiality in the context of political discourse by 
investigating the co-occurrence of various types of modals and evidentials both 
quantitatively and qualitatively.  
 
7.2 Quantitative Analysis 
This section will calculate and compare the frequencies of the co-occurrence of 
modality and evidentiality from different aspects at the sentential level
55
 among the 
three cases: (1) modal types and evidentials; (2) modals and evidential types; (3) 
epistemic modals and evidential types; (4) deontic modality and evidential types; (5) 
volitional modals and evidential types.  
 
7.2.1 Co-occurrence of Modal Types and Evidentiality 
As can be seen in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1, three cases share the same pattern in the 
co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials. Epistemic modals take up the first 
position in all the cases with around 60% on average, followed by deontic and 
volitional modals. Overall, the modals co-occurring with evidentials among the three 
cases take up 10% on average in their total numbers in the data (Blair: 67 vs. 722 
counts, 9.28%; Obama: 87 vs. 806 counts, 10.79%; Ahmadinejad: 46 vs. 407 counts, 
11.3%). The percentages of epistemic modals co-occurred with evidentials (in their 
total numbers in the data) rank first in all three cases (Obama: 39 vs. 373 counts, 
12.53%; Ahmadinejad: 26 vs. 208 counts, 12.5%; Blair: 60 vs. 479 counts, 10.46%), 
followed by those of deontic modality and volitional modality with very similar 





                                                        
55 This means the quantitative analysis only focus on the modals and evidentials co-occur in the same sentence for 
the convenience of calculation. Those co-occurrences of modals and evidentials in the context or at the discourse 
level will also be discussed in the section of qualitative analysis.  
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Table 7.1 The distribution of the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials in the 
three cases 
 










No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
E.M. + E. 39 58.21% 60 68.97% 26 56.52% 
D.M. + E. 17 25.37% 15 17.24% 13 28.26% 
V.M. + E. 11 16.41% 12 13.79% 7 15.22% 
Total  67 100% 87 100% 46 100% 
 
   
 
Figure 7.1 The distribution of the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials in the 
three cases 
 
As illustrated in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2, although the co-occurrence of epistemic 
modals and evidentials ranks first in all three cases, its frequency in the case of Obama 
is much higher than that of the other two cases. The other two categories (D.M. + E. 
and V.M. + E.), on the other hand, have no significant differences among the three 
speakers.  
 
However, further statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences in 















categories, while the differences between those of Blair and Obama are only 
significant in the category of epistemic modality co-occurring with evidentials
56
.     
 
Table 7.2 A comparison of the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials in the 
three cases  
 















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
E.M. + E. 39 1.48 60 2.27 26 1.02 0.001540 Yes 
D.M. + E. 17 0.65 15 0.57 13 0.51 0.8141 No 
V.M. + E. 11 0.42 12 0.45 7 0.28 0.5496 No 
Total  67 2.54 87 3.29 46 1.81 0.003814 Yes 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 




Figure 7.2 A comparison of the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials in the 
three cases 
                                                        
56 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Ahmadinejad in the 
co-occurrence of modals and evidentials in all the categories: epistemic modals + evidentials (P-value: 0.2162); 
deontic modals + evidentials (P-value: 0.8141); volitional modals + evidentials (P-value: 0.5496); Total figure 
(P-value: 0.08938). However, the differences between Blair and Obama in the co-occurrence of modals and 











7.2.2 Co-occurrence of Evidential Types and Modality 
 
Section 7.2.1 has examined and compared the frequencies of different types of modals 
which co-occur with evidentials in the three cases at the sentential level. However, 
modals and evidentials do not often co-occur on a one-to-one basis, it is also 
necessary to investigate the frequencies of different types of evidentials co-occurring 
with modals.  
 
It can be seen in Table 7.3 and Figure 7.3 that the co-occurrences of evidential types 
and modals present a similar pattern in the cases of Blair and Obama, with P.K. 
evidentials taking up the first position and S.K. & H.E. evidentials ranking the second 
and third. However, the results in the case of Ahmadinejad are rather different, with 
S.P., S.K. and P.K. evidentials taking up the first three positions. It is interesting to see 
that the total frequency of evidentials co-occurring with modals is almost the same 
with that of modals in Blair’s case (67 vs. 66 counts); while the figures of evidentials 
are much lower than those of modals in the cases of Obama (87 vs. 68 counts) and 
Ahmadinejad (46 vs. 35 counts).  
 
Overall, the evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases take up 42% 
on average in their total numbers in the data (Blair: 66 vs. 154 counts, 43.5%; Obama: 
68 vs. 138 counts, 49.28%; Ahmadinejad: 35 vs. 103 counts, 33.98%). It is interesting 
to note that P.K. evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases ranks 
first among all the categories, taking up around 66% on average in their total numbers 
in the data (Blair: 24 vs. 42 counts, 57.14%; Obama: 33 vs. 53 counts, 62.26%; 
Ahmadinejad: 8 vs. 10 counts, 80%). H.E., S.K. and I.R. evidentials also co-occur 
more with modals than other categories in their total numbers in the cases of Blair and 
Obama, while S.P. evidentials co-occur more with modals in the case of Ahmadinejad. 
It is not surprising to see that the percentages of P.P. evidentials co-occurring with 
modals are the lowest of all in the cases of Blair (1 vs. 8 counts, 12.5%) and 
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Ahmadinejad (0), though it is S.P. evidentials which come last in Obama’s case (4 vs. 
16 counts, 25%).   
 
Table 7.3 The distribution of the co-occurrence of evidential types and modals in the 
three cases 
 










No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent 
I.R. + M.  6 9.09% 1 1.47% 0 0 
H.E. + M.  8 12.12% 11 16.18% 6 17.14% 
S.P. + M.  5 7.58% 4 5.88% 11 31.43% 
S.K. + M.  12 18.18% 15 22.06% 10 28.57% 
P.P. + M.  1 1.52% 4 5.88% 0 0 
P.K. + M.  24 36.36% 33 48.53% 8 22.86% 
Total  66 100% 68 100% 35 100% 
 
   
 



























Table 7.4 and Figure 7.4 show us that there are no significant differences in the 
co-occurrence of evidential types and modals in the three cases except for the 
categories of I.R., P.K. evidentials and the total figures. However, further statistical 
analyses indicate that the results of the cases of Blair and Obama show no significant 
differences in all the categories, particularly in the category of S.P. evidentials + 
modals (P-value: 0.9945) and total numbers
57
 (p-value: 0.9524).  
 
While Obama comes first in most categories, Ahmadinejad has a much higher 
frequency in the co-occurrence of S.P. evidentials + modals, and Blair also ranks first 
in that of I.R. evidentials + modals.   
 
Table 7.4 A comparison of the co-occurrence of evidential types and modals in the 
three cases 
 


















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
I.R. + M.  6 0.23 1 0.04 0 0 0.01291 Yes 
H.E. + M.  8 0.30 11 0.42 6 0.24 0.5106 No 
S.P. + M.  5 0.19 4 0.15 11 0.43 0.096 No 
S.K. + M.  12 0.46 15 0.57 10 0.39 0.6526 No 
P.P. + M.  1 0.04 4 0.15 0 0 0.07982 No 
P.K. + M.  24 0.91 33 1.25 8 0.31 0.0009589 Yes 
Total  66 2.50 68 2.57 35 1.38 0.004562 Yes 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 
                                                        
57 The statistical analyses show that there are no significant differences between Blair and Obama in the 
co-occurrence of modals and evidentials in all the categories: I.R. + modals (P-value: 0.129); H.E.+ modals 




three speakers is significant.) 
 
  
Figure 7.4 A comparison of the co-occurrence of evidential types and modals in the 
three cases 
 
7.2.3 Co-occurrence of Epistemic Modality and Evidentiality 
Table 7.5 and Figure 7.5 demonstrate that Obama ranks first in the co-occurrence of 
epistemic modals with inside and shared evidentials, while Blair comes first in the 
co-occurrence of epistemic modals with Outside evidentials. Although Ahmadinejad 
comes last in every category, he uses more epistemic modals co-occurring with shared 
evidentials.  
 
The differences of the co-occurrence of epistemic modals with evidential sources are 
not significant among the three speakers except for the inside evidentials. That is 
because there are far more epistemic modals co-occurring with inside evidentials in 


















Table 7.5 A comparison of the co-occurrence of epistemic modals and evidential 
sources in the three cases 
 
  Speakers  
E.M. + 













No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
E.M.+ Outside E. 15 0.57 9 0.34 6 0.24 0.1385 No 
E.M.+ Shared E. 13 0.49 14 0.53 12 0.47 0.9572 No 
E. M. + Inside E. 11 0.42 37 1.40 8 0.31 2.011e-06 Yes 
Total  39 1.48 60 2.27 26 1.02 0.001540 Yes 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 




Figure 7.5 A comparison of the co-occurrence of epistemic modals and evidential 
sources in the three cases 
 
7.2.4 Co-occurrence of Deontic Modality and Evidentiality 
As can be seen in Table 7.6 and Figure 7.6, there are no significant differences in the 
co-occurrence of deontic modals with evidential sources in all the categories among 
















evidentials, while deontic modals with shared evidentials co-occur most in the cases 
of Obama and Ahmadinejad.  
 
Table 7.6 A comparison of the co-occurrence of deontic modals and evidential sources 
in the three cases 
 
   Speakers  
 
D.M. + 













No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
D.M. + Outside E. 3 0.11 3 0.11 2 0.08 0.9022 No 
D. M. + Shared E. 4 0.15 7 0.26 8 0.31 0.4755 No 
D. M. + Inside E. 10 0.38 5 0.19 3 0.12 0.1257 No 
Total  17 0.65 15 0.57 13 0.51 0.8141 No 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 




Figure 7.6 A comparison of the co-occurrence of deontic modals and evidential 


















7.2.5 Co-occurrence of Volitional Modality and Evidentiality 
Table 7.7 and Figure 7.7 show that three cases present a similar pattern in the 
co-occurrence of volitional modals and evidential sources. The co-occurrence of 
volitional modals with inside evidentials ranks first in all three cases, though their 
figures are much higher in the cases of Blair and Obama than that of Ahmadinejad. 
The statistical analyses show that the differences in the co-occurrence of volitional 
modals with evidential sources are not significant in all the categories among the three 
speakers.  
 
Table 7.7 A comparison of the co-occurrence of volitional modals and evidential 
sources in the three cases 
 
   Speakers  
V.M. + 















No. ptw No. ptw No. ptw 
V.M. + Outside E. 1 0.04 0 0 3 0.12 0.1602 No 
V.M. + Shared E. 2 0.08 2 0.08 1 0.04 0.8366 No 
V.M. + Inside E. 8 0.30 10 0.38 3 0.12 0.1780 No 
Total  11 0.42 12 0.45 7 0.28 0.5496 No 
(If p-value is less than 0.05, then the difference of the relevant category among the 






Figure 7.7 A comparison of the co-occurrence of volitional modals and evidential 
sources in the three cases 
 
7.2.6 Discussions and Implications 
Sections 7.2.1-7.2.5 in this chapter investigated the co-occurrence of modality and 
evidentiality at the sentential level in the three cases quantitatively in terms of various 
modal types and evidential types. The most striking results of these quantitative 
analyses can be summarised as follows: 
 
(i) Overall, the modals which co-occur with evidentials among the three cases take up 
10% on average when compared with their total numbers in the data, while the 
evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases take up 42% on 
average.  
(ii) With respect to the co-occurrence of modal types and evidentials, epistemic 
modals rank first in all the cases with around 60% on average, followed by deontic 
and volitional modals. The result is consistent with the view that evidentiality has 
a closer relationship with epistemic modality than the other types of modality, 
though it is surprising to discover that when compared with its total numbers in the 
data this difference is not obvious.  
 















evidentials take up the first three positions in the cases of Blair and Obama, while 
S.P., S.K. and P.K. evidentials are the top three categories in the case of 
Ahmadinejad. The evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases 
take up 42% on average in their total numbers in the data. Evidentials inferred 
from indirect sources especially personal knowledge (P.K. evidentials, with around 
66% on average), co-occur far more frequently with modals than those evidentials 
from direct sources (P.P. and S.P. evidentials). It can be concluded from the results 
that the evidentials (such as P.K. evidentials) of lower reliability (strength) 
co-occur with modals far more frequently than the evidentials of higher reliability 
(such as P.P. and S.P. evidentials).  
 
(iv) When it comes to the co-occurrence of epistemic modals with evidential sources, 
Obama uses most in epistemic modals co-occurring with inside and shared 
evidentials, while Blair ranks first in the co-occurrence of epistemic modals with 
outside evidentials. The differences among the three speakers are not significant 
except for the inside evidentials.  
 
(v) The differences in the co-occurrences of deontic modals with evidential sources 
among the three speakers are not significant in all the categories. However, inside 
evidentials co-occur most frequently with deontic modals in the cases of Blair, 
while shared evidentials co-occur most in the cases of Obama and Ahmadinejad.  
 
(vi) As to the co-occurrence of volitional modals and evidential sources, there are no 
significant differences among the three speakers. The frequency of volitional 
modals co-occurring with inside evidentials comes first in all three cases.  
 
Overall, the quantitative analyses of the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality 
reveal us some useful patterns about their interactions in political discourse. However, 
it is still necessary to investigate their interaction patterns and specific functions in the 
context with detailed qualitative analysis. Therefore, in the following section I will try 
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to identify the most typical co-occurrence patterns between three types of modals and 
three sources of evidentials, focusing on their functions in stance-taking, 
ideology-coding and (de)legitimisation.   
 
7.3 Qualitative Analysis  
Modality and evidentiality share the common ground that both of them function as 
stance-taking acts (See Marín-Arrese 2011a), contributing to legitimisation process. 
However, they differ in essence, because the former is concerned with the 
speaker’s/writer’s evaluation/stance towards the evidence, while the latter emphasizes 
the source and strength (reliability) of the evidence (Hart 2010:172). Therefore, 
evidentiality is treated as a distinct category, but working together with modality (all 
types of modality), and serving as an indispensable part in (de)legitimising the 
speaker’s assertions and actions. However, there remain some unsolved issues 
concerning the relations between modality and evidentiality: such as ‘What are the 
differences between the stance-taking acts by modal markers and evidential markers? 
How are they related or interacted in different contexts? What are the most typical 
patterns about their relations or interactions?  
 
Thus, in what follows I will discuss the co-occurrence of three types of modality and 
three sources of evidentiality both at the sentential level and at the discourse level. In 
particular, I will investigate their functions in relation to (de)legitimisation or 
persuasion (manipulation) in the context of political discourse, with annotated 
examples from the three cases. I will first examine the interaction (co-occurrence) 
between epistemic modals and three sources of evidentials at the sentential level, 
following by those of deontic modals and volitional modals. After that, I will 
summarise the typical patterns of the interactions between modality and evidentiality 
and address their relationships further at the discourse level (beyond the sentential 




7.3.1 Epistemic Modality and Evidentiality  
 
(1) Epistemic modals and outside evidentials   
As can be seen in Table 7.5, epistemic modals do not often co-occur with outside 
evidentials. Compared with I.R. evidentials, H.E. evidentials are used more frequently 
with epistemic modals. Consider the following examples:   
 
[1] It was expected < Outside / H.E. > then that the Special Commission, together 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency, would (Past form of will) < M.verb. 
/ E.M. / High. > complete this process in a few months. But it was not to be. What 
no-one fully foresaw at the time was the huge effort Iraq would (Past form of will) 
< M.verb. / E.M. / High. > put into blocking it. (T. Blair; 17 December 1998) 
[2] I am happy to note that whereas 1,700 companies applied for this benefit in 
2001-02, in this financial year it is estimated that < Outside / H.E. > around 3000 
claims will < M.verb. / E.M. /High. > be made. (T. Blair; 18 November 2003) 
[3] As we look to the future, we can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter.> learn from our past -- 
for history shows < Outside / I.R. > us that both our nations benefit from 
engagement that is grounded in mutual interest and mutual respect. (B. Obama; 
27 July 2009) 
 
As the sentential level, the hearsay evidential ‘It was expected that’ in Example [1] is 
the source of the epistemic stance expressed by ‘would’ in its following proposition. 
At the discourse level, both the evidential marker and epistemic modal are used to 
legitimise the speaker’s proposal that starting a war on Iraq is necessary, since the 
result (carrying out the decision of destroying all Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction) 
did not meet the expectation (it could be inferred from ‘But it was not to be.’ ). 
Furthermore, Blair tries to legitimise his action by pointing out it was Iraq that put 
great efforts in blocking the process.    
 
Similarly, the epistemic stance encoded by modal marker ‘will’ in Example [2] 
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originates from an outside source, indicating by the hearsay evidential ‘it is estimated 
that’ which is of a weak strength. Therefore, the force of this epistemic stance-marker 
is much weaker than that in its common use as it is only estimated here.    
 
Example [3], on the other hand, shows that outside evidentials like ‘history shows’ 
can also be used to illustrate the epistemic stance (expressed by ‘can’). Here ‘can’ 
could be interpreted both as an epistemic modal and a dynamic modal, which means it 
is probable for us to learn from our past or we are able to learn from our past.  
 
(2) Epistemic modals and shared evidentials   
Compared with the previous category, epistemic modals and evidentials from shared 
sources co-occur more frequently in the data, and their interactions are more 
complicated. Consider the following examples:   
 
[4] But what we know < Shared / S.K. >  -- what we have seen < Shared / S.P. > - is 
that America can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > change. What we have already 
achieved gives us hope - the audacity to hope - for what we can < M.verb. / E.M. / 
Inter. > and must < M.verb. / D.M. / High > achieve tomorrow. (B. Obama; 18 
March 2008) 
[5] You have certainly < M.adv. / E.M. / High > heard < Shared / S.P. > the sad stories 
of the Guantanamo and Abu-Ghraib prisons. (M. Ahmadinejad; 29 November 
2006) 
[6] You may < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > remember that < Shared / S.K. > how the 
aerial transport of a cruise missile mistakenly loaded with nuclear warhead from a 
base inside the US soil to another base in the country posed a serious danger 
creating anxiety and fear among the American people. (M. Ahmadinejad; 17 
April 2010) 
[7] I know < Inside / P.K. >that political campaigns can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > 




[8] The practical challenge of such a plan may < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. >be large; but 
there is no doubt < Shared / S.K. > what works. (T. Blair; 13 December 2009)  
 
In Example [4], two evidentials ‘we know’ and ‘we have seen’ (indicating shared 
knowledge and metaphorical visual perception respectively) are used together to 
provide direct and strong evidence (Whitt 2010:8) for the justification of the epistemic 
stance expressed by ‘can’. These evidentials and epistemic modals can then be further 
used to legitimise the speaker’s proposal ‘the possibility of a more perfect union’ in 
the context as he later said that ‘What we have already achieved gives us hope - the 
audacity to hope - for what we can and must achieve tomorrow’.  
 
As shown in Example [5], epistemic modals can be part of evidentials and function as 
an intensifier. We can see that the epistemic stance marker ‘certainly’ is used to 
reinforce the strength of the shared perceptual evidential ‘you have heard’. It reveals 
the speaker’s intention (as part of his ideology) that he wants to make the addressees 
believe what he said are facts because they have heard it.  
 
The epistemic modals ‘may’ in Example [6] and ‘can’ in Example [7], on the other 
hand, are used to weaken the strength of the two evidentials ‘remember’ and ‘seem’. 
Therefore, both epistemic modals function as downtoners, which either demonstrates 
the speaker’s uncertainty about the sources of evidence as in Example [6] or expresses 
the hearer’s assumed disapproval to them as in Example [7].  
 
Example [8], however, shows a concessive relation between the epistemic modal ‘may’ 
and the shared evidential ‘there is no doubt’. This relation is indicated by a marker of 
concessive adverbial clause - ‘but’. The evidential marker reveals the speaker’s 
ideology that his plan is feasible and beneficial and also legitimises it based on shared 





(3) Epistemic modals and inside evidentials 
Table 7.5 shows us that epistemic modals and inside evidentials co-occur much more 
frequently in the case of Obama than the other two speakers. Besides, their 
interactions are different from the previous two categories. Consider the following 
examples:   
 
[9] I know < Inside / P.K. > that even a successful war against Iraq will < M.verb. / 
E.M. / High >require a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined 
cost, with undetermined consequences. (B. Obama; 26 October 2002) 
[10] I would not < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter.  >be running for President if I didn't 
believe with all my heart that < Inside / P.K. > this is what the vast majority of 
Americans want for this country. (B. Obama; 18 March 2008) 
[11] Now, I don't believe < Inside / P.K. > it's too late to change course, but it will < 
M.verb. / E.M. / High > be if we don't take dramatic action as soon as possible. 
(B. Obama; 8 January 2009) 
[12] I believe < Inside / P.K. > this is the fundamental cure for the diseases which have 
plagued the human society for several hundred years; and it can < M.verb. / E.M. 
/ Inter. > be administered. (M. Ahmadinejad; 30 August 2012) 
[13] And I’m pretty sure < M.adj. / E.M. / High > I know < Inside / P.K. >what most 
Americans would < M.verb. / V.M. & E.M. / Inter. > choose. (B. Obama; 8 
September 2011) 
 
Like Example [4], the evidential marker ‘I know’ in Example [9] provides inside 
source of evidence to the stance expressed by the epistemic modal ‘will’. That means 
the speaker makes sole commitment to this epistemic stance by stating that the 
evidence is from his own knowledge.  
 
Example [10] illustrates a conditional relation between the epistemic stance encoded 
by ‘would not’ and the evidential marker ‘I didn't believe with all my heart that’. 
This relation is indicated by a marker of conditional adverbial clause- ‘if’. Here the 
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evidential functions as the source of the premise of the epistemic stance.  
 
Like Example [8], Example [11] also demonstrates a concessive relation between the 
source indicating by the evidential marker ‘I don't believe’ and the epistemic stance 
encoded by ‘will’ which also functions as the conclusion of a conditional clause ‘if we 
don't take dramatic action as soon as possible’. This reveals the speaker’s ideology 
that ‘we should take actions as soon as possible’ and therefore legitimises his proposal 
of carrying out ‘American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan’.  
 
Example [12], on the other hand, shows us a coordinative relation or progressive 
relation between the proposition following the evidential marker ‘I believe’ and the 
epistemic stance expressed by ‘can’. This relation is indicated by a marker of 
coordinative or progressive clause- ‘and’. In this example, the evidential may also 
provide the source of evidence for the epistemic stance.  
 
Similar to Example [5], the epistemic modal adjective ‘sure’ in Example [13] is a part 
of evidentials and the phrase ‘I’m pretty sure’ functions as an intensifier. It adds 
epistemic judgement to the shared evidential ‘I know’ and reinforces its strength. It 
shows that evidentiality is also a gradual semantic category just like modality.  
 
7.3.2 Deontic Modality and Evidentiality 
 
(1) Deontic modals and outside evidentials   
Compared with epistemic modals, there are far fewer deontic modals co-occurring 
with evidentials in the three cases, especially for outside evidentials, which comes last 
among three sub-categories. So the relations between deontic modals and evidentials 
are not as complicated as those between epistemic modals and evidentials. Consider 
the following examples:  
 
[14] There were some who thought < Outside / H.E. >we should < M.verb. / D.M. / 
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Inter. > have taken military action on 14 November. But, despite our severe 
doubts, we went that extra mile. (T. Blair; 17 December 1998) 
[15] Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions - who suggest < 
Outside / H.E. > that our system cannot < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > tolerate too 
many big plans. (B. Obama; 20 January 2009) 
[16] The Secretary-General should not < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > come under 
pressure from powers and/or the country hosting the organization for his stating 
the truth and administration of justice. It is suggested that < Outside / H.E. > the 
General Assembly should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. >, within one year and in the 
framework of an extraordinary session, finalize the reformation of the 
Organization’s structure. (M. Ahmadinejad; 23 September 2010) 
 
Just like Examples [1] and [2], the outside evidentials in Examples [14], [15] and [16] 
indicate the sources of deontic modal stance in respective examples. It is interesting to 
see that the speaker actually wants to delegitimise the deontic stance by adopting 
unspecific source of evidentials (with low validity) such as ‘There were some who 
thought’ and ‘there are some … who suggest’, as illustrated in Examples [14] and 
[15]. That is because hearsay evidentials allow the speaker to distance himself/herself 
from the reported stance and ‘provide a signal that alternative or contrary view points 
may be valid’ (White 2006:59). In this sense, the evidentials here function as the 
unreliable sources of information rather than as sources of evidence. 
 
Example [16], on the other hand, expresses the speaker’s own deontic stance, though 
the speaker distances himself by using an outside evidential ‘It is suggested that’. 
This can be inferred from the context as this deontic stance is actually a solution to the 
deontic stance encoded by ‘should not’ in the previous proposition. It means this type 
of evidentials can also be used to mystify the responsibility of the stance-taking act 





(2) Deontic modals and shared evidentials 
According to Table 7.6, deontic modals co-occurred most with shared evidentials in 
the cases of Obama and Ahmadinejad. So there are more examples in this sub-section 
and the relations between deontic modals and shared evidentials could be more 
diverse than the previous sub-section. Consider the following examples: 
 
[17] But we have seen < Shared / S.P. > its fall during our lives and it collapsed in 
such a way that we have to < M.semi. / D.M. / High > refer to libraries because 
no trace of it is left. (M. Ahmadinejad; 26 October 2005) 
[18] But we know < Shared / S.K. > we have to < M.semi. / D.M. / High. > tighten the 
asylum system further. (T. Blair; 22 April 2005) 
[19] It is clear that < Shared / S.P. > basics of thought and social interaction should < 
M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > change from selfishness and bullying to compassion, 
affection and an interaction based on justice and respect. (M. Ahmadinejad; 30 
August 2012) 
[20] There can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be a regular review process – in fact < 
Shared / S.K. >, on any sensible basis there has to < M.semi. / D.M. / High. > be. 
(T. Blair; 13 December 2009) 
 
Similar to Example [12], Example [17] shows us a progressive relation between the 
evidential marker ‘we have seen’ and the strong deontic stance expressed by ‘have to’. 
In this example, the evidential also provides strong visual evidence for this deontic 
stance.  
 
Examples [18], [19] and [20] illustrate that evidentials often provide sources of 
evidence for deontic stance, while they legitimise them in different ways. In Example 
[18], the speaker (Blair) tries to legitimise his deontic stance encoded by ‘have to’ 
towards the proposition ‘we tighten the asylum system further’ by assuming it as 
common knowledge shared by his addressees, for he uses an S.K. evidential marker 




Example [19], on the other hand, justifies the deontic stance (expressed by ‘should’) 
through the adoption of an S.P. evidential ‘It is clear that’ which indicates mental 
perception or inference (Greenbaum 1969:205; Bednarek 2006a:640). That means the 
speaker (Ahmadinejad) assumes the following proposition as the reality, which can be 
seen or inferred mentally.   
 
In Example [20], however, the speaker adopts the evidential marker ‘in fact’ to 
legitimise his deontic stance by treating it as a fact (cf. Chafe 1986:271). The deontic 
stance expressed by semi-modal ‘has to’ indicate that the designated action is to be 
actualized by an external force (Sweester 1990:61).  
 
(3) Deontic modals and inside evidentials 
According to Table 7.6, deontic modals co-occur most with inside evidentials in the 
case of Blair, though it is very rare for the P.P. evidentials to appear with deontic 
modals in the same sentence. Consider the following examples: 
 
[21] I listened to these people, and what I heard < Inside / P.P. > was people working 
tirelessly to make our country and borders secure, but too often frustrated by a 
system that hampered them when it should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > have been 
helping them. (T. Blair; 22 April 2005) 
[22] And I believe < Inside / P.K. > any alliance must < M.verb. / D.M. / High.> start 
with America and Europe. (T. Blair; 17 July 2003) 
[23] I’m also well aware < Inside / P.K. > that there are many Republicans who don’t 
believe we should < M.verb. / D.M. / Inter. > raise taxes on those who are most 
fortunate and can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter.> best afford it. (B. Obama; 8 
September 2011) 
 
Similar to Example [8], Example [21] illustrates a concessive relation between the 
proposition following the evidential ‘I heard’ and the deontic stance expressed by 
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‘should’. That is to say, the deontic stance expressed here is in opposition to the 
speaker’s expectations. Actually, this is not a part of a story that the speaker had heard 
about, but the speaker’s own deontic evaluation on how an immigration system should 
be. So the evidential ‘I heard’ does not provide evidence for the deontic stance in this 
example.  
 
In Example [22], the speaker makes sole commitment to his strong deontic stance and 
his belief (knowledge-based ideology) ‘any alliance must start with America and 
Europe’ by adopting an inside evidential ‘I believe’. This evidential then indicates the 
source of evidence for the deontic stance expressed by ‘must’.   
 
In Example [23], however, the speaker acknowledges his awareness of knowing 
‘many Republicans who don’t believe we should raise taxes on…’, but he does not 
explicitly commit to the deontic stance expressed by ‘should’. From the context, we 
can infer that this is actually his stance, though the evidential ‘I’m also well aware’ is 
not the source of evidence for this deontic stance.  
 
7.3.3 Volitional Modality and Evidentiality  
 
(1) Volitional modals and outside evidentials   
According to Table 7.7, volitional modals seldom co-occur with outside evidentials in 
the three cases, particularly there is no occurrence in the case of Obama. Consider the 
following examples: 
 
[24] And the New Deal shows < Outside / I.R. > the kind of direction this Government 
will < M.verb. / V.M. / High. > take – and the direction I believe < Inside / P.K. > 
that the British people want us to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > take. (T. Blair; 30 
November 2000) 
[25] We have observed the regulations of the IAEA more than our commitments, yet, 
we have never submitted to illegally imposed pressures nor will < M.verb. / V.M. 
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/ High. > we ever do so. It has been said that < Outside / H.E. > they want to < 
M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > pressure Iran into a dialogue.  (M. Ahmadinejad; 23 
September 2010) 
 
These two examples both illustrate that outside evidentials can provide source of 
evidence to volitional modal stance. The evidential I.R. evidential ‘the New Deal 
shows’ in Example [24] is much stronger with respect to the strength / reliability of 
evidence than the H.E. evidential ‘It has been said that’ in Example [25]. That is 
because the former evidential has an explicit and reliable source; while the latter 
remains implicit in term of the source (it is not clear about who said it.). Therefore, the 
volitional stance expressed in Example [25] is less objective and persuasive than that 
in Example [24].   
 
(2) Volitional modals and shared evidentials   
As can be seen in Table 7.7, it is also very rare for volitional modals to co-occur with 
shared evidentials in the three cases. Consider the following examples: 
 
[26] Today, a lot of this is reinforced by what arises from Europe. About 50% of 
regulations with a significant impact on business now emanate from the EU. And 
it often seems to < Shared / S.P. > want to < M.semi. / V.M. / Inter. > regulate too 
heavily without sufficient cause. (T. Blair; 26 May 2005) 
[27] But I have asserted a firm conviction - a conviction rooted in my faith in God and 
my faith in the American people - that working together we can < M.verb. / E.M. 
/ Inter. > move beyond some of our old racial wounds, and that in fact < Shared / 
S.K. > we have no choice if we are to < M.semi. / V.M. / High.> continue on the 
path of a more perfect union. (B. Obama; 18 March 2008) 
 
The evidential ‘it often seems to’ in Example [26] provides evidence for the volitional 
stance encoded by ‘want to’, though this evidential is much weaker than direct visual 
perceptions like ‘we’ve seen’ because ‘seem’ often indicates a kind of mental 
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perception which is inferred from visual perception (Greenbaum 1969:205; Bednarek 
2006a:640). By adopting this evidential, the speaker tries to persuade his audience to 
accept his stance as true (as if it can be seen mentally by everyone).  
 
Example [27] demonstrates how evidentials can be used to justify a conditional clause. 
Different from Example [10], however, the volitional stance encoded by ‘are to’ 
functions as the premise of the conditional clause, while the evidential ‘in fact’ also 
provide evidence for the volitional stance. The evidential marker ‘in fact’ reflects the 
speaker’s ideology that he treats this sentence ‘we have no choice if we are to 
continue on the path of a more perfect union’ as a fact shared by his audience, and at 
the same time legitimises his proposal that ‘it is necessary to work together for a more 
perfect union’. Therefore the volitional stance expressed here is intersubjective as the 
speaker involves the addressees into his judgments by using the evidential ‘in fact’ 
(Traugott and Dasher 2002:155) and the use of an inclusive ‘we’.  
 
(3) Volitional modals and inside evidentials 
Volitional modals co-occur most with inside evidentials in all three cases (refer to 
Table 7.7). Consider the following examples: 
 
[28] I’ve seen < Inside / P.P. > it in the family business whose owners would rather < 
M.verb. / V.M. / Inter. > cut their own pay than lay off their neighbors and in the 
workers who would rather < M.verb. / V.M./ Inter. > cut back their hours than 
see a friend lose a job. (B. Obama; 7 November 2012) 
[29] And I know < Inside / P.K. >that every American wants her future to < M.semi. / 
V.M. / Inter. > be just as bright. (B. Obama; 7 November 2012) 
[30] And I believe < Inside / P.K. > the vast majority of wealthy Americans and CEOs 
are willing to < M.semi. / V.M. / Low. > do just that, if it helps the economy grow 
and gets our fiscal house in order. (B. Obama; 8 September 2011) 
 
The inside evidentials in these three examples all function as the source of evidence 
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for respective volitional stance. The evidential ‘I’ve seen’ in Example [28] provides 
the direct visual evidence for the volitional stance expressed by two ‘would’, therefore 
it is the strongest of all in terms of reliability / strength of evidence (Sweetser 1984: 13) 
among the three examples.  
 
The evidential ‘I know’ in Example [29] indicates that the speaker tries to legitimise 
his volitional stance (expressed by ‘want to’) on the basis of his own knowledge.  
 
The evidential marker ‘I believe’ in Example [30], on the other hand, shows that his 
stance-taking act (the volitional stance expressed by ‘are willing to’) is based on his 
own belief, which is the least of all with respect to the strength of evidence. Besides, 
this volitional stance is also part of the conclusion of a conditional clause.  
 
7.3.4 Discussions and Implications  
After the detailed qualitative analyses of the co-occurrence of modality and 
evidentiality from various perspectives, I identified five typical patterns about their 
relations at the sentential level in the examples among the three cases. They can be 
briefly summarised as follows:  
 
(i) Evidentials as SOURCE of Evidence for modal stance 
This is the most common phenomenon between the interaction of evidentiality and 
modality in (de)legitimisation process. Most types of evidentials serve as the source of 
epistemic /deontic /volitional stance, including most evidentials from outside and 
inside sources and some shared evidentials, as shown in most examples in the 
previous sections. However, the situation is different for different sources of 
evidentials. In particular, the speaker can use hearsay evidentials (with unspecific or 
unreliable sources) to delegitimise modal stance, as shown in Example [1], [14], and 
[15]. In this sense, these hearsay evidentials are used to indicate the sources of modal 




(ii) Epistemic modality as PART of evidentials 
Epistemic modality can be part of evidentials and function as intensifiers or 
down-toners, especially in the form of adjectives or adverbs, such as ‘certainly’ and 
‘sure’, as shown in Examples [5] and [13]. Epistemic modals enable the speaker to 
evaluate the certainty / reliability of the source of evidence. This also provides 
evidence for the adoption of strength of evidence in this thesis.   
 
(iii) A concessive relation between evidentials and modals  
Sometimes, evidentials do not indicate the source of evidence for modal stance when 
they co-occur in the same sentence but in different clauses, there can be a concessive 
relation between them. It means evidentials and modals are used in a main clause and 
a concessive clause respectively which often marked by a conjunctive like ‘although’ 
or ‘but’, as illustrated in Examples [8], [11] and [21]. The concessive relation is 
actually the relation between the two clauses, but it also indicates an emerging pattern 
in the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality.   
 
(iv) A conditional relation between evidentials and modals 
Similar to a concessive relation, the co-occurrence of evidentials and modals can also 
demonstrate a conditional relation, when evidentials can be part of the conditional 
premise or providing evidence for the whole sentence. It means evidentials and 
modals are used in a main clause and a conditional clause respectively which often 
marked by a conjunctive like ‘if’, as shown in Examples [10], [27] and [30].  
 
(v) A coordinative or progressive relation between evidentials and modals 
Similarly, there can also be a coordinative or progressive relation between evidentials 
and modals when they co-occur in the same sentence. It means evidentials and modals 
are used in two coordinative clauses respectively which often marked by a conjunctive 
like ‘and’, as demonstrated in Example [12] and [17].  
 
In this type of relation, evidentials often do not provide the source of evidence for the 
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modal stance which co-occurred in the same sentence.   
 
The previous section also discussed about the relations between modality and 
evidentiality beyond the sentential level. As shown in Example [1] and [4], at the 
discourse level, evidentials often provide evidence for the modal stance in their 
neighbouring sentences, and work with modals to legitimise the speaker’s assertions, 
actions or proposals in the context. Consider the following examples:  
 
[31] There are suggestions that < Outside / H.E. >the timing of military action is 
somehow linked to the internal affairs of the United States. I refute this entirely. I 
have no doubt whatsoever that < Inside / P.K. > action is fully justified now. That 
is my strong personal view. I know < Inside / P.K. > that President Clinton 
reached the same conclusion for the same reasons. Had he acted differently, out 
of regard to internal matters of U.S. politics, that would < M.verb. / E.M. / 
Inter. >have been a dereliction of his duty as President. Instead, not for the first 
time, he has shown the courage to do the right thing and he has my full support. 
(T. Blair; 17 December 1998) 
 
Example [31] is extracted from ‘Blair’s statement to Parliament concerning Iraq in 
1998’. As can be seen in the example that Blair adopts a hearsay evidential ‘There 
are suggestions that’ to indicate the source of a belief that he apparently opposes to 
(he then said: “I refute this entirely”). He then uses two inside evidentials ‘I have no 
doubt whatsoever that’ and ‘I know’ to support his stance that ‘action is fully 
justified now’ (Here the action refers to ‘the war on Iraq’). These three evidentials and 
the epistemic stance expressed by ‘would’ (used in a subjective mood) all contribute 
to the legitimisation of his following assertion that it is right for President Clinton to 
start the war on Iraq and he supports him.    
 
[32] Everyone here knows < Shared / S.K. > that small businesses are where most new 
jobs begin. And you know  < Shared / S.K. > that while corporate profits have 
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come roaring back, smaller companies haven’t. So for everyone who speaks so 
passionately about making life easier for “job creators,” this plan is for you.  
Pass this jobs bill, and starting tomorrow, small businesses will < M.verb. / E.M. / 
High > get a tax cut if they hire new workers or raise workers’ wages. Pass this 
jobs bill, and all small business owners will < M.verb. / E.M. / High >also see 
their payroll taxes cut in half next year. If you have 50 employees making an 
average salary, That is an $80,000 tax cut. And all businesses will < M.verb. / 
E.M. / High > be able to continue writing off the investments they make in 
2012.  (B. Obama; 8 September 2011) 
 
Example [32] is extracted from ‘Obama's speech to Congress on job’. His main aim of 
this speech is to persuade the Congress to pass the jobs bill. First Obama impresses 
them that small businesses can help creating jobs. By using two shared evidentials 
‘Everyone here knows’ and ‘you know’, he tries to make them believe these two 
propositions are common knowledge shared by everyone. But actually there is no 
solid evidence for them. On the basis of these two propositions, he then tries to 
persuade the Congress to pass the jobs bill by explaining the benefits those small 
businesses will get if they pass it. The strong epistemic stance expressed by three 
epistemic modals of high value -‘will’ also contributes to the justification of his 
proposal. That is to say, if they want to create more jobs, they need to pass the bill 
because doing so will bring these benefits for small businesses (and these benefits 
help create more jobs).  
 
[33] Today we can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > see < Shared / S.P. > that old wounds of 
the world war the second have not been yet healed. Zionist aggression against 
Palestinian people within Palestinian territories has been going on for more than 60 
years. So we can < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > see < Shared / S.P. > as long as justice is 
not reestablished peace will not < M.verb. / E.M. / High. > return to Palestine.  
   If justice is reestablished all displaced Palestinians will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > 
return to their motherland. If justice is reestablished and prevails then occupiers and 
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aggressors will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > leave Palestinian territory and a Palestinian 
state will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > be created by all Palestinians.  
   If justice is reestablished, oppressed Iraqi nation will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > 
taste the sweet flavor of justice and full national sovereignty.  
   And if justice is reestablished real peace and stability will < M.verb. / E.M. / High > 
prevail in the region. This has always been emphasized by all our great personalities 
that, as attested by the human history, peace may not < M.verb. / E.M. / Inter. > be 
established through injustice. The basis of the sustainable peace is justice. (M. 
Ahmadinejad; 19 November 2007) 
 
Example [33] is extracted from ‘Ahmadinejad’s address to 2007 APA general 
assembly’. By adopting two shared perceptual evidentials ‘we can see’, Ahmadinejad 
treats his belief (as part of his ideology) -‘as long as justice is not reestablished peace 
will not return to Palestine’ as facts. Then he uses five conditionals to further express 
his stance towards this issue (the issue of Palestine’). Obviously, the two evidentials 
and the epistemic stance expressed by five ‘will’ in those conditionals also help to 
legitimise his proposal in the whole speech-‘joint efforts for the establishment of 
justice in the world’.   
 
7.4 Summary  
In sum, this chapter first examined the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality at 
the sentential level in the three cases quantitatively. It then discussed their interactions 
in terms of three modal types co-occurring with evidential sources and identified five 
most typical patterns about their relations. The most striking results can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
 Epistemic modals co-occurring with evidentials rank first in all the cases with 
around 60% on average, followed by deontic and volitional modals.  
 The modals co-occurring with evidentials among the three cases take up 10% 
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on average when compared with their total numbers in the data, while the 
evidentials co-occurring with modals among the three cases take up 42% on 
average. 
 Evidentials inferred from indirect sources especially personal knowledge (P.K. 
evidentials, with around 66% on average), co-occur far more frequently with 
modals than those evidentials from direct sources (P.P. and S.P. evidentials).  
 The differences in the co-occurrences of three types of modals with evidential 
sources among the three speakers are not significant in all the categories 
except for the inside evidentials.  
 At the sentential level, there are five typical patterns between the 
co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality: Evidentials as SOURCE of 
Evidence for modal stance; epistemic modality as PART of evidentials; a 
concessive relation; a conditional relation; a coordinative or progressive 
relation. 
 At the discourse level, evidentials often provide evidence for the modal stance 
in the context, and work with modal stance to legitimise the speaker’s 



















The main objective of this thesis has been to analyse modality and evidentiality in 
political discourse within a cognitive-functional analytical framework.  
 
This thesis answered the four research questions raised in the introduction chapter by 
proposing a systemic analytical framework for studying modality and evidentiality in 
political discourse and applying it in the quantitative and qualitative analyses of three 
types of modality and six types of evidentiality among the three cases of political 
speeches (former British premier Tony Blair, US President Barack Obama, former 
Iran president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad). In what follows, I will briefly review how 
these questions have been addressed in the thesis and then summarise its conceptual, 
methodological and empirical contributions to the fields of political discourse studies, 
semantics and pragmatics. Finally, I will discuss the limitations of this thesis and 
future research following it.  
 
 How can modality be approached from a cognitive-functional perspective? 
Chapter One highlighted that it is necessary and possible to study modality with a 
combination of functional and cognitive linguistic perspectives to explore the whole 
process of discourse from different dimensions and bring new insights to PDA as well 
as CDA. On the one hand, the functional linguistic perspective (the theory of modal 
value in SFL) helps us analyse pragmatic functions of the texts. On the other hand, the 
adoption of theories from Cognitive Linguistics enables us to reveal the speaker’s 
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conceptualization process of discourse production in terms of persuasion or 
manipulation. 
 
Chapter Two established a systemic cognitive-functional analytical framework for 
studying modality. Drawing on SFL as well as some relevant theories and concepts 
from Cognitive Linguistics (including image schemas of space, Langacker’s epistemic 
model and Chilton’s model of discourse space), this framework --- the STE Model– 
can explore functions of modality in political discourse from dimensions of space, 
time and evidentiality. 
 
In this model, modality is fundamentally conceptualized in terms of space, displayed 
on a figure combining the CENTRE-PERIPHERY schema and the NEAR-FAR 
schema, together with the three dimensions of space, time and evidentiality. The 
centre circle represents ‘Here’ in terms of space, ‘Now’ in terms of time, ‘Necessity’ in 
terms of ‘deontic stance, ‘Certainty’ in terms of ‘epistemic stance’, and ‘Willingness’ 
in terms of ‘volitional stance’. The shaded circle dot in the centre circle represents the 
speaker (viz. the speaker’s self, ‘I’ or ‘we’). The functions of modality in political 
discourse are addressed from three aspects: deontic distance / epistemic distance / 
volitional distance, value of modality and strength of evidence, with each graded on 
three levels, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 (see P. 60).  
 
 What functions does modality perform in political discourse? 
In Chapter Two, this thesis introduced the functions of modality with respect to stance, 
ideology and legitimisation.  
 
Chapters Three, Four and Five discussed the functions of epistemic modality, deontic 
modality and volitional modality respectively, supported with a large number of 
examples from the data.  
 
With regard to stance-taking acts, three types of modality encode different types of 
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stance. For example, epistemic modality functions as expressing knowledge-based 
(epistemic) stance as it involves ‘the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to 
the knowledge concerning the realization of events’ (Marín-Arrese 2011:195). Put 
another way, epistemic stance reveals the speaker’s ideology pertaining to the 
knowledge he/she has. Epistemic stance contributes to the legitimisation process in 
terms of what is possible or not possible to be actualized.  
 
Different from epistemic modality, deontic modality functions as expressing 
value-based (deontic) stance as it involves the positioning of the speaker/writer with 
respect to the necessity/ rightness (values) concerning the realization of events. It 
means that deontic stance reveals the speaker’s ideology pertaining to the political, 
social or moral values/beliefs he/she holds. Deontic stance contributes to the 
legitimisation process in terms of what actions are necessary (right) or not to take.  
 
Volitional modality, on the other hand, functions as expressing emotion-based 
(volitional) stance as it involves the positioning of the speaker/writer with respect to 
the willingness (emotions) concerning the realization of events. That is to say, 
volitional stance reveals the speaker’s ideology pertaining to the emotions (including 
willingness, determination, intentions) he/she has. Volitional stance contributes to the 
legitimisation process in terms of who is willing or unwilling to take actions, or what 
actions they are willing or unwilling to take.  
 
In summary, modality functions as stance-taking acts, which then contribute to the 
functions of encoding ideology and (de)legitimisation. Different types of modality 
function differently in terms of stance-taking acts, reflecting ideology and 
(de)legitimisation, as shown in Table 2.2 (see p. 67) and Figure 2.2 (see P. 68).  
    
 How do different speakers use modality and evidentiality in political 
discourse? 
In Chapter Two, I investigated and compared the distributions and frequencies of 
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modal types, values and forms among the three cases in general. In Chapters Three to 
Six, I examined the use of modality and evidentiality among three political speakers 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. The most striking results as follows:  
 
Overall, the results demonstrated that three speakers had a lot in common in terms of 
the use of modal markers and evidential markers, particularly in the cases of Blair and 
Obama, which indicates these common features might be the main characteristics of 
using modality and evidentiality in political discourse. First, the number of epistemic 
modals ranks first in all three cases, followed by those of deontic modals and 
volitional modals. Second, the three speakers use deontic modals of high value more 
frequently than those of intermediate value, while there are more epistemic modals of 
intermediate value and volitional modals of high value in the cases of Blair and 
Obama. Third, there are far more modal verbs in epistemic modals (around 85%), 
since ‘will’, ‘can’ and ‘would’ take up the first three positions among the three cases. 
However, modal verbs only account for about 50% and 60% in deontic and volitional 
modals respectively. Fourth, semi-modals are used very often in deontic modals, 
though ‘should’ and ‘must’ take up the first two positions in all three cases. Fifth, 
volitional modals ‘will’, ‘want to’ and ‘would’ rank top three in the cases of Blair and 
Obama, but this order is different in the case of Ahmadinejad. Sixth, evidentials from 
shared sources are preferred in the cases of Blair and Ahmadinejad, while those from 
inside sources are more popular in Obama’s case. In addition to the similarities, each 
speaker also has his own preferences, which reflect their different worldviews and 
rhetorical styles. 
 
Tony Blair ranks second in the use of modal markers, with 722 counts in total. He uses 
epistemic modals most with 373 counts, followed by deontic modals (200 counts) and 
volitional modals (149 counts). In terms of epistemic modality, Blair tends to use 
more modals of intermediate value (such as ‘would’ and ‘be to’) to emphasize the 
potential threats or force from his opponents in justifying his own proposal. With 
regard to deontic modality, Blair uses more semi-modals such as ‘need to’ to persuade 
Concluding Remarks 
 250 
his addressees that taking the designated actions is not his idea but out of their internal 
needs. For volitional modality, Blair adopts more modals indicating strong emotions 
to express his determination, promises, or strong commitments, such as ‘will’, ‘shall’, 
and ‘be to’. As to evidential markers, Blair uses more evidential markers (154 counts) 
than Obama (138 counts) and Ahmadinejad (103 counts), especially with respect to 
evidentials from outside sources (with 35 counts). In particular, Blair uses more 
evidentials from outside source than the other two speakers, which allows him to 
distance himself from the commitments of his stance-taking acts. In sum, the use of 
modal and evidential markers in the case of Blair shows he often takes a more 
objective and authoritative stance in his speech style (Fairclough 2000a) and he is 
skillful in using implicit modal markers to persuade or manipulate his addressees.  
 
Barack Obama uses the most modal markers among the three speakers with 806 
counts in total. He uses far more epistemic modals (with 479 counts) than deontic 
modals (with 177 counts) and volitional modals (with 150 counts). For the use of 
epistemic modality, ‘can’ is the most frequent epistemic modal (with 167 counts) in 
the case of Obama, which may help him gain the audience’s support by giving them 
hope and confidence. In terms of deontic modals, Obama also uses more deontic 
modal ‘can’ than the other two speakers. As to volitional modals, Obama tends to use 
more semi-modal ‘want to’ and ‘be going to’ to express his intentions or plans. With 
regard to evidentiality, Obama uses more evidentials from inside sources than the 
other two speakers, which allows him to make high commitment to his stance-taking 
acts. In sum, Obama’s speech style with respect to the use of modals and evidentials is 
distinctive from Blair. He has been inclined to involve the audience into his speech 
and establish intimate interpersonal relations with them in order to win their support.  
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad uses much fewer modal markers than Blair and Obama, with 
only half of their figures (407 counts). The number of epistemic modals also ranks 
first with 208 counts, followed by deontic modals with 140 counts and volitional 
modals with 59 counts. In terms of epistemic modals, Ahmadinejad uses more 
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‘possible’ than Blair and Obama. With regard to deontic modals, Ahmadinejad uses 
more passive deontic modals such as ‘be allowed to’ to delete the actors and avoid the 
potential conflicts. Besides, Ahmadinejad uses much fewer modal verbs ‘will’ and 
semi-modals ‘want to’, which both involve the future. It implies that Ahmadinejad’s 
speeches focus more on past events, while the other two speakers talk about more 
about the future plans or policies. Ahmadinejad does not use any volitional modal 
adjectives and adverbs in his speeches. Ahmadinejad comes last in the total number of 
evidential markers as well as those in most categories of evidentials, though he uses 
more shared perceptual evidentials than the other two speakers. This allows him to 
present or presuppose his opinions as shared perceptions or facts in persuading his 
addressees. In sum, Ahmadinejad takes a totally different speech style from the other 
two speakers. For example, he uses more passive modals or modals of intermediate 
value to avoid his self-commitments and evade responsibilities. In particular, he is not 
very skillful in using implicit modals such as semi-modals, or modal adverbs. This is 
probably because of his personal rhetorical style or the fact that his speeches are not 
original but translated versions.   
 
 How does evidentiality function in political discourse and how does it relate 
to modality? 
Chapter Six discussed the functions of evidentiality with regard to Commitments, 
(Inter)subjectivity and Ideology in the context of political discourse.  
 
Firstly, different sources of evidentials indicate the speaker’s different degrees of 
commitment/ responsibility to the propositions, particularly to the stance expressed in 
the designated context, such as epistemic, deontic and volitional stance. Evidentials 
from inside sources indicate the speaker’s personal (high) commitment to his/ her 
propositions and the evidentials from shared sources indicate shared commitment 
among the speaker and the hearers. The evidentials from outside sources, on the other 




Secondly, different sources of evidentials also mark subjectivity, intersubjectivity and 
objectivity of the speaker’s stance as their distinction lies in the degree of speaker’s 
commitment to his/her stance. If the speaker makes sole commitment to his/her stance 
(with evidence from inside source), then the stance (here expressed by modal markers) 
he expressed is subjective. If the speaker shares commitment with his/her hearers to 
his/her stance (with evidence from shared source), then the stance he expressed is 
inter-subjective. If the speaker makes no commitment to his/her stance (with evidence 
from outside source), then the stance he expressed is more objective.   
 
Thirdly, different types of evidentials reflect the speakers’ ideology concerning 
who/what is authoritative (e.g. Inferential evidentials from results), what is truth (e.g. 
Shared Perceptual evidentials), what is common knowledge (e.g. Evidentials inferred 
from shared knowledge) and what is believed (e.g. Evidentials inferred from personal 
beliefs), etc.  
 
Chapter Seven discussed the co-occurrence of modality and evidentiality in the 
persuasion/(de)legitimisation process in political discourse both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  
 
First, the chapter examined the frequencies of the co-occurrence of three types of 
modals and three sources of evidentials and compared their similarities and 
differences among the three speakers.  
 
Second, it investigated the functions and relations of the co-occurrence of different 
types of modals and evidentials in the context, and identified several typical patterns 
for their interactions at both propositional / sentential and discourse levels.  
 
Besides, similar to modality, evidentiality contributes to the process of 




This thesis made a few contributions to the scholarship of the field of discourse 
studies, particularly modality and evidentiality in political discourse studies. In what 
follows, I will briefly summarise them from conceptual, methodological and empirical 
perspectives.  
 
Conceptual Contributions  
The conceptual contributions of this thesis mainly involve the following five aspects: 
  
 This thesis redefined and reclassified modality  
This thesis redefined modality, taking into account its semantic meanings as well as its 
distinctive features both from functional and cognitive linguistic perspectives.   
 
This thesis classified modality into four categories: Epistemic Modality, Deontic 
Modality, Dynamic Modality, and Volitional Modality, though Dynamic Modality is 
not discussed here. This classification is relatively more inclusive than other studies, 
making it possible to see a more complete picture of modality. In particular, the 
category of volitional modality has long been neglected in previous studies.      
 
 This thesis treated modality as a scalar phenomenon, conceptualized in terms of 
space.  
In this thesis, three types of modality are treated as scales of possibility, necessity and 
willingness respectively, with three levels of modal value (high, intermediate, and low) 
being positioned according to the corresponding distance (close, near, distant) to the 
centre. In this way, epistemic modality is addressed in terms of epistemic distance, 
while deontic modality and volitional modality are addressed pertaining to deontic 
distance and volitional distance respectively.   
 
 This thesis found modality expressed in a wide range of forms 
The thesis found that modality can be expressed in many different forms in addition to 
modal verbs. By adopting a data-driven approach, this study identified and 
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investigated four forms of modality in English political speeches: modal verbs, 
semi-modals, modal adjectives, and modal adverbs. In particular, it is interesting to 
see that modal verbs only account for around 50% in the quantitative results of deontic 
modality in all three cases. This means other modal forms other than modal verbs, 
(especially semi-modals and) should also be taken into account in PDA. More 
importantly, the qualitative analysis showed that those implicit modal markers such as 
semi-modals and modal adjectives play an important role in the persuasion or 
manipulation processes.  
 
 This thesis reclassified evidentiality based on sources of evidence and modes of 
knowing 
The thesis proposed that evidentiality can be reclassified into three main types 
according to locus of information, depending on whether it is from an outside source 
(the speaker distances himself from the source of information); or from a shared 
source (the speaker presupposes the source of information is shared by addressees), or 
from an inside source (only the speaker is accessible to the source of information). 
They can be further classified into two categories in each source according to different 
modes of knowing.  
 
In summary, the evidential markers in this classification are divided into six types, 
including Inferential Evidentials from Results (I.R.); Hearsay Evidentials (H.E.); 
Shared Perceptual Evidentials (S.P.); Inferential Evidentials from Shared Knowledge 
(S.K.); Personal Perceptual Evidentials (P.P.); Inferential Evidentials from Personal 
Knowledge (P.K.), as shown in Table 2.6 (see P. 90).   
 
Methodological Contributions  
The methodological contributions of this thesis are mainly concerned with the 
following three perspectives:  
   
 This thesis established an analytical framework for studying modality from a 
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cognitive-functional perspective.  
 
 This thesis annotated the data with a novel coding system to study modal and 
evidential markers both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
 
 This thesis adopted a corpus linguistic approach to study modality and 
evidentiality with examining empirical data of thirty political speeches.  
 
Empirical Contributions  
The empirical contributions of this thesis include quantitative and qualitative results of 
modality and evidentiality from the analyses of three case studies.  
 
The quantitative results show that:  
1) On the whole, the distributions and frequencies of modal markers present a similar 
pattern in terms of values and forms in the cases of Blair and Obama, while 
Ahmadinejad is different in many aspects.  
 
2) Implicit modal markers such as semi-modals are also used frequently, particularly 
in deontic modality.  
 
3) Intermediate value is preferred in epistemic modality, while high value is more 
frequent in deontic and volitional modality.  
 
4) Blair and Obama adopt very similar numbers of modals and evidential markers, but 
Ahmadinejad only uses about two thirds of their figures.  
 
5) Shared evidentials rank first in the cases of Ahmadinejad and Blair, while inside 




6) Besides the similarities in top-ten markers of modal and evidentials, each speaker 
also has his own preferences. 
 
7) The modals co-occurring with evidentials among the three cases take up 10% on 
average when compared with their total numbers in the data, while the evidentials 
co-occurring with modals among the three cases take up 42% on average. 
 
8) Evidentials inferred from indirect sources especially personal knowledge (P.K. 
evidentials, with around 66% on average), co-occur far more frequently with 
modals than those evidentials from direct sources (P.P. and S.P. evidentials).  
 
The qualitative results show that:  
1) The cognitive linguistic perspective of studying modality and evidentiality can help 
reveal the speaker’s conceptualization processes in discourse production, 
particularly in terms of the three different levels of epistemic, deontic and volitional 
distance to the centre of certainty, necessity and willingness.  
 
2) The functional linguistic perspective helps investigate the strategic functions of 
modal markers and evidentials in different contexts through the three levels of 
modal values.  
 
3) The three speakers’ choices of modals and evidentials reflect their distinctive 
ideology and rhetorical styles.  
 
4) The modals of high value and shared or inside evidentials are often used in the 
legitimisation of the speaker’s own views or proposals (‘positive 
self-representation’), while some modals of low value and hearsay evidentials can 





5) Modality functions as three different types of stance-taking acts and encodes 
ideology with regard to knowledge, value and emotions respectively. 
 
6) The same modal marker indicates different semantic meanings and various degrees 
of force according to different contexts.  
 
7) The adoption of different sources of evidence reveals the speakers’ corresponding 
commitments/responsibility toward their stance and marks the subjectivity or 
intersubjectivity of their stance.  
 
8) Some types of evidentials reflect the speaker’s ideology as they encode their 
presuppositions of authorities, facts or shared knowledge. 
 
9) Evidentiality has a closer relationship with epistemic modality than the other types 
of modality. 
 
10) Five most typical patterns between the co-occurrence of modality and 
evidentiality have been identified at the sentential level: Evidentials as SOURCE 
of Evidence for modal stance; epistemic modality as PART of evidentials; a 
concessive relation; a conditional relation; a coordinative or progressive relation. 
At the discourse level, evidentials often provide evidence for the modal stance in 
the context, and work with modal stance to legitimise the speaker’s proposals in 
the context. 
 
In summary, the major contributions of this thesis include: reclassifications of 
modality and evidentiality; a systemic analytical framework of studying modality; a 
novel coding system of annotating data, a comparative quantitative study of modality 
and evidentiality among the three cases; new functions of modality and evidentiality; 





Limitations and Future Research  
Modality is a very complicated domain, just as Nuyts puts it:  
‘Modality’ is one of the ‘golden oldies’ among the basic notions in the semantic 
analysis of language. But in spite of this, it also remains one of the most 
problematic and controversial notions: there is no consensus on how to define and 
characterize it, let alone on how to apply definitions in the empirical analysis of 
data.  (Nuyts, 2010:5) 
 
Indeed, due to its complexity and controversy, there are certainly some inevitable 
limitations in this thesis, which need to be improved in the future research. In what 
follows, some specific issues relating to modality and evidentiality will be discussed, 
which might be of interest to the researchers in this field and shed some light on the 
trends for future studies.  
 
Forms, meanings and functions of modality 
This thesis has examined four forms (including modal verbs, semi-modals, modal 
adjectives, and modal adverbs), and three functions (including expressing stance, 
reflecting ideology and (de)legitimising propositions) of three types of modality 
(including epistemic modality, deontic modality and volitional modality).  
 
Some modal forms and functions have not been taken into account in this thesis. First 
of all, modality also contributes to the establishment of the speaker’s identity, 
According to Fairclough, ‘what people commit themselves to in texts is an important 
part of how they identify themselves, the texturing of identities’ (2003:164). He then 
argues that ‘[M]odality is important in the texturing of identities, both personal 
(‘personalities’) and social, in the sense that what you commit yourself to is a 
significant part of what you are - so modality choices in texts can be seen as part of 
the process of texturing self-identity’ (Fairclough 2003:166). For example, former UK 
Prime Minister Tony Blair makes a number of categorical, authoritative assertions in 
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responding to a question about the European Union and its new currency – the euro 
(e.g. ‘it is essential…not to end up walking away’, ‘there’s no future in that for 
Britain’, ‘it would be the biggest failure of leadership imaginable’), in which he 
establishes his identity of authoritativeness through modality (indicating the degree of 
assertiveness) (Fairclough 2000a:100). For another example, Stubbs claims that the 
language of modality functions to ‘express group membership’ (equivalent to group 
identity, my emphasis), as ‘speakers adopt positions, express agreement and 
disagreement with others, make personal and social allegiances and contracts’ (1996: 
202). In addition, Benwell and Stokoe (2006:112) argue that modality has particular 
relevance for ‘representations of identity and interpersonal relationships’. This 
function of modality is worth investigating further in political discourse in future 
study.   
 
Secondly, in addition to the four basic forms of modality examined in this thesis, other 
forms or structures may also encode modal meanings, such as conditionals, 
propositional attitude verbs and adjectives, inﬁnitives, and covert modality (Portner 
2009:2-3).  
 
Last but not least, the functions of some special modal forms or structures have not 
been explored thoroughly, such as the functions of dynamic modality, negative modals, 
modals in questions, double modals and modals in conditionals. All of them can be 
interesting topics in future research.  
 
The interaction between modality and time 
This thesis proposed that modality can be studied from three dimensions: space, time 
and evidentiality. However, its focus is more on the dimensions of space and 
evidentiality. As a matter of fact, time is also conceptualized in terms of distance 
(space), particularly for epistemic distance. This is not examined thoroughly in the 
qualitative analysis of data. For future research, the interaction of modality and time 
could be further investigated in political discourse analysis. For example, it would be 
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interesting to do a contrast study between the functions of modal forms of the present 
tense with their past tense in discourse studies.    
 
Can the analytical framework of studying modality and evidentiality be applied 
elsewhere? 
The analytical framework in this thesis is designed to analyse modality and 
evidentiality in political discourse from a cognitive-functional perspective. It can also 
be applied in other discourse genres and materials. The value of modality, distance of 
modality and strength of evidence may be similar in other types of discourse. 
However, the functions of modality may vary in different contexts. For example, 
modals in daily conversations often function as requesting in terms of speech acts. For 
another example, modals in academic discourse are usually treated as hedgings 
(Itakura 2013). So it might be interesting to see new functions of modality to be 
identified in different discourse genres. It would also be interesting to see the results 
of investigating modality in other languages with the framework or some concepts 
from it.  
  
Can the classification of evidentiality be used elsewhere?  
The classification of evidentiality in this thesis is based on English language. So it is 
also useful in other types of English discourse, such as media discourse, academic 
discourse, racial discourse, and many others. In particular, those studies aiming to 
explore its functions of persuasion or manipulation should be of special interest in this 
classification. For example, it should be interesting to study the types of evidentiality 
and their functions in courtroom discourse or religious discourse as both of them 
involve the purpose of persuasion or manipulation.   
 
For other languages which have similar or different grammar systems, this 
classification can also shed some light for their studies, especially for the idea of three 
different sources and the strength of evidence. Besides, it would be significant to do a 
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Table A1 The Distribution of Epistemic Modal Markers in Blair’s speeches 
 
    No. 
Forms 













must 5 would 58 could 19    
297 will 116 should 4 might 6   
shall 4 can 74     
  may 11     
be to 6 be able to 5     15 
be going to 4       
certain 2 capable 1 possible 11   19 
sure 3 probable 0     
  likely 2     





  wouldn’t 4 couldn’t 3 will not 8  
 
37 
  may not 2 might not 
 
0 can’t 20 




9       be not 
going to 
1 




  unlikely 1     
Sub-total 0  7  7  38 52 





























Table A2 The Distribution of Epistemic Modal Markers in Obama’s speeches 
 



















must 3 would 31 could 28    
373 will 148 should 2 might 5   
shall 4 can 136     
  may 16     
be to 1       21 
be going 
to 
11 be able to 9     
certain 2 capable 1 possible 12   20 
sure 2 probable 0     
  likely 3     





  wouldn’t 6 couldn’t 4 will not 13  
59   may not 4 might not 
 
1 can’t 31 
        
      be not 
able to  
3 3 
  Improba 
-ble 
2 uncertain 2 Impossi
-ble 
1 5 
  unlikely 0     
Sub-total 0  12  7  49 68 






Table A3 The Distribution of Epistemic Modal Markers in Ahmadinejad’s 
speeches 
 



















must 1 would 25 could 13    
 
166 
will 75 should 0 might 0   
shall 4 can 42     
  may 6     
be to 0       10 
be going 
to 
0 be able to 10     
certain 0 capable 0 possible 13   16 
sure 2 probable 1     
  likely 0     





  wouldn’t 5 couldn’t 2 will not 7  
 
22 
  may not 0 might not 
 
0 can’t 8 





0 uncertain 0 impossibl
e 
9 10 
  unlikely 1     
Sub-total 0  6  2  31 39 
Total 
 





Table A4 The Distribution of Deontic Modal Markers in Blair’s speeches 
 
    No. 
Forms 














must 34 should 39     78 
 shall 2 can 3     
have (got) 
to 
29 be supposed to  
 
1 be allowed 
to 
4    
 
72 need to 34       
be to 3       
be required 
to 
1       
obliged 0 responsible 3     13 
necessary 10       





  shouldn’t 7 couldn’t 0 mustn’t 2  
 
22 
  can’t 10   can’t 3 
  may not 0     
  ought not to 0     
    not have to 4   5 
    not need to 1   
  irresponsible 1 unnecessary 4   5 
Sub-total 0  18  10  5 33 








Table A5 The Distribution of Deontic Modal Markers in Obama’s speeches 
 
  No. 
Forms 
















must 32 should 31     76 
shall 3 can 10     
have (got) 
to 
34 be supposed 
to  
0      
 
57 need to 22       
be to 1   be allowed 
to 
0   
be required 
to 
0       
obliged 0       9 
necessary 7 responsible 2     





  shouldn’t 8   mustn’t 6  
27   can’t 8   can’t 1 
  ought not to 1   may not 1 
      couldn’t 2 





    not need to 2   
  irresponsible 0 unnecessary 2   2 
Sub-total 0  19  5  11 35 




Table A6 The Distribution of Deontic Modal Markers in Ahmadinejad’s speeches 
 
  No. 
Forms 
















must 39 should 38 could 1   93 
shall 7 can 8     
have to 2 be supposed 
to  
0      
 
13 have got to 0       
need to 7       
be to 0   be allowed 
to 
3   
be required 
to 
1       
obliged 2       15 
necessary 6 responsible 7     





  shouldn’t 6   couldn’t 1  
12 
 
  can’t 5     
  may not 0     
  ought not to 0     





    not need to 0   
  irresponsible 0 unnecessary 1   1 
Sub-total 0  11  1  7 19 
Total 71 78 5 7 161 
Appendix 
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Table A7 The Distribution of Volitional Modal Markers in Blair’s speeches 
 























will 60 would 16 might 0    
82 shall 4 may 1     
  should 1     
be to 5 intend to 2 be willing 
to 
 
2    
 
52 




3       
  anxious 1     1 





  wouldn’t 0   will not 12 12 





0 be not 
going to 
1 2 
  not want 
to 
1     
Sub-total 0  1  0  13 14 








Table A8 The Distribution of Volitional Modal Markers in Obama’s speeches 
 























will 54 would 14 might 1    
74 shall 1 may 4     
  should 0     
be to 1   be willing 
to 
7    
61 




0 want to 40     
  anxious 2     2 





  wouldn’t 2   will not 9 11 





0    
0 
  not want 
to 
0     
Sub-total 0  2  0  9 11 
Total  
 








Table A9 The Distribution of Volitional Modal Markers in Ahmadinejad’s 
speeches 
 























will 12 would 16 might 0    
35 shall 3 may 4     
  should 0     
be to 1   be willing to 0    




2 want to 15     
  anxious 0     0 





  wouldn’t 2   will not 2 4 
  not intend 
to 
1 be unwilling 
to 
0    
4 
  not want 
to 
3     
Sub-total 0  6  0  2 8 
T
Total  

































Analysis/ figures show 5/1 
according to the relevant 













People say/ Some say 2/1 
They say 2 
He thought 1 
There are suggestions  1 
It has been claimed 1 













We see/We’ve seen/ UK 
has seen 
1/1/1 
It was (has been) clear 
that/clearly 
2/1 












in fact  6 
We know 10 
You know 9 
There’s no doubt that 1 
We have learned 2 
We believe 1 












I see 1 
I heard 4 
I feel 1 









I know 12 
I am convinced 1 
I’ve learned 2 
I am aware that 2 
I have no doubt  2 
I believe 18 
I think 2 
I am confident 2 




























Reports suggest 2 









they understood 2 
Some think 2 












We’ve seen/ we saw 4/2 
We are seeing 2 
We’ve heard 2 
seem 3 









in fact  4 
We know 12 
You know 4 
Everyone here knows 2 
There’s no doubt that 2 















I saw 2 
I have seen 4 
I heard/ hear 2/2 








I know 17 
I realized 2 
I learned 1 
I believe 13 
I have no doubt that 1 
I’m confident 3 
I think 2 
I understand 2 





































According to article 4 and 6 1 






It is (was) said that 4 
 They say  1 
It is proposed/announced 
/suggested that 
2/1/1 













You see / you can see 1/1 
We can see/we’ve seen 3/1 
You’ve heard  2 
You are witnessing  1 
It is clear that/clearly 6/7 
Apparently 2 








in fact /as a matter of fact 9/3 
We know 3 
You know /Everyone 
knows 
5/1 




There’s no doubt that 2 
It is evident 3 
you and I believe 1 



















I know 1 
I have no doubt 3 
I believe 3 
I think/ I guess 1/1 
In my opinion 1 
Sub-total 10 
Sub-total 10 
Total 103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
